Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Out-of-work residents of Michigan may claim unemployment benefits if they meet certain eligibility criteria. The State’s Unemployment Insurance Agency oversees the benefits system. In 2011, with the help of private contractors, the Agency began to develop software to administer the unemployment system. The Agency sought to equip the software to auto-adjudicate as many parts of the claims process as possible. The Agency programmed software that used logic trees to help process cases and identify fraud. A claimant’s failure to return the fact-finding questionnaire, for example, led to a fraud finding, as did the claimant’s selection of certain multiple-choice responses. In August 2015, problems arose with some features of the system, prompting the Agency to turn off the auto-adjudication feature for fraud claims.Plaintiffs are four individuals who obtained unemployment benefits, which were terminated after the Agency flagged their claims for fraud. Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against three government contractors and nineteen Agency staffers, raising claims under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 26 U.S.C. Sec. 6402(f), and Michigan tort law. In a previous proceeding, the court held that plaintiffs’ due process rights clearly existed because they had alleged a deprivation of their property interests without adequate notice and without an opportunity for a pre-deprivation hearing.At this stage, because the remaining plaintiffs have failed to show that these procedures violate any clearly established law, the supervisors of the unemployment insurance agency are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court also found that an intervening plaintiff was properly prevented from joining the case, based on her untimely filing. View "Patti Cahoo v. SAS Institute, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the administrative law judge (ALJ) that the Department of Workers' Claims had jurisdiction to hear the claim of Roger Hall, who suffered a work-related injury after being exposed to asbestos-containing material while working for the Letcher County Board of Education, that he was permanently and totally disabled and was entitled to medical benefits, holding that there was no error.As to jurisdiction, the Workers' Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ, concluding that nothing in Ky. Rev. Stat. 49.020 prevents an employee with proceeding on a claim against his or her employer pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department of Workers' Claims had jurisdiction over Hall's case. View "Letcher County Bd. of Education v. Hall" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of Federal contractor employees and Federal employees working for the Department of Energy, challenged two Executive Orders, Executive Orders 14,042 and 14,043 (EOs), issued in September 2021. 1 Those EOs mandated COVID-19 vaccination for Federal contractor employees and Federal employees, respectively. They also provided for legally required medical or religious exemptions. Plaintiffs challenged the EOs as ultra vires exercises of presidential power in violation of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (Procurement Act), the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (Procurement Policy Act), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA), the major questions doctrine, and general constitutional federalism constraints. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief to address their allegedly “imminent and wrongful terminations” for failure to comply with the vaccination requirements. The district court held that Plaintiffs who had submitted religious and medical exemptions but who had not yet completed the exemption request process did not have claims ripe for adjudication. The district court then dismissed the operative Second Amended Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim and without leave to amend.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and dismissed as moot in part. The panel concluded that the case was moot as to all non-RFRA claims. The vaccine mandate exemption processes that the Plaintiffs challenged were premised on the revoked EOs. The panel held that it could not provide relief from EOs and exemption processes that no longer exist. Accordingly, no live controversy remained between the parties. The panel further concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims for damages under RFRA were precluded by sovereign immunity. View "DAVID DONOVAN, ET AL V. BRIAN VANCE" on Justia Law

Longmont United Hospital (Longmont) petitioned for a review of the decision of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board), concluding that Longmont violated the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to bargain with the National Nurses Organizing Committee/National Nurses United, AFL-CIO (Union). Longmont does not dispute that it refused to bargain with the Union. Instead, it challenges the representation election whereby a group of registered nurses at Longmont elected the Union as its exclusive collective bargaining representative.   The DC Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement. The court reasoned that Longmont has not shown a basis to disturb the Hearing Officer’s credibility findings. Further, the court held that the Board correctly declined to relitigate issues in the enforcement proceeding that had been decided in the representation proceeding. The Board did not adjudicate the General Counsel’s request for compensatory relief, and, as a result, any challenge to the fact or measure of compensatory damages is premature. View "Longmont United Hospital v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendant, in his capacity as the finance director/treasurer for the Town of Smithfield, in this action challenging the calculation of a former employee's retirement benefits, holding that the court erred in concluding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.Armand Beaudry worked as a firefighter for the Town for several years before he was placed on disability retirement benefits. The retirement benefits were governed by a pension system that constituted "an amalgamation of various documents." The case arose from a dispute over the calculation of Beaudry's benefits. Beaudry filed a complaint challenging the amount. The trial court granted the Town's motion for summary judgment based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the hearing justice erred by finding that a challenged amendment to the plan was enforceable at the time of Beaudry's retirement, thus creating an administrative remedy that Beaudry failed to exhaust. View "Beaudry v. Rossi" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (collectively, the Officers) worked as police officers for the City of Hoover, Alabama. They also served as military reservists. Over a two-decade span, the Officers were summoned to active-duty service a combined thirteen times. While away, Hoover did not provide the Officers the same holiday pay and accrued benefits that it gave employees on paid administrative leave. This disparate treatment prompted the Officers to sue Hoover under USERRA. And it led the district court to grant summary judgment for the Officers. On appeal, Hoover argued that the Officers are not similar to employees placed on paid administrative leave. Second, Hoover asserted that military leave is not comparable to paid administrative leave.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Hoover violated Section 4316(b)(1)(B) by not providing the Officers the same benefits on military leave that it afforded similar employees on paid administrative leave. The court concluded that the DOL’s interpretation of Section 4316(b)(1)(B) deserves deference. Thus, to the extent Congress spoke to the meaning of “status” and “pay,” the legislative history suggests that it did so in a way that defeats Hoover’s interpretation. Further, the court reasoned that had the Officers been placed on paid administrative leave instead of military leave, they would have received holiday pay and accrued benefits for each period of service, including those shorter than sixteen months. So, the district court should have found the two forms of leave comparable in duration. However, the court affirmed because the district court reached the correct conclusion. View "Thaddaeus Myrick, et al v. City of Hoover, Alabama" on Justia Law

