Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
Hutson v. SC State Ports Authority
Frank Hutson was working as a crane operator for the State Ports Authority when he suffered an injury to his lower back and legs while attempting to remove a container from a ship. He was diagnosed with a disc bulge for which he was treated with steroid injections, physical therapy, and used a back brace. After reaching maximum medical improvement, he filed a Form 50 with the workers' compensation commission for continued benefits alleging permanent and total disability pursuant to Sections 42-9-10 and 42-9-30 South Carolina Code (1976 & Supp. 2011) or, alternatively, a wage loss under Section 42-9-20. He also asked to receive the award in lump sum. Although the Ports Authority and its insurance carrier, the State Accident Fund (collectively, Respondents), admitted the accident and the back injury, they disputed the claims to his legs and argued he should receive only permanent partial disability benefits. They also objected to Hutson's request that his benefits be paid in a lump sum. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether speculative testimony by the claimant concerning his possible future work as a restaurateur qualified as substantial evidence to establish he did not sustain a wage loss pursuant to Section 42-9-20 of the South Carolina Code (1976). The Court held it did not, and therefore reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.
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Sanchez v. Vilsack
Plaintiff-Appellant Clarice Sanchez, a long-time secretarial employee of the United States Forest Service, suffered irreversible brain damage after falling at work. As a result of her injury, Sanchez lost the left half of her field of vision. She requested a hardship transfer to Albuquerque where she could better access ongoing medical treatment. After the Forest Service declined to accommodate her request, she brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Forest Service, concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit disagreed and held that Plaintiff raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding her disability. On appeal, the Forest Service urged the Court to affirm summary judgment on an alternative ground. However, the Court declined, concluding that transfer accommodations for the purpose of medical treatment or therapy were not unreasonable per se. View "Sanchez v. Vilsack" on Justia Law
Somont Oil Co. v. King
After Employee made allegations about a fellow employee that Employer concluded were patently false, Employee was discharged. Employee applied to the Department of Labor and Industry Unemployment Insurance Division (UID) for unemployment benefits, and the UID determined Employee had not been discharged for misconduct. Employer appealed. The Department of Labor and Industry Hearings Bureau reversed. The Board of Labor Appeals (BOLA) reversed, concluding that Employee's conduct was a good faith error in judgment and that Employer had presented insufficient evidence that Employee acted in willful or wanton or deliberate disregard for the interests of Employer. The District Court found substantial evidence to support BOLA's determination that Employer had not shown misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because BOLA's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, it's legal conclusion that misconduct had not been shown was correct. View "Somont Oil Co. v. King" on Justia Law
Velez v. Comm’r of Labor
Plaintiff filed a complaint with the department of labor against her employer (Employer), alleging a violation of the Connecticut family and medical leave statute, which applies only to employers that employer seventy-five or more employees. Although Employer employed more than 1,000 employees nationwide, the commissioner of labor dismissed the complaint on the ground that the leave statute does not apply to Employer because it does not employ seventy-five or more employees within the state of Connecticut. The trial court sustained Plaintiff's appeal and rendered judgment in Plaintiff's favor, concluding that all employees of a business are to be counted in determining whether the business is an employer under the leave statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section Conn. Agencies Regs. 31-51qq-42, which has the force and effect of a statute, makes clear that only Connecticut employees are to be counted under the leave statute. View "Velez v. Comm'r of Labor" on Justia Law
Zaloudek Grain Co. v. CompSource Oklahoma
Zaloudek Grain Company held a workers' compensation policy with CompSource Oklahoma for approximately ten years prior to 2011. Zaloudek was required each year to provide payroll audit information to CompSource. The audit information was used to determine the proper premium for each year. CompSource sent a notice in late 2010 to Zaloudek requesting audit information. In January, 2011, Zaloudek's policy was renewed for all of 2011 through January 1, 2012. On January 18, 2011, CompSource sent another letter requesting Zaloudek provide the necessary payroll audit information, but Zaloudek was unresponsive. Subsequently, CompSource sent Zaloudek a notification to inform the company that the process of canceling its policy would begin if CompSource did not receive the audit information. The audit information was not provided; CompSource ultimately canceled the policy when Zaloudek ignored several subsequent requests. CompSource issued a refund for payments made under the policy. Later that summer, two teenage workers were seriously injured in the grain auger at Zaloudek's facility. CompSource did not accept the company's new insurance application because it was incomplete and was not signed by an owner of Zaloudek. Zaloudek sued a few weeks following the rejection of its application, asking for a judgment against CompSource for breach of contract and bad faith and further requested declaratory relief in the form of an order requiring CompSource to provide workers' compensation coverage. Zaloudek filed a motion for summary judgment claiming CompSource lacked legal justification for terminating its policy and requested orders to establish there was no lapse in coverage and requiring CompSource to provide coverage for its two injured employees. Zaloudek further requested a finding that CompSource was in breach of contract. CompSource moved for summary judgment, arguing Zaloudek was not covered at the time of the incident and its policy was properly canceled. Zaloudek filed a counter-motion for summary judgment asserting CompSource should be estopped from denying coverage because it retained premiums and acted in a manner toward Zaloudek consistent with continued coverage. The trial court issued an order dismissing Zaloudek's bad faith claim but left pending its claims for breach of contract and declaratory relief. CompSource appealed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that CompSource was authorized to cancel a policy for an insured's failure to participate in the audit. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings on the other contract issues raised. View "Zaloudek Grain Co. v. CompSource Oklahoma" on Justia Law
Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue
Plaintiff-Appellant Pennie Keyes-Zachary appealed a district court order that affirmed the Commissioner's decision denying her applications for Social Security disability and Supplemental Security Income benefits. Plaintiff alleged disability based on, among other things, neck, back, shoulder, elbow, wrist, hand, and knee problems, accompanied by pain; hearing loss; urinary frequency; anger-management problems; depression; and anxiety. The ALJ upheld the denial of her application for benefits. The Appeals Council denied her request for review of the ALJ's decision, and she then appealed to the district court. The district court remanded the case to the ALJ for further consideration. After the second hearing, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained residual functional capacity to perform light work with certain restrictions, but that she was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council declined jurisdiction, and the ALJ's decision was then deemed the Commissioner's final decision. On appeal Plaintiff raised two issues: (1) that the ALJ "failed to properly consider, evaluate and discuss the medical source evidence;" and (2) the ALJ "failed to perform a proper credibility determination." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no error in the ALJ's decision and affirmed the Commission's final determination in Plaintiff's case.
