Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In August 2008 Ellington accepted the position of Deputy Clerk of the City Council of East Cleveland. The City Council wanted him, but then-Mayor, Brewer, stood in the way. After resolution of an approximately three-month-long standoff between the sides, Ellington began receiving regular paychecks and compensation for wages unpaid since he had begun performing services. Ellington sued, claiming that failure to issue him paychecks between August 2008 and November 2008 violated the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201–219, article II, section 34a of the Ohio Constitution; and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, Ohio Rev. Code 4111.01–.99. The district court concluded that Ellington, as an employee of the City Council, was subject to the “legislative employee” exclusions to the federal and state minimum wage and overtime provisions and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. To conclude that Ellington, who has been found to be an employee of a legislative body, is covered by the FLSA because, as Deputy Clerk of Council, he is also part of the City of East Cleveland’s workforce would effectively excise the FLSA’s “legislative employee” exclusion.

The district court entered judgment for the City of Cut Bank on Petitioner Arthur F. Rooney's complaint that he was wrongfully terminated from employment as a City police officer. Petitioner appealed the court's decision that his termination did not violate Montana's Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act (WDEA). The City cross-appealed the district court's earlier interlocutory order which denied the City's motion to dismiss the WDEA claim. Because the Supreme Court reversed the interlocutory ruling, it did not reach the issues raised by Petitioner. The Court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the City on this alternative ground.

Mischelle Richter appealed (1) the district court's order dismissing her retaliation claims under Title VII and the Missouri Human Rights Act for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and (2) the dismissal of her wrongful discharge claim under Missouri law for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the district court's dismissal of the retaliation claims, holding that Richter did not properly exhaust her retaliation claims; but (2) reversed and remanded on the state-law wrongful discharge claim, holding that Richter alleged sufficient facts to state a wrongful discharge claim under Missouri law.

Gallo served as an FAA air traffic control specialist from 1982 until 1995 when she experienced a job-related injury for which she received OWCP benefits. Gallo recovered enough to return to light duty. In 1996 she lost her medical certification to continue as an operational ATCS. Until 2000 she was assigned to a “non-operational” automation specialist position, which did not provide the same retirement credit or weekend pay. She received OWCP benefits for the differential. Gallo fully recovered in 2000 and received medical clearance; the Agency terminated OWCP benefit. She applied for restoration under 5 U.S.C. 8151(b)(2), which provides the right to priority consideration for restoration to federal employees who have overcome a compensable injury. The Agency assigned Gallo to a supervisory ATCS position. In setting her salary, the Agency did not take into account pay increases granted to operational ATCS employees during while Gallo was working as an automation specialist. The Merit Systems Protection Board denied her claim. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Board erred in interpreting “resumes employment with the Federal Government” under section 8151(a), and any pay increases that Gallo would have received based on her creditable service time with the federal government are “benefits based on length of service.”

This workers' compensation appeal raised the question of whether the fifteen-percent statutory violation penalty under Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.120.4 applies to an employee's (claimant) compensation award from the Second Injury Fund (SIF). The ALJ here refused to award the claimant additional benefits, determining that the fifteen-percent penalty under section 287.120.4 was not applicable to enhance the claimant's award. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission found that the fifteen-percent penalty applied to the compensation awards entered by the ALJ. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the section 287.120.4 penalty was inapplicable to the award that claimant received from the SIF.

Deborah Gervich appealed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denying her workers' compensation benefits as a dependent of her deceased husband, Gary Gervich. The Commission found that Gary's right to permanent total disability benefits terminated at the time of his death because his wife's right to such benefits had not "vested" prior to the 2008 statutory amendments that eliminated dependents from the definition of "employee" in Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.020.1. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statutes in effect at the time of Gary's injury governed, and under those statutes, the dependents of an injured worker, who was entitled to permanent total disability benefits and who died of causes unrelated to the work injury, are included within the definition of "employee"; (2) therefore, such dependents are entitled to continuing permanent total disability benefits; and (3) because an employee's dependents are determined at the time of the injury and include the spouse of an injured worker, the Commission was not authorized by law to deny such benefits to Deborah.

Arnaz Crawford was fired from his job in January 2009. Crawford subsequently applied for Social Security disability benefits (SSDI benefits) due to a mental condition, but the social security administration (Administration) denied the claim. Meanwhile, Crawford applied for state unemployment benefits. The division of employment security (Division) awarded unemployment benefits to Crawford until March 20, 2010. On March 2, 2010, the Administration determined Crawford had been disabled and eligible for SSDI benefits since January 29, 2009. The Division subsequently determined (1) Crawford was unable to work from December 20, 2009 to March 20, 2010 and, therefore, was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits; and (2) Crawford had received $3,080 in benefits that he was ineligible to receive. The labor and industrial relations commission (Commission) affirmed the determination that Crawford was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the Commission's decisions to the extent they authorized the Division to collect the overpayment from Crawford; but (2) otherwise affirmed the Commission's decision.

In this case, Plaintiff prevailed on its Access to Public Records Act (Act) claim against a public agency and an intervening private party. As required by statute, the trial court awarded Plaintiff attorney's fees. The fees were awarded against both the public agency and the intervening private party, jointly and severally. The private party argued that the Act does not contemplate the award of attorney's fees against an intervening private party and that only the public agency should be liable for the fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Plaintiff, holding (1) the Act, in light of the legislature's liberal-construction mandate and the statute's underlying policy, permits the award of attorney's fees against an intervening private party; and (2) in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its apportionment of liability.

Shirley Frisby died from an apparent heart attack while working on an assembly line at Milbank Manufacturing Company in Arkansas. A claim for workers' compensation death benefits was filed just before the two-year statute of limitations expired. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission denied the claim. Curtis Frisby, as administrator of his wife's estate, then commenced this wrongful death diversity action against Milbank. The district court dismissed the action as time barred. Curtis appealed, arguing that the filing of a workers' compensation claim tolls the statute of limitations for a tort claim against the employer for the same injury, and alternatively, that the Arkansas "savings statute" applies and provided him one year after the workers' compensation claim denial to file this action for the same injury. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because Curtis was able to file a timely wrongful death tort action before or concurrent with the claim for workers' compensation benefits, the district court correctly rejected his tolling argument; and (2) the savings statute did not apply because the dismissal of the workers' compensation claim did not have the same effect as a nonsuit.

Plaintiff, a former employee of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) who suffered from multiple sclerosis and systemic lupus, filed an administrative complaint based on alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The complaint was adjudicated by an ALJ, who denied relief in part. Plaintiff then filed an optional administrative appeal with the EEOC. Plaintiff withdrew her appeal without waiting 180 days as specified in 29 C.F.R. 1614.407(d) and filed suit in district court based on the same claims she asserted in her administrative complaint. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, holding that under Rivera v. USPS, it lacked jurisdiction because Plaintiff had not waited 180 days after filing her administrative appeal. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that based on Bankston v. White and on post-Rivera regulation, Bullock had exhausted her administrative remedies. Remanded.