Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent sustained six injuries while playing for the Washington Redskins on four separate occasions. Consequently, Respondent filed with the Maryland Workers Compensation Commission six separate claims against his employer, the Washington Redskins (Petitioner). The Commission denied five of Respondent's claims on the ground that he was not a "covered employee" because he was working for the Redskins outside of the State when he sustained the injuries underlying the claims. The circuit court affirmed. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a football player employed by the Washington Redskins is a "covered employee," and therefore entitled to avail himself of Maryland's workers' compensation laws, when injured while practicing and playing football outside of Maryland. View "Pro-Football, Inc. v. McCants" on Justia Law

Appellee was injured during the course of his employment. When his workers' compensation benefits ceased, Appellee applied for and received unemployment insurance benefits. The Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission determined that Kan. Rev. Stat. 341.090, which permits the use of an "extended base period" that captures earnings leading to equitable unemployment benefits, required that the extended base period may include only the four calendar quarters that immediately precede the base period. Pursuant to this extended base period, Appellee was awarded benefits of $149 per week. The circuit court reversed. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the extended base period need not be limited to the four quarters that immediately precede the base period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission properly applied the statute in calculating Appellee's unemployment benefits. View "Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the method for excluding impairment from a non-compensable disability when calculating a worker's permanent disability benefit under the post-1996 version of Kan. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(b). The ALJ calculated a benefit based on the claimant's entire post-injury permanent impairment rating and then subtracted an amount equal to a benefit based on his pre-existing active impairment rating. The workers' compensation board reversed, determining that the present version of section 342.730(1)(b) requires the calculation of income benefits to be based only on the permanent impairment rating caused by the injury being compensated. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that pre-existing impairment must be excluded when calculating a total disability award under section 342.730(1)(b). View "Tudor v. Indus. Mold & Mach. Co." on Justia Law

Claimant sustained a work-related injury in 2003, for which he was awarded temporary total disability (TTD) benefits followed by 425 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits. In 2007 Claimant sustained another injury. After finding the effects of the 2003 injury caused Claimant's 2007 injury, an ALJ increased Claimant's partial disability benefit at reopening and tripled the entire income benefit awarded for his injury. The workers' compensation board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the finding of increased impairment as well as the finding that Claimant lacked the physical capacity at reopening to perform the type of work performed at the time of his injury; and (2) the combined effects of the impairment present at the time of the initial award and the additional impairment present at reopening entitled Claimant to triple benefits based on the whole of his disability for the balance of the compensable period. View "James T. English Trucking v. Beeler" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned an ALJ's decision to award the claimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for his work-related shoulder injury from the date he left work, May 10, 2007, until May 8, 2009. The ALJ also awarded permanent income and medical benefits for the injury but denied claims for cervical and lumbar spine injuries. A court of appeals majority reversed, concluding that the opinion and award failed to contain findings adequate to make clear whether the ALJ considered and understood all of the evidence relevant to the date when TTD began. The Supreme Court (1) reversed to the extent that the ALJ made the finding of fact required by Kan. Rev. Stat. 342.0011(11)(a); but (2) affirmed to the extent the Court was unable to determine whether the ALJ simply misstated May 10, 2007 as being the date the claimant testified he stopped working due to the effects of his injury, misunderstood the evidence concerning his reason for missing work on May 10, 2007, or chose May 10, 2007 based on other evidence. Remanded to the ALJ to clarify that portion of the decision. View "Arnold v. Toyota Motor Mfg." on Justia Law

Employee was discharged after she filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and a lawsuit against Employer alleging employment discrimination. Employee appealed the termination to the Metro Civil Service Commission (Commission) and eventually settled the appeal, receiving backpay and other consideration in exchange for her agreement not to accept future employment with the agency that discharged her. Employee subsequently filed a complaint against Employer alleging violations of the Civil Rights Act and Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer, reasoning that Employee could not establish her termination constituted an adverse employment action because she had accepted backpay and agreed not to be reinstated as part of the settlement of her Commission appeal. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Employee's acceptance of the settlement did not preclude her from establishing that her termination constituted an adverse employment action for purposes of her federal retaliatory discharge claims. View "Perkins v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether a labor arbitration award, issued pursuant to the Public Employe Relations Act ("PERA"), and reinstating an employee discharged for acts constituting sexual harassment, violated well-defined and dominant public policy. Concluding that it did, the Court affirmed an order of the Commonwealth Court, and vacated the award. View "Phila. Housing Authority v. AFSCME" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Aspen Contracting NE, LLC (Aspen), appealed the decisions of the Administrative Hearing Committee (Committee) and the Appeal Tribunal for the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (DES), as both were sustained by the DES Appellate Board, finding the claimants to be employees and Aspen to be an employer in New Hampshire subject to RSA chapter 282-A. Upon review of the Committee's and the Appeal Tribunal's administrative records, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Aspen Contracting NE, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner Casey B. Moore appealed a decision of the appeal tribunal (tribunal), as affirmed by the appellate board, of the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (DES) finding him ineligible for unemployment benefits because he voluntarily left his job without good cause. Moore began working as an arborist in 2008 for Guillemette Tree Services (GTS), a small business owned by Ken Guillemette. He worked part-time at a rate of $31.25 per hour, sometimes getting paid as an employee of GTS and sometimes as an independent contractor. Moore and Guillemette had a dispute about when Moore would be paid for work he had previously performed. The following Saturday, Moore met with Guillemette to collect his wages, which Guillemette paid partially by cash and partially by check. He also issued Moore a written warning for failing to show up at work on the previous day. Moore, however, claimed he was unaware that he had been required to work that day. The next Monday, Moore arrived at Guillemette’s house early in the morning to begin that day’s work. Before they started work, however, Moore told Guillemette that he wanted to "finish our conversation from Saturday," and stated that he wished to continue working for GTS as a subcontractor for $51.25 per hour. Guillemette expressed frustration and said, "I’ll have to think about it." He then asked Moore, "So what’s going on for today?" Moore responded that he would work as soon as Guillemette hired him as a subcontractor. Moore then left, and there was no further contact between them. In this case, the Supreme Court found that Moore’s own testimony established that he voluntarily quit working for GTS, and that Moore presented no evidence to support his claim that Guillemette fired him: "to the contrary, Moore admitted that Guillemette was 'frustrated' and 'all ticked off' when faced with the choice of either acceding to Moore’s request for a significant pay raise or losing him as an employee altogether." View "Appeal of Moore" on Justia Law

The Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc. (FOP) filed a grievance under its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Montgomery County following the County's unilateral decision to discontinue a long-standing practice of allowing shop stewards to sit in on disciplinary interrogations for training purposes. The County filed a motion to dismiss the grievance, arguing that arbitration of the issue was preempted by the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBR). The arbitrator determined the grievance was not preempted and denied the motion to dismiss. Subsequently, the County filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award in the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the arbitrator's decision and granted summary judgment on behalf of the FOP. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the LEOBR was not implicated by the steward training grievance and, therefore, did not preempt its arbitration under the CBA. View "Montgomery Co. v. FOP Lodge 35" on Justia Law