The DRBA, a bi-state agency created by an interstate compact between Delaware and New Jersey, hired Minor as its Deputy Executive Director in 2009 and terminated him in 2017. Minor, believing he was fired for his support of then-incoming New Jersey Governor Murphy, sued the DRBA and its Commissioners for violating his First Amendment right to political affiliation. The court rejected the Commissioners’ request for qualified immunity, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Minor’s responsibilities were purely administrative by the time he was dismissed so that the Commissioners were barred potentially by the First Amendment from firing Minor on account of his politics.The Third Circuit vacated. The district court correctly held that the right of certain employees not to be fired based on political affiliation was clearly established. However, there is a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether Minor held such a position. The question of immunity must await the determination of facts at trial. Third Circuit precedent requires the district court to “analyze separately, and state findings with respect to, the specific conduct of each [Commissioner]” to learn more about whether each Commissioner could know that his specific conduct violated clearly established rights. View "Minor v. Delaware River & Bay Authority" on Justia Law

Rodney Dickenson brought a whistleblower case against the Benewah County Sheriff’s Office (“BCSO”), Benewah County Board of Commissioners, and former Benewah County Sheriff, David Resser (collectively, the “County”). BCSO told Dickenson that his employment was being terminated for violating law enforcement policy and ethics. Dickenson alleged his termination violated Idaho’s Whistleblower Act because he was terminated for secretly recording meetings with Sheriff Resser and Undersheriff Anthony Eells to document malfeasance and the illegal activities of some deputies. After unsuccessful attempts at administrative appeals, Dickenson filed a complaint in district court alleging wrongful termination from his employment as a sergeant, in violation of Idaho Code sections 6-2101-2109, “because he communicated in good faith, with reasonable basis in fact, regarding a violation or suspected violation of the law.” The County moved for summary judgment on Dickenson’s complaint, which the district court granted, concluding Dickenson could not show he was fired for engaging in a protected activity. Dickenson appealed, arguing: (1) disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment; (2) the question of causation should have been a question for the jury; and (3) that the district court erred in its interpretation of the Whistleblower Act. The Idaho Supreme Court found that while these three issues were clear from Dickenson's opening brief, the brief included practically no citations to the record to support his claims. Neither the recordings themselves nor a transcript of either meeting was in the record, and the Court was left to divine from Dickenson’s generalized or conclusory statements in his affidavit what was said. "This dilemma alone is not just problematic, but fatal to Dickenson’s position on appeal." The district court concluded that Dickenson did not “provide[] evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact that he was terminated because he engaged in an activity protected by Idaho’s Whistleblower Act, and summary judgment [is] granted to defendants.” The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Dickenson v. Benewah County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff City of Portsmouth, New Hampshire Police Commission/Police Department (the City) appealed a superior court's denial of the City’s request to modify, correct, or vacate an arbitrator’s award of backpay to Aaron Goodwin, a police officer who was previously employed by the City and who was a member of defendant Portsmouth Ranking Officers Association, NEPBA, Local 220 (the Union). The arbitration arose from a grievance filed by the Union challenging Goodwin’s termination. The arbitrator found that the City wrongfully terminated Goodwin and awarded him approximately twenty-six months of backpay. The superior court confirmed the arbitrator’s termination decision and backpay award. On appeal, the City argued the arbitrator committed plain mistake because she failed to correctly apply the after-acquired-evidence doctrine in determining the amount of the backpay award. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with the City that the arbitrator committed a plain mistake of law in reaching the backpay award, it reversed in part, vacated the superior court’s confirmation of the arbitrator’s award, and remanded. View "City of Portsmouth Police Commission/Department v. Portsmouth Ranking Officers Association, NEPBA, Local 220" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) denying Workers' Compensation Division benefits for treatment to Appellant's upper back, neck, and arms, holding that the OAH's determination was supported by the evidence and was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.Eight days after she twisted her back at work Appellant was in a motorcycle accident. The Division concluded that Appellant had suffered a compensable injury to her lumbar spine but denied payments for treatments for cervical spine, carpal tunnel syndrome, and cervical disc degeneration because those conditions were not related to Appellant's work injury. After a contested case hearing, the OAH upheld the decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the OAH's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. View "Vandom v. State, ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division" on Justia Law