Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent injured his back while working, and his employer's workers' compensation insurer, Texas Mutual Insurance Company (TMIC), accepted the injury as compensable. Three years later when it was discovered that Respondent had herniated lumbar intervertebral discs, TMIC disputed whether they were causally related to the original injury. The Texas Department of Insurance Division of Workers' Compensation determined that the disc herniations were related to the original injury and ordered TMIC to pay medical benefits, which it did. Respondent later sued TMIC for damages caused by its delay in paying benefits. The trial court rendered judgment for Respondent, and the court of appeals affirmed. Based on the Court's recent decision in Texas Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ruttiger, the Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment for TMIC. View "Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morris" on Justia Law

This case came before the Supreme Court on Plaintiff's application for direct appellate review of a decision of the superior court affirming a decision of the contributory retirement appeal board. The case required the Court to decide whether the $200 fixed annual compensation threshold set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 3(2)(d) applies to elected officials who are otherwise eligible to become members of the contributory retirement system for public employees and whether health insurance contributions and professional association dues paid on behalf of such an official are to be considered as fixed annual compensation for the purposes of this subsection. The Court affirmed the superior court, holding (1) the $200 threshold applies to "any person," including an elected official, otherwise eligible for membership under chapter 32; and (2) the value of health insurance contributions and association dues does not qualify as fixed annual compensation. View "Rotondi v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd." on Justia Law

Lynch was injured while working at a jobsite as a mechanic for Metropolitan Rail (Metra), when the top rail of a chain-link fence he was installing fell and struck him on the back of his neck and shoulders. In his suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Metra. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that Lynch adequately raised material issues of fact concerning whether Metra was negligent. View "Lynch v. NE Reg'l Commuter R.R.Corp." on Justia Law

The Alabama Department of Corrections ("ADOC"), the Alabama Corrections Institution Finance Authority ("ACIFA"), and Kim Thomas, in his official capacities as the commissioner of ADOC and as ex officio vice president of ACIFA, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its May 2012 order denying their motion seeking a partial summary judgment and requested the court enter a new order granting their motion. In 2010, Albert Wilson, Rufus Barnes, Joseph Danzey, Bryan Gavins, and Donald Simmons, all of whom were employed by ADOC as correctional officers, sued ADOC and its then commissioner Richard Allen alleging that ADOC was violating its own regulations and state law in the manner in which it: (1) compensated correctional officers for overtime; (2) restricted the way correctional officers were allowed to use earned leave; and (3) paid correctional officers the daily subsistence allowance provided by law. The plaintiffs also sought class certification on behalf of all other similarly situated correctional officers employed by ADOC and requested injunctive relief, as well as money damages, to include backpay with interest, punitive damages, and litigation costs and expenses, including attorney fees. Because ADOC and Thomas, in his official capacity as commissioner of ADOC, were entitled to State immunity on those claims, the Court granted the petition as to ADOC and Thomas, in his capacity as commissioner of ADOC, and issued the writ. However, ACIFA and Thomas, in his official capacity as vice president of ACIFA, did not argue that they were entitled to State immunity on the claims asserted against them; rather, they argued that those claims lacked merit. That argument presented an insufficient basis upon which to issue a writ of mandamus, and the Supreme Court therefore denied the petition with regard to the those claims because ACIFA and Thomas had an adequate remedy on appeal. View "Wilson v. Thomas " on Justia Law

Appellant appealed from an opinion of the court of appeals which affirmed an order of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's petition for review of a decision of the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission (KUIC). In addition to denying Appellant unemployment benefits, the KUIC ordered Appellant to reimburse $12,785 in benefit payments he had already received. The circuit court dismissed Appellant's petition for review because it did not comply with the verification requirement contained in Ky. Rev. Stat. 341.450(1), and thus the court concluded that its jurisdiction was not invoked within the twenty-day limitations period provided for filing such an action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant failed to comply with the verification provision of section 341.450(1), the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the controversy; and (2) Appellant did not comply with the verification requirement, as his attorney's signature on the petition did not constitute "certification." View "Taylor v. Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Employee's employment was terminated by Employer after Employee refused to sign an agreement acknowledging her repeated tardiness violated Employer's code of conduct. Employee subsequently filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits, which was denied on grounds that Employee's discharge was for work related misconduct. A referee with the division of unemployment insurance reversed the determination. The unemployment insurance commission reversed the referee's decision, concluding that Employee was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits because she was fired for misconduct. The circuit court affirmed, and the court of appeals reversed the circuit court. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) the commission's conclusion that Employee was not terminated for tardiness but, rather, for refusing to sign the agreement was clearly erroneous; (2) there was substantial evidence to support the commission's finding that Employee was repeatedly tardy; and (3) therefore, pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 341.370(6), the commission did not err in denying unemployment insurance benefits. View "Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Cecil" on Justia Law

Appellant Collette Bishop appealed a district court judgment that affirmed an administrative law judge's order ("ALJ") which affirmed an order of Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") denying further vocational rehabilitation benefits and temporary total disability benefits to Bishop. Upon review, the Supreme Court also affirmed, concluding the ALJ's finding that Bishop was capable of performing the return-to-work options identified in her vocational rehabilitation plan was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Bishop v. No. Dakota Workforce Safety & Ins." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Bridget Smith worked for Rail Link, Inc. (Rail Link) as a freight operator in Wyoming. She was injured on the job, and subsequently sued Rail Link and its corporate parent Genessee & Wyoming, Inc. (GWI) in federal district court, asserting that the companies were liable for her injuries under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). The Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that they were not subject to FELA liability for Plaintiff's injuries because FELA only applies where a defendant is the injured worker's employer and is a common carrier. Rail Link argued it was a not a common carrier, and GWI argued it was neither a common carrier nor Plaintiff's Smith's employer. The district court agreed granted summary judgment for both Defendants. Upon appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: "[t]he concept of employment under FELA is a broad one, but to show an employment relationship a plaintiff still must offer some evidence that physical conduct was or could have been controlled by an alleged employer. The record here is lacking in [that] regard, compelling a ruling in GWI's favor." View "Smith v. Rail Link, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Del Monte Fresh Produce Company decided to cease growing pineapples at its plantation on O'ahu. The company's subsidiary, Del Monte Fresh Produce (Hawaii), Inc, subsequently bargained with the International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 142, with regard to the effects of that decision on Del Monte employees in Hawaii. The Union believed the company was not negotiating in good faith and filed a complaint with the Hawai'i Labor Relations Board alleging that Del Monte had engaged in unfair labor practices. The Hawaii Labor Relations Board (HLRB) entered an order concluding that Del Monte failed to bargain in good faith. The circuit court and intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the HLRB did not clearly err in finding Del Monte engaged in bad faith bargaining, because there was substantial evidence that the totality of Del Monte's conduct did not evince a present intention to find a basis for agreement and a sincere effort to reach common ground. View "Del Monte Fresh Produce (Haw.), Inc. v. Int'l Longshore & Warehouse Union, Local 142" on Justia Law

Petitioners asked the circuit court to declare that the West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board could not impose disability re-certification requirements of an amended statute and new rule upon them. The circuit court determined that Petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and, therefore, dismissed the case. Petitioners appealed, contending the circuit court erred in not reaching the merits of their petition because the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was inapplicable to the facts of their case. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court properly dismissed Petitioners' statute-based claims; but (2) Petitioners' rule-based and letter-based claims were properly before the circuit court. Remanded. View "Hicks v. Mani" on Justia Law