Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Employer terminated Employee's employment after receiving complaints regarding poor service and use of inappropriate language by Employee. The Department of Labor & Industry concluded Employee was not qualified for unemployment insurance benefits because she had been discharged for misconduct. A hearing officer awarded unemployment benefits to Employee, concluding that Employee had not been deliberately rude and thus had not engaged in misconduct. The Board of Labor Appeals affirmed. Employer petitioned for judicial review. The Department and Board filed a notice of non-participation indicating they would not participate in the proceeding but reserved the right to intervene if issues arose pertaining to them. The district court reversed, holding that Employee's conduct as established by the hearing officer's findings of fact constituted misconduct as a matter of law under the carelessness standard of Admin. R. M 24.11.460(1)(d). The Department appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Department did not preserve its evidentiary arguments for appeal; and (2) the district court did not err by determining that the evidence found by the Department constituted misconduct as a matter of law under the carelessness standard. View "Gary & Leo's Fresh Foods v. Dep't of Labor & Indus." on Justia Law

Appellant filed an application for permanent total disability (PTD). The Industrial Commission of Ohio found Appellant was capable of sedentary sustained remunerative employment and denied her request for PTD. Appellant filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion. The court of appeals denied the mandamus action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission's conclusion that Appellant's allowed conditions did not foreclose sustained remunerative employment was not an abuse of discretion; (2) the Commission did not abuse its discretion in failing to view Appellant's rehabilitation efforts favorably; and (3) the Commission did not improperly factor the economic climate into the PTD equation. View "State ex rel. Guthrie v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law

Merwin Carlson appealed a judgment affirming a Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") decision that denied his claim for workers' compensation benefits after remand. Under the law of the underlying case, the Supreme Court held that the administrative law judge ("ALJ") erred in concluding WSI properly exercised its continuing jurisdiction under N.D.C.C.65-05-04 to deny Carlson benefits on remand. The Court reversed and remanded for WSI to award Carlson benefits based on the ALJ's calculation that Carlson's average weekly wage was $722. View "Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this case to determine whether the immunity provisions of Section 23 of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act 44) applied to "subrogation and/or reimbursement claims sought against an employee who has entered into a third[-]party settlement with a Commonwealth [p]arty such as Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ('SEPTA')." Upon review of this matter, the Supreme Court held that the portion of Act 44 at issue in this case barred any claim made by the employer for the recoupment of workers' compensation benefits it paid. View "Fraizer v. W.C.A.B." on Justia Law

An hourly employee who worked part-time while attending college sustained a work-related injury. At issue before the Supreme Court was how to calculate the employee's average weekly wage in order to determine the appropriate vocational rehabilitation priority - using his part-time wages, as the employer contended, or wages calculated using a forty-hour workweek, as the court below ruled. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of the compensation court, holding that under the circumstances of this case, a vocational rehabilitation plan seeking an average weekly wage based on a forty-hour week - the calculation used for purposes of permanent disability - best restored the employee to suitable employment. View "Becerra v. UPS" on Justia Law

In 2002, county voters adopted an amendment to the county charter relating to the resolution by binding arbitration of collective bargaining impasses with the county's law enforcement employees and uniformed firefighters. In 2003, the county council adopted an ordinance implementing that charter provision. In 2011, the county council amended the 2003 ordinance to provide that binding arbitration did not require the council to appropriate funds or enact legislation necessary to implement a final written award in arbitration. An uncodified section of the 2011 council bill also provided that, if any part of the 2011 ordinance were held invalid, the entire county code section enacted by the 2003 ordinance, as amended through the 2011 ordinance, would be deemed repealed by operation of law, with the result that impasses would be addressed by a code section that did not authorize binding arbitration. Petitioners sought a declaratory judgment that the 2011 ordinance violated the 2002 charter amendment. The circuit court held the 2002 charter amendment violated the Maryland Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the 2002 charter amendment bound the county council; and (2) portions of the 2011 ordinance, as well as its uncodified section 3, violated the charter and were invalid. Remanded. View "Atkinson v. Anne Arundel County" on Justia Law

Three certified questions came before the court from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning application of the farm labor contractors act (FLCA), chapter 19.30 RCW. The primary question asked whether a trial court, if awarding statutory damages under the civil remedies provision of the FLCA must award $500 per plaintiff per violation. Upon review, the Washington Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. The second question asked whether requiring a trial court to award $500 per plaintiff per violation violated due process or public policy; the Court answered in the negative, expressly limiting its analysis and holding on this question to state due process principles and statutes. The third question asked whether the FLCA provided for awarding statutory damages to persons who have not been shown to have been aggrieved by a particular violation. "Because our standing jurisprudence tracks that of the United States Supreme Court, we leave to the Ninth Circuit to answer this question based on its standing jurisprudence and the standing jurisprudence of the Supreme Court." View "Perez-Farias v. Global Horizons, Inc." on Justia Law

Bay Mechanical & Electrical Corporation, a specialty mechanical contractor, challenged a sales-tax assessment issued by the tax commissioner with respect to Bay's purchase of allegedly taxable employment services. During the audit period, Bay purchased the services from two entities. Bay treated the personnel supplied by the entities as "permanent-assignment" employees, and therefore regarded the attendant employment services as exempt pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 5739.01(JJ)(3). The commissioner denied the exemption on the ground that the evidence offered by Bay was insufficient to prove entitlement to the exemption. The board of tax appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully when it upheld the tax commissioner's sales-tax assessment against Bay because the contracts and testimony offered by Bay did not satisfy the one-year and permanent-assignment criteria of section 5739.01(JJ)(3). View "Bay Mech. & Elec. Corp. v. Testa" on Justia Law

Respondents William Harris, in his official capacity as president of Alabama State University ("ASU"), and the individual members of ASU's Board of Trustees, in their official capacities as members of the Board, appealed a circuit court's order granting the petition filed by Felisa Owens seeking a writ of mandamus and declaratory relief as a result of the termination of her employment with ASU and awarding Owens full backpay and benefits. Upon review, the Court determined that Respondents were statutorily immune from suit for any claim for monetary damages. Therefore, the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Owens's claim for backpay and benefits. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's order with regard to the backpay issue, but affirmed the lower court in all other respects. View "Harris v. Owens " on Justia Law

An employee filed a request for assistance with the Tennessee Department of Labor after she was injured at her workplace. After approximately six months of inaction by the Department, the employee filed a complaint for workers' compensation benefits against her employer in the circuit court. The employer responded with a motion to dismiss asserting that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the parties had not participated in the benefit review conference process. The trial judge did not dismiss the complaint but ordered the case to be held in abeyance pending further orders of he court. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the employee's complaint with prejudice, holding that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction of the case because the employee did not exhaust the benefit review conference process before filing suit as required by Tenn. Code Ann. 50-6-203. View "Chapman v. Davita, Inc." on Justia Law