Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Ponderay Police Department Officer Michael Watkins injured his knee while chasing a suspect. Because Watkins was injured during the performance of his duties as a police officer, he was eligible to receive his full base salary during the period of his disability under the Peace Officer and Detention Officer Temporary Disability Act. Rather than receive payments under the Act, Watkins accepted worker’s compensation benefits from the Idaho State Insurance Fund. Nearly a year later, Watkins filed a complaint against the City of Ponderay seeking payment of his full base salary. The Commission fashioned a remedy which required the City to pay Watkins his full base salary, but reduced that amount by the worker’s compensation payments Watkins had already received. Watkins appealed, arguing the Commission failed to follow the Act and exceeded its authority by ordering that the City receive a credit for benefits Watkins received. Finding the Commission erred in ordering the City receive a credit for the worker's compensation benefits, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed. View "Watkins v. City of Ponderay" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss Petitioner's petition for judicial review of a decision of a hearing examiner with the Fire and Police Employees' Retirement System for the City of Baltimore denying Petitioner's request for line-of-duty disability retirement, holding that the petition was untimely.Petitioner, a police officer, sustained an injury during a car accident that occurred while he was responding to an emergency call. A copy of the hearing examiner's decision denying line-of-duty disability retirement but granting him non-line-of-duty disability retirement. At issue was whether former Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera's administrative tolling order issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic applied to Defendant's case. The circuit court concluded that the extension applied only to deadlines that were tolled during the closure of the clerks' offices between March 16, 2020 and July 20, 2020. The appellate court certified the question of whether the fifteen-day extension applied to all cases whose statute of limitations and deadlines related to initiation expired between those dates. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding that the fifteen-day extension under the administrative tolling orders applied only to cases with deadlines that were suspended during the closure of the clerks' offices between the relevant dates. View "In re Hosein" on Justia Law

While at his job as a correctional officer at the Lancaster State Prison in August 2002, respondent Michael Ayala was severely injured in a preplanned attack by inmates. He filed a workers’ compensation claim and alleged that the injury was caused by the serious and willful misconduct of his employer, petitioner California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Such an allegation was significant because Labor Code section 4553 provided that “[t]he amount of compensation otherwise recoverable shall be increased one-half . . . where the employee is injured by reason of serious and willful misconduct” by the employer. Ayala and CDCR agreed that the injury caused Ayala 85 percent permanent disability, but they could not agree whether CDCR engaged in serious and willful misconduct. Over a dissent, a Board majority found that CDCR “failed to act on a credible threat of inmate violence that was specifically reported to be planned for the day of the attack and took the facility off lockdown despite this threat even though it possessed additional information . . . that this had long been planned.” Ayala contended that, for the period before his permanent disability, his base compensation was his full salary. He was paid his full salary because he was on industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave, which were alternatives to temporary disability. CDCR contended the base compensation was only what Ayala would have been entitled to on temporary disability. Assuming that Ayala would have been entitled to temporary total disability, the base compensation would have been two-thirds of his salary, subject to statutory limits. The workers’ compensation judge agreed with CDCR and found that the base compensation was what Ayala would have been paid in temporary disability. But on reconsideration, the Board again rescinded and reversed the workers’ compensation judge’s decision, this time finding that the base compensation was what Ayala was paid on industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave. The Court of Appeal held that industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave were not “compensation” as that term was used in section 4553 and annuled the Board’s contrary decision. View "Cal. Dept. Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd." on Justia Law

Gregory Lowell appealed the Idaho Industrial Commission’s decision affirming the Idaho Department of Labor’s determination that Lowell was ineligible for unemployment benefits because he had been discharged for employee-related misconduct. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission’s decision because Lowell failed to provide a sufficient record or sufficient argument and authority to support his claims. View "Lowell v. Human Dynamics & Diagnostics, PLLC" on Justia Law

Andrew Hennessey appealed a district court order dismissing with prejudice his action against the Milnor School District (“District”). The District employed Hennessey as a teacher for the 2021-2022 school year. In October 2021, the District placed Hennessey on paid administrative leave for immoral conduct and conduct unbecoming his position. The District requested Hennessey sign a resignation letter, which would have immediately terminated his employment, salary, and benefits. He declined to sign the resignation letter and requested an administrative hearing. The District then converted Hennessey’s leave from paid to unpaid leave and recommended his dismissal for cause. Hennessey subsequently signed a severance agreement providing him salary through October 2021 and insurance benefits through December 2021, and waiving his rights to challenge the dismissal. He later learned through an open records request that the District’s legal counsel had advised the District in an email, in part, to convert his leave to unpaid to have “some leverage over this guy.” In December 2022, Hennessey filed this action seeking to rescind the agreement’s release and waiver section to allow him to challenge his dismissal. He claimed the District exerted undue financial pressure on him to secure the waiver of his rights to an administrative hearing and to challenge his termination in district court when it converted his paid leave to unpaid leave. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, finding Hennessey failed to allege facts sufficient to support rescinding a contract for undue influence under N.D.C.C. § 9-09-02. View "Hennessey v. Milnor School District" on Justia Law