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McKitrick v. Alaska Pub. Employees Retirement Sys.
A man filed an application for both occupational and nonoccupational disability benefits from the Public Employees Retirement System, claiming disability from both physical and mental conditions. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied his claim, finding that he failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he had a physical or mental disability that presumably permanently prevented him from satisfactorily performing his job. The man appealed and the superior court affirmed the ALJ's determination. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the man challenged the ALJ's determination regarding his mental condition. Because the ALJ's written findings were sufficiently detailed to support the ALJ's conclusions, and because substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusion that the man’s mental condition did not amount to an occupational or nonoccupational disability, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to uphold the ALJ's order. View "McKitrick v. Alaska Pub. Employees Retirement Sys." on Justia Law
Winters v. No. Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue
The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was whether a plaintiff, who was removed from public employment after positing a claim of employer retaliation in a civil service disciplinary proceeding, should have been barred from seeking to circumvent that discipline through a subsequent Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) action also alleging retaliation. Plaintiff was terminated from his position following two close-in-time proceedings involving separate disciplinary matters before the Civil Service Commission (Commission). The first resulted in a demotion and the imposition of a sixty-day suspension. The second proceeding involved a distinct set of charges relating to plaintiff's abuse of sick leave. Following full discovery practice before the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) and the commencement of an evidential proceeding in the second matter, the employer moved for partial summary decision, which was granted by the administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ found it significant that despite plaintiff's defensive theme of employer retaliation, he did not provide support for that claim in his response to the employer's motion seeking partial summary judgment, and plaintiff's termination, for sick-leave misuse. "This matter raises significant and practical concerns about the intersection of administrative disciplinary proceedings and the important protection provided to whistle-blowing employees through CEPA. Although this matter does not present a textbook record for transparent application of the elements required for application of collateral estoppel, [the Supreme Court was] persuaded that preclusion should apply to plaintiff's subsequently filed retaliation claims against his former employer." The Court reversed the appellate court and held that under the facts of this case, plaintiff's CEPA action was barred.
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Elwell v. Bd. of Regents Univ. of Okla.
The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case was whether the Americans with Disabilities Act created two separate-but-overlapping causes of action for employment discrimination. Plaintiff-Appellant Judy Elwell worked for Defendant-Appellee University of Oklahoma for years in an administrative role. She began to suffer from a degenerative spinal disc condition which did not prevent her from performing the essential functions of her job. Nevertheless, she sought certain accommodations from her employer. She alleged that the University refused to grant those accommodations and ultimately fired her, allegedly because of her disability. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint, holding that Title II did not provide a cause of action for discrimination, and that Oklahoma did not waive its immunity from suit under the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act (OADA). The Tenth Circuit affirmed: "[i]n this case, those traditional tools of statutory construction - including a close examination of the text together with a careful review of the larger statutory structure . . . persuade us that Congress has spoken and spoken clearly to the question of employment discrimination claims and placed them exclusively in Title I. . . . Because Title II does not contain an independent cause of action for employment discrimination and because Ms. Elwell [could not] carry her burden of showing a waiver of sovereign immunity that might permit her to proceed with an OADA claim, the judgment of the district court [was] affirmed." View "Elwell v. Bd. of Regents Univ. of Okla." on Justia Law
Smith v. Ellis
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether an employee who filed an injury claim against his employer under the State Workers' Compensation Act and receives compensation in exchange for a "no liability" settlement with his employer that is approved by the State Board of Workers' Compensation may then turn around and sue the co-employee who caused the injury in a tort action. Ten years ago, the Court of Appeals answered this question no, holding that the Act's exclusive remedy provision bars such a lawsuit based on the same injury for which the employee has already received a remedy. In this appeal, however, the Court of Appeals was equally divided as to whether the underlying case law should be overruled, and the case was sent to the Supreme Court for resolution. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "Ridley" was correctly decided. Thus, appellant Joseph Smith, having previously entered a Board-approved settlement with his employer in exchange for compensation, would be barred from suing appellee John Ellis for the same injury in tort if Ellis qualified as an "employee of the same employer" as Smith, rather than a "third-party tort-feasor," as those phrases are used in the applicable statutory authority. However, the evidence did not establish that Ellis was acting as "an employee of the same employer" in the course of his employment, at the time he injured Smith. The trial court therefore erred in granting summary judgment to Ellis, and that judgment was reversed.
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