Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Pontiac has experienced significant economic difficulties. In 2011 Michigan’s Governor appointed Schimmel as Pontiac’s emergency manager under then-existing law (Public Act 4), in 2011, Schimmel modified the collective bargaining agreements of retired city employees and severance benefits, including pension benefits, for retirees not covered by collective bargaining agreements. Retired employees sued under the Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Bankruptcy Clause. The district court denied an injunction. In 2013, the Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for expedited consideration of state law issues. Michigan voters later rejected Public Act 4 by referendum. Following rehearing, en banc, the Sixth Circuit again vacated and remanded for consideration of whether, under section 903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, Public Act 4 prescribed a method of composition of indebtedness that binds the retirees without their consent and, if so, whether principles of state sovereignty preclude application of section 903(1) in this case; whether the emergency manager’s orders were legislative acts under the Contract Clause; whether the reductions and eliminations of health care benefits were “necessary and reasonable” under the Contract Clause; whether the retirees’ procedural due process claim is viable; and, assuming the Due Process Clause’s procedural protections apply, whether the collective bargaining agreements, considered in their entireties, establish protected property rights. View "City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass'n v. Schimmel" on Justia Law

An Alaska state trooper was discharged for having consensual sex with a domestic violence victim the morning after assisting in the arrest of the victim's husband. The Public Safety Employees Association (PSEA) filed a grievance under its collective bargaining agreement with the State. An arbitrator ordered that the trooper be reinstated with back pay after a three-day suspension, concluding that the State did not have just cause to discharge the trooper. The superior court upheld the arbitrator's order of back pay but decided that it could not enforce the ordered reinstatement because the Alaska Police Standards Council had by this point revoked the trooper's police certificate. The State appealed, arguing that the arbitrator committed gross error and that the order was unenforceable as a violation of public policy. The Supreme Court "generally will not disturb the results of a binding arbitration, even where [it] would reach a different conclusion were we to review the matter independently." The Court reasoned that because no statute, regulation, or written policy prohibited supervisors from engaging in progressive discipline of the trooper, in lieu of discharging him for his misconduct, the arbitrator's decision to impose discipline rather than uphold the termination did not violate any explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy. Because the arbitrator's award was neither unenforceable nor grossly erroneous, the Court affirmed the superior court's decision to uphold the arbitration award in part. View "Alaska v. Public Safety Employees Association" on Justia Law

Roger Frith appealed a district court judgment affirming an order of Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") denying him medical benefits. In September 2010, Frith filed a claim for a work injury, alleging that on August 18th or 19th he hurt his back at work while lifting and moving a large desk backwards up some stairs. Frith was working for DMI Industries. In June 2011, WSI denied Frith's claim for benefits, concluding he had not proven that his condition was causally related to a work injury or that his work activities substantially accelerated the progression or substantially worsened the severity of his preexisting spine condition. WSI found the medical records reflected a pre-existing condition which exhibited symptoms well before Frith alleged he injured his back at work. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding a reasoning mind could have reasonably concluded Frith failed to show his work activities substantially accelerated the progression or substantially worsened the severity of a preexisting condition. View "Frith v. WSI" on Justia Law

This case arose out of dispute over the administration of a workers’ compensation self-insurance plan (“Plan”) administered by Herkimer County. Dozens of municipalities participated in the Plan, including the Village of Herkimer. In 2005, the County passed a resolution to terminate the plan. To ensure funding for outstanding workers’ compensation claims, the County created an Abandonment Plan that allowed municipalities to withdraw from the plan and pay a lump sum withdrawal fee. Several of the participating municipalities, including the Village, filed an action challenging the Plan and Abandonment Plan based on alleged mismanagement by the County. The County counterclaimed for breach of contract, seeking to recover the withdrawal liability. The County prevailed on summary judgment as to the liability on its counterclaim for breach of contract against the Village. After a trial on damages, the jury awarded the full amount of damages sought by the County against the Village. The Appellate Division affirmed the damages award. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding that the fee for the Village’s withdrawal from the Plan reflected benefits to be paid in the future and therefore should have been discounted to its current value as of the date it was due. View "Village of Ilion v. County of Herkimer" on Justia Law

