Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The State of Alaska dismissed an employee for allegedly submitting a falsified timesheet and claiming full pay for a week when she was not working. The employee argued her dismissal violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because a biased supervisor was involved with the termination decision, because the State's investigation was conducted unfairly, and because she was treated differently from similarly situated employees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision that there was insufficient evidence to show a breach of the implied covenant on any of these grounds. The Court also affirmed the superior court's ruling that the employee's unfair labor practice claim was untimely and therefore waived.

Cornel Kilber appealed a district court judgment that affirmed the Grand Forks Public School District No. 1 ("District") decision to discharge him from his teaching position with the District for conduct unbecoming the position of a teacher. Upon review of the district court record, the Supreme Court concluded that Kilber was not denied a fair discharge hearing and that any claimed procedural errors that occurred during the hearing were harmless.

Claimant was employed by New Orleans Depot Services, Inc. (NODSI) as a mechanic from 1996 until 2002. Prior to his employment with NODSI, Claimant was employed by New Orleans Marine Contractors (NOMC) for five months. During his employment with both NODSI and NOMC, Claimant was exposed to loud noises on a continuous basis and did not use hearing protection. Claimant sought permanent partial disability benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act for a hearing impairment. The ALJ determined that NODSI was liable for Claimants benefits as his last maritime employer. The Benefits Review Board (BRB) affirmed. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the factual findings of the ALJ.

Appellant brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners and its members, the chief of police, and certain police officers, alleging constitutional violations under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. The district court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, reasoning Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided the exclusive remedy for Appellant's claims and Appellant could not circumvent the Act's procedural requirements by solely pleading constitutional violations under section 1983. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that to the extent that Appellant's complaint asserted the violation of rights secured by the Constitution and committed by persons acting under color of state law, the district court erred in dismissing her section 1983 action for failure to comply with Title VII's procedural requirements.

Appellant worked in the classified position of human-services hearing manager with the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS). In December 2004, Appellant was assigned additional duties. Appellant was not informed that the assumption of these duties would move his position to the unclassified service. In December 2005, ODJFS suspended Appellant for violations of the code of conduct and subsequently removed him from his position. Appellant appealed his removal to the State Personnel Board of Review (SPBR), basing his appeal on Ohio Rev. Code 124.11(D), which grants state employees who move from classified positions to unclassified the positions the right to resume the classified position held before the appointment to the unclassified position. The SPBR found that Appellant was an unclassified employee when he was suspended and dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court of common pleas and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant was entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel ODJFS and its director to reinstate him to his previous classified position of human-services hearing manager or a substantially equal position, without the duties assigned to him in December 2004 that moved his position into the unclassified service. Remanded.

Sutter East Bay Hospitals sought review of a National Labor Relations Board (Board) order concluding that Sutter East Bay violated the National Labor Relations Act. The Board cross-applied for enforcement of that order. Sutter East Bay conceded that it engaged in illegal surveillance of its employees' union activities, and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals granted the Board's application for enforcement of that determination. The Court also granted the Board's application for enforcement of the finding that Sutter East Bay unlawfully changed its solicitation policy to stifle support for a new labor union. The Court agreed with Sutter East Bay, however, that the ALJ failed to properly apply the appropriate legal standard in determining that the employer unlawfully disciplined its employee and granted Sutter East Bay's petition for review with regard to those disciplinary actions. Remanded to the Board for rehearing.

Deborah Benge, a former employee of Pacific Ship Repair and Fabrication, filed a disability claim under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act seeking compensation for her work-related injury. The ALJ found that Benge's disability at the time was permanent. The Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP) made partial permanent disability payments to Benge until Benge underwent surgery. An ALJ subsequently determined that Benge's nine-month total disability immediately following the surgery was temporary in nature. This determination absolved the OWCP from making disability payments during this time period. Instead, Pacific was liable for the payments. The Department of Labor's Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ, concluding that even if a disability is declared permanent, it may be later re-characterized as temporary when the underlying condition worsens and re-stabilizes following a surgical procedure. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under the Longshore Act, a prior finding of partial permanent disability does not preclude a later finding of temporary disability for the same underlying injury during a period of recovery following surgery; and (2) because Benge's partial disability could be re-characterized as a temporary total disability in accord with changed circumstances, Pacific was responsible for the temporary total disability payments.

In 2008, Rocha was appointed to an excepted service position at the State Department. By letter (July, 2010), the Department informed Rocha that his appointment would soon expire and that the agency would not convert his appointment into a career or career-conditional position. An administrative judge concluded that the board had no jurisdiction over Rocha’s appeal because he was serving under an excepted service appointment in the Federal Career Intern Program. Rocha was informed by the administrative judge that the decision would become final on December 15, 2010. The initial decision was served upon Rocha by email; he had consented to electronic filing. On June 3, 2011, Rocha filed a petition with the board, which informed Rocha that his petition was untimely and that it would consider the merits only if he established good cause for untimely filing. In response, Rocha asserted that he never received notification that his case had been dismissed. On December 22, the board dismissed, noting that its regulations require an e-filer to monitor case activity at e-Appeal Online to ensure receipt of all documents. Rocha presented no evidence of circumstances beyond his control that affected his ability to comply with time limits. The Federal Circuit affirmed.

Petitioners Professional Fire Fighters of Wolfeboro, IAFF Local 3708, president of the union and several firefighters appealed a superior court order that dismissed their suit against Respondent Town of Wolfeboro. The suit arose from the parties' negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Union had ever been certified by the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) as a bargaining unit. In July 2010, the parties met and agreed on ground rules governing the conduct of their future negotiations, including that "[a]fter October 1, 2010, either party [could] request mediation of the outstanding issues." Shortly thereafter, however, the negotiations broke down. At an August 2010 meeting, the Town's Board of Selectmen voted to rescind its recognition of the Union. The petitioners filed a verified petition for an ex parte temporary restraining order against the Town and requested temporary and permanent injunctive relief. After a hearing, the trial court granted the petitioners' requested temporary restraining order, and scheduled the matter for further hearing. The Town moved to dismiss the entire proceeding. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the Town's motion and vacated its temporary restraining order. The petitioners unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the portion of RSA 31:3 which grants municipalities the right to recognize unions and enter into collective bargaining agreements was superseded by the enactment of the PELRA, and, therefore, the Town had no authority to recognize the non-PELRB-certified Union. Accordingly, the agreement, as well as the subsequent agreements, were ultra vires contracts and wholly void. The Court affirmed the superior court's decision to dismiss Petitioners' case.

A State of Alaska employee was discharged. With union representation, the employee unsuccessfully challenged his termination in grievance proceedings. When he later filed suit for wrongful termination, the State subpoenaed the union representative to appear for a deposition with the union's grievance file. The superior court denied the employee's privilege-based request for a protective order. The Supreme Court granted the employee's petition for review to consider whether a union-relations privilege exists in Alaska. The Court concluded the privilege exists by implication of Alaska statutes, and therefore reversed the superior court's ruling and remanded the case for application of the privilege to the discovery dispute.