In an effort to employ an Australian citizen and E-3 visa-holder, Persian Broadcast filed and received approval for a Labor Condition Application (LCA) through the U.S. Department of Labor (“Department”), first in 2011 and again in 2013. An LCA binds an employer to pay the required wages for the period of authorized employment, and only two exemptions can eliminate an employer’s legal obligations: when an employee is nonproductive for personal reasons or there has been a bona fide termination of the employment relationship. In February 2015, the employee filed an administrative complaint with the Department, arguing that Persian Broadcast failed to pay him the full amount of his wages as specified in the two LCAs.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment upholding an Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) order awarding backpay plus pre-and post-judgment interest to the employee. First, the panel held that the employee’s February 2015 complaint was not time-barred. The ARB reasonably relied on the LCAs rather than the employee’s visa to determine the period of authorized employment and Persian Broadcast’s wage obligations. By failing to pay the employee the reported wage under the second LCA period, Persian Broadcast continued to violate the wage requirement until the LCA period ended on September 12, 2015. Second, the panel held that the employee’s circumstances did not meet either of the statutory exemptions to the LCA wage requirement because, by continuing his reporting work, the employee remained in productive status, and there was never a bona fide termination. View "PERSIAN BROADCAST SERVICE GLOB V. MARTIN WALSH, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s ruling granting Plaintiffs’ petition for a peremptory writ of mandate prohibiting the Board, the Los Angeles County Auditor and the Los Angeles County Chief Executive Officer (CEO) from enforcing the charter amendment. The court held the amendment neither impairs the exercise of essential government functions nor violates state law.the voters of Los Angeles County (County) amended the County charter by enacting Measure J. The charter amendment adopted by Measure J requires the County Board of Supervisors (Board) to annually allocate at least 10 percent of the County’s locally generated unrestricted revenues in the general fund to direct community investment (such as youth programs, job training, rental assistance, and affordable housing) and alternatives to incarceration (including health, mental health, and substance use disorder programs). The charter amendment also specifically prohibits Measure J funds from being allocated to any carceral system or law enforcement agency. Immediately after Measure J’s enactment, a coalition of County employee unions and two individuals filed a petition for a peremptory writ of mandate prohibiting the Board, the Los Angeles County Auditor (auditor), and the Los Angeles County Chief Executive Officer (CEO) from enforcing the charter amendment. The trial court granted the petition.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court wrote that because the charter amendment enacted by Measure J defines a “power of the County’s “governing bod[y]” (the Board)—and because it concerns “[t]he performance of functions required by statute” (adopting a budget)—it is a permissible exercise of the County’s authority to amend its charter. Further, contrary to Plaintiffs' contentions, the amendment neither impairs the exercise of essential government functions nor violates state law. Measure J thus is enforceable, and the court, therefore, reversed the judgment granting the petition for writ of mandate. View "Coalition of County Unions v. L.A. County Bd. of Supervisors" on Justia Law

After serving in the United States Navy, Plaintiff became eligible to receive education benefits under the G.I. Bill, which he used to pursue a bachelor’s degree. Plaintiff also sought tuition assistance from his employer, Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), under the company’s Employee Education Program, but OPPD denied Plaintiff’s request because his G.I. Bill benefits fully covered his tuition expenses. Plaintiff sued, claiming that OPPD’s denial of company-provided tuition assistance based on his receipt of G.I. Bill benefits amounted to unlawful discrimination under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The district court granted summary judgment in OPPD’s favor, and Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff y has “failed to present sufficient evidence to make” the requisite “threshold showing” that his status as a military veteran was “a motivating factor” in OPPD’s decision to deny him EEP benefits. His discrimination claim under USERRA thus fails, and the district court properly granted summary judgment in OPPD’s favor. View "Andrew Kelly v. Omaha Public Power District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal of the judgment of the district court affirming the order of the Nebraska Police Standards Advisory Council denying Appellant admission into the basic officer certification training at the Nebraska Law Enforcement Training Center, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction, and therefore, so did this Court.Appellant sought judicial review of the decision of the Council upholding the denial by the Director of the Training Center of Appellant's application for entrance into basic training for failure to meet the minimum requirements for admission. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Appellant's petition because he failed properly to make the Director a party to the proceedings for review. View "Swicord v. Police Standards Advisory Council" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Air Force veteran, appeals from a decision of the Physical Disability Board of Review (“Board”) declining to increase his disability rating, which would entitle him to greater benefits. The district court rejected Plaintiff’s arguments that the Board was required to conduct a physical examination before making its decision and that its decision was arbitrary and capricious.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that by arguing that he could not be taken off the List or have his temporary 50% rating lowered until the Air Force conducted a physical examination—an examination that necessarily could not occur until years after his retroactive placement on the List—Plaintiff pushes for an interpretation that would effectively grant a retroactive 50% rating for years to all individuals whose disabilities are reviewed by the Board and fall under Section 4.129. But that defies the purpose of the Board: to ensure accurate disability determinations at the time of a member’s discharge, “based on the records of the armed force concerned and such other evidence as may be presented to the” Board. The court, therefore, rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the Board was required to order a new physical examination before making its determination. Ultimately, the court concluded that its decision was supported by substantial evidence, with a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” View "Blair Coleman v. Frank Kendall" on Justia Law