Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Softrock Geological Services, Inc.
The issue this case presented to the Colorado Supreme Court was whether an individual was an independent contractor as opposed to an employee for unemployment tax liability purposes. Waterman Ormsby was a geologist contracted to work on a project basis for Softrock Geological Services, Inc. In 2011, the Division of Employment and Training audited Softrock and issued a notice of liability on grounds that Softrock should have treated Ormsby as an employee for Colorado Employment Security Act (CESA) purposes. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that whether an individual was "customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business related to the service performed" was a question of fact. Whether the individual worked for another was not dispositive of whether the individual was engaged in an independent business. The Court disagreed with the appellate court, however, that whether an individual was engaged in an independent trade or business could be determined by applying a nine-factor test to create a presumption of an independent contractor relationship under statute. Instead, the Court held that the determination must be based on a totality of the circumstances test that evaluates the dynamics of the relationship between the putative employee and the employer. The factors listed in the statute might be relevant to that determination, but the statute does not provide an exhaustive list of factors to be considered. The case was remanded to the appellate court to return the case to the Industrial Claim Appeals office for further proceedings.
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Rodgers v. Neb. State Fair
In 2009, Appellant suffered injuries to both of his knees in a work-related accident. Appellant filed a request for loss of earning compensation. The Workers’ Compensation Court concluded that, notwithstanding findings of permanent impairment, because no permanent physical restrictions were specifically assigned by an expert for Appellant’s left knee, the court could not perform a loss of earning capacity calculation authorized under the third paragraph of Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-121(3) and that Appellant was thus limited to scheduled member compensation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the compensation court erred as a matter of law in concluding that there must be expert opinion of permanent physical restrictions as to each injured member in order to perform a loss of earning capacity calculation under section 48-121(3). Remanded. View "Rodgers v. Neb. State Fair" on Justia Law
Perez v. Loren Cook Co.
The Secretary petitioned for review of OSHA's order approving without comment an underlying ALJ's decision that addressed competing interpretations of a Department of Labor safety regulation, 29 U.S.C. 1910.212(a)(1). The Secretary determined that the regulation requires lathes such as those used by Loren Cook to have guards to protect workers from ejected workpieces. The court concluded that the Secretary's interpretation of the regulation in this matter was reasonable and well supported by the plain meaning of the regulation's text. Pursuant to Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, the court deferred to the Secretary's interpretation rather than the Commission. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, reversed the order of the Commission, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Perez v. Loren Cook Co." on Justia Law
State ex rel. Bailey v. Indus. Comm’n
Between 1996 and 2003, Appellant filed several workers’ compensation claims, which were allowed for certain conditions. Appellant subsequently filed two applications for permanent-total-disability compensation. The Industrial Commission denied the applications, relying in part on the report of Dr. Lee Howard, a psychologist, who determined that Appellant could perform work without significant limitations. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the Commission abused its discretion when it relied on Dr. Howard’s report because the report was stale. The court of appeals denied the writ, determining that Dr. Howard’s report was relevant evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it relied on Dr. Howard’s report in denying permanent-total-disability compensation. View "State ex rel. Bailey v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Sheppard v. Indus. Comm’n
Robert Sheppard was injured while working for Employer. After Sheppard retired, he filed an application for permanent-total-disability (PTD) compensation, which a staff hearing officer granted. Employer filed a request for reconsideration on the basis that the staff hearing officer’s order contained mistakes of fact and law. After a hearing, the Industrial Commission issued an order confirming that the staff hearing officer’s order contained a clear mistake of law and denying the underlying request for PTD compensation. Sheppard filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Commission abused its discretion when it exercised continuing jurisdiction and denied PTD compensation. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding (1) the staff hearing officer’s mistake of law was sufficient for the Commission to invoke its continuing jurisdiction; and (2) once the Commission properly invoked its continuing jurisdiction, it had authority to reconsider the issue of PTD compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the staff hearing officer made a mistake of law justifying the exercise of continuing jurisdiction; and (2) the Commission’s continuing jurisdiction vested it with authority to issue a new order denying PTD compensation. View "State ex rel. Sheppard v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n
Robert Corlew was an employee of Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc. when he was injured while working. Honda’s long-term-disability insurance carrier eventually determined that Corlew was not eligible for ongoing disability benefits because he was capable of gainful employment outside of Honda. Corlew subsequently retired because there was no position available at Honda. One year later, Corlew underwent surgery on his wrist. The Industrial Commission awarded temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation to be paid during Corlew’s postsurgical recovery, concluding that Corlew had not voluntarily retired or abandoned the workforce. The court of appeals denied Honda’s request for a writ of mandamus, concluding that Corlew’s retirement was due to his industrial injury, and thus was involuntary, and that there was no evidence that Corlew had abandoned the entire workforce. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Corlew was eligible for TTD compensation even though he suffered no economic loss that could be directly attributed to his industrial injury. View "State ex rel. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law
AFSCME, Council 81, Registered Nurses Unit, Local 2305 v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs.