Workforce Safety and Insurance appealed a district court judgment affirming an administrative law judge's order finding William Snook and other similarly situated welders were independent contractors. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the ALJ's findings of fact were supported by a preponderance of the evidence and the conclusions of law were supported by those facts. View "WSI v. Larry's On Site Welding" on Justia Law

Dennis Whedbee appealed a district court judgment affirming Workforce Safety and Insurance's ("WSI") binding dispute resolution denying Whedbee's request for a myoelectric prosthesis and approving a body-powered prosthesis. Whedbee argued the binding dispute resolution was an abuse of discretion and violated his due process rights. He argued that WSI should have selected an independent medical examiner located closer to his residence and that his treating physician's opinion should have been given controlling weight. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Whedbee v. WSI" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Montgomery County Council adopted Resolution No. 17-149 (Resolution), which “changed” three contract provisions for fiscal year 2012 in the pre-existing collectively-bargained agreement (CBA) with members of the County’s police force. Specifically, the Resolution changed certain employment benefits of the CBA. The Fraternal Order of the Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35 filed suit against the County and the Council, challenging the legality of the Council’s actions in adopting the Resolution and the actions of the Council and the County in implementing the changes in the resolution. The circuit court declared that the Council’s actions were permissible under the Police Labor Relations Act (PLRA), the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and the CBA. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Council acted within its authority under the PLRA in deciding not to fund fully - and thereby, to change - certain benefits in the CBA, where the changes were fiscal in nature and the County Executive and the FOP did not submit a re-negotiated agreement to the Council. View "Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 35 v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

Respondent Town of Brookline appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB), based upon stipulated facts and exhibits, which found that the Town engaged in an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the petitioner, AFSCME, Council 93 (Union). On appeal, the Town argued that the PELRB erred by ruling that the Town had a duty to bargain with the Union even though the bargaining unit in question, originally certified in 2001, currently contains fewer than ten employees. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Town of Brookline" on Justia Law

Wisconsin’s Act 10 significantly changed Wisconsin public‐sector labor law: it prohibited government employers from collectively bargaining with their general employees (not public safety employees) over anything except base wages and precluded general‐employee unions from using automatic payroll deductions and fair‐share agreements. Act 10 mandated that general‐employee unions submit to a recertification election every year (instead of remaining certified indefinitely) and certification requires affirmative votes from an absolute majority of the bargaining unit, not just those voting. Public‐employee unions and an individual union member sued, claiming that these changes infringe their First Amendment petition and association rights and deny union members the equal protection of the laws. The district court rejected the challenges. The Seventh Circuit, having previously held that Act 10’s prohibition on payroll deductions did not violate the First Amendment and that Act 10’s distinction between public safety and general employees was viewpoint‐neutral, affirmed. The court concluded that the law does not implicate the First Amendment and applied rational basis review. Its limitations on the scope of statutory collective bargaining are rationally related to a legitimate government interest: promoting flexibility in state and local government budgets by providing public employers more leverage in negotiations. View "Laborers Local 236, AFLO-CIO v. Walker" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured when he fell from a ladder as he was working on a billboard in the course and scope of his employment with Employer. Appellant sought an award for violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), alleging that Employer had violated several safety rules, resulting in his injury. The Industrial Commission denied the award. Appellant subsequently filed an action in mandamus in the court of appeals, requesting that the Commission be ordered to grant him the VSSR award. The magistrate of the court of appeals and a three-judge panel determined that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying the award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission (1) properly considered evidence of the industry standards in determining whether Appellant’s ladder and harness equipment complied with the law; (2) correctly concluded that a hook ladder, when properly secured, can be part of a billboard structure; and (3) properly considered Appellant’s negligence in deciding to deny a VSSR award. View "State ex rel. Richmond v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law