Petitioner worked as a charge nurse at a facility of the State’s Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS). After an incident with a patient who later died, DHSS concluded that Petitioner should be dismissed for patient neglect, failure to perform a thorough assessment of the patient’s condition, and unprofessional and unacceptable behavior. Petitioner’s employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between a union and HDSS. After arbitration as prescribed by the CBA, the arbitrator concluded there was just cause for Petitioner’s dismissal. Petitioner brought this action challenging the arbitrator’s decision. The Court of Chancery granted summary judgment in favor of DHSS, holding that the arbitrator (1) correctly held DHSS to its burden to demonstrate good cause for termination in reaching his decision; (2) applied the correct standard of care as to the definition of “neglect”; and (3) necessarily rejected Petitioner’s effort to obtain back pay. View "AFSCME, Council 81, Registered Nurses Unit, Local 2305 v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs." on Justia Law
Church Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dardar
The question before the Supreme Court was whether La. R.S. 23:1203.1 applied to requests for medical treatment and/or disputes arising out of requests for medical treatment in cases in which the compensable accident or injury occurred prior to the effective date of the medical treatment schedule. The Office of Workers’ Compensation (OWC) ruled that the medical treatment schedule applied to all requests for medical treatment submitted after its effective date, regardless of the date of injury or accident. The court of appeal reversed, holding that La. R.S. 23:1203.1 was substantive in nature and could not be applied retroactively to rights acquired by a claimant whose work-related accident antedated the promulgation of the medical treatment schedule. The Supreme Court disagreed with the conclusion of the court of appeal and found that La. R.S. 23:1203.1 was a procedural statute and, thus, did not operate retroactively to divest a claimant of vested rights. As a result, the statute applied to all requests for medical treatment and/or all disputes emanating from requests for medical treatment after the effective date of the medical treatment schedule, regardless of the date of the work-related injury or accident.
View "Church Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dardar" on Justia Law
Cook v. Family Care Services, Inc.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider whether La. R.S. 23:1203.1 applied to a dispute arising out of a request for medical treatment where the request for treatment was submitted after the effective date of the statute and the medical treatment schedule, but the compensable accident and injury that necessitated the request occurred prior to that date. Both the Office of Workers’ Compensation (OWC) and the court of appeal ruled that La. R.S. 23:1203.1 applied to all requests for medical treatment submitted after the statute’s effective date, regardless of the date of accident and injury. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cook v. Family Care Services, Inc." on Justia Law
Appeal of Town of North Hampton
The Town of North Hampton appealed the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board's (PELRB) finding that the Town engaged in unfair labor practices in dealing with respondent North Hampton Professional Fire Fighters, Local 3211, IAFF (Union). The CBA contained wage scales for firefighters and lieutenants, respectively, each consisting of five steps. It provided that "[m]ovement through [the] steps is dependent on achieving certain professional certifications." During bargaining over the CBA, the Union submitted a wage proposal that provided for, among other things, a "[s]tipend for paramedic level EMT [that] will be 5% over actual step (base pay) whether hired as or a current employee has received the certification." The Town rejected the proposal and the parties put the paramedic program issue on hold. The Town remained interested in a paramedic program, however, and the Union informed the Town in June 2011 that it was willing to resume negotiations over the program. The Town responded that a vacancy on the selectboard was delaying the process. Nevertheless, in August 2011, the Town adopted a paramedic program that was not produced through bargaining with the Union. The program established a wage schedule and conditions of employment similar to those previously proposed by the Union and rejected by the Town. On appeal, the Town argued that the PELRB erred in: (1) finding that the Town was required to bargain over its paramedic program when the adoption of that program was within the Town’s "managerial prerogative"; (2) finding that the Town had previously created a paramedic program; (3) finding that the Town was required to bargain over the wages, hours, and working conditions of a position before the parties agreed to, and the PELRB ordered, the inclusion of that position in a bargaining unit; and (4) finding, on insufficient evidence, that the Town violated its duty to bargain and/or was motivated by anti-union animus. The Supreme Court concluded the Town failed to demonstrate that the PELRB made an erroneous ruling of law or to demonstrate, by a clear preponderance of the evidence, that its order was unjust or unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court declined to set aside the PELRB’s decision. View "Appeal of Town of North Hampton " on Justia Law