Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellee Gary Lederman sued his former employer, Frontier Fire Protection, Inc., to recover overtime pay he alleged was owed to him under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). A jury found Frontier liable and awarded Lederman $17,440.86 in damages. Frontier challenged the jury instructions issued by the district court. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the district court should not have instructed the jury that Frontier bore a heightened burden of proof in establishing its entitlement to an FLSA exemption. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellant Elizabeth A. Bertsch appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Defendant-Appellee Overstock.com, on her hostile work environment and retaliation claims, and appealed the denial of leave to amend to add a disparate-treatment claim, all under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-e17. Plaintiff claimed that working next to another employee "notorious" for viewing sexually explicit videos at work and making misogynistic comments made work a hostile work environment. Despite her "clean" record, she and the offending co-worker were reprimanded for contributing to the work environment and instructed to work more cooperatively. Cooperative efforts ultimately failed, and Plaintiff was eventually fired; the employer elected to terminate Plaintiff because the situation between Plaintiff and the co-worker "was not ever going to resolve itself." Overstock viewed Plaintiff as a "difficult, high-maintenance employee who left the company with no choice but to part ways." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies prior to bringing her disparate treatment claim before the Court. Accordingly, the Court held Plaintiff could not bring her Title VII action based on claims that were not part of the timely-filed EEOC charge for which she received a right-to-sue letter. Otherwise, the Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the hostile work environment sexual harassment claim (and denial of leave to amend). The Court reversed the district court on Plaintiff's retaliation claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellant Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on behalf of Jessica Chrysler ("Employee"), appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee The Picture People ("Employer"). The district court granted summary judgment on the basis that Employee could not establish that she was qualified (with or without accommodation) to perform an essential function of her job as a "performer" in Employer's store. It also concluded that Employee's retaliation claim failed because she could not perform an essential function of the job, and that she offered no evidence that Employer's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons were pretextual. Upon review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit found no error and affirmed.

Plaintiff Arthur Rooney appealed a district court's order in favor of Defendant City of Cut Bank in his wrongful termination suit. Plaintiff appealed the court's decision that his termination did not violate Montana's Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act (WDEA). The City cross-appealed the District Court's earlier interlocutory order denying the City's motion to dismiss the WDEA claim. The Supreme Court reversed an interlocutory ruling, and did not reach the issues raised by Plaintiff. The Court affirmed the District Court's judgment in favor of the City on this alternative ground. The Supreme Court concluded Plaintiff was afforded "full and fair adjudication of his claims in the proceedings before the Police Commission." When the City moved for relief from the District Court's order ruling that the WDEA claim was distinct from the appeal of the Police Commission decision, it was correct that issue preclusion applied.

An injured employee (Employee) sought workers' compensation benefits for a work-related injury. A claims adjuster with Employer's workers' compensation insurer's (Insurer) third party administrator denied the claim. The Division of Workers' compensation determined that Employee was entitled to medical and temporary income benefits. Employee subsequently brought a bad faith action against Insurer, its third party administrator, and the claims adjuster (Defendants). During discovery, Employee sought communications made between Insurer's lawyer and Employer during the administrative proceedings. Defendants argued that the attorney-client privilege protected the communications. The trial court held that the privilege did not apply. The court of appeals subsequently denied mandamus relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the attorney-client privilege did not protect the communications between Insurer and its insured.

Employee suffered an injury during the course of his employment that was compensable under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. Petitioner insurance company provided workers' compensation coverage to Employee's employer. Petitioner disputed the impairment rating of twenty percent assigned by the doctor in the administrative proceedings. A hearing officer issued a decision finding that Employee had an impairment rating of twenty percent. The Division of Workers' Compensation upheld the decision. Petitioner appealed. The trial court granted Employee's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a reviewing court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to resolve an impairment rating appeal if the only rating presented to the agency was invalid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the absence of a valid impairment rating does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Remanded.

In this case the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether Iowa's workers' compensation statute allows a claimant to recover healing period benefits - after he had reached maximum medical improvement and returned to substantially similar work following a work-related injury - for a period of approximately thirteen weeks of postsurgical convalescence during which he was unable to work. The workers' compensation commission awarded such benefits, and the district court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that Iowa Code 85.34(1) did not authorize the benefits under the circumstances of this case. The Supreme Court vacated in part the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the district court's judgment affirming the award, holding that section 85.34(1) did authorize an award of healing period benefits in this case.

Plaintiff Roderick McGarry appealed a final judgment in favor of Defendant Town of Cumberland School Department which granted defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The trial justice concluded that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that defendant had discriminated against him on the basis of his age. After a jury trial, the verdict was returned in plaintiff's favor. However, the trial justice granted defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. On appeal to the Supreme Court, plaintiff contended the trial justice's post-trial Rule 50 ruling was in error and argued that the jury verdict should be reinstated. Specifically, plaintiff contended that the trial justice erred by granting judgment as a matter of law because: (1) defendant failed to offer a nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring plaintiff; and (2) the trial justice erred in ruling that an adverse inference resulting from the spoliation of evidence, without additional extrinsic evidence, could not satisfy plaintiff's burden of proof (plaintiff contended that he did present such extrinsic evidence). Upon review, the Supreme Court partly affirmed the superior court, and partly reversed. The Court found the trial justice erred in granting defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court agreed with the trial justice in granting defendant's motion for a new trial. The case was remanded to the superior court for further proceedings.

Respondent-Appellant Chad Cringle appealed a district court order that remanded his case to the Montana Human Rights Commission for further proceedings in his discrimination complaint against Petitioner-Appellee BNSF Railway Company (BNSF). The issue on appeal was whether BNSF demonstrated sufficient grounds to excuse its noncompliance with a fourteen-day filing deadline. In 2008, Respondent filed a complaint with the Montana Department of Labor and Industry charging that BNSF had illegally discriminated against him in employment. Following proceedings on the issues of damages and affirmative relief, the hearing officer issued a final decision in Respondent's favor. That same day, the hearing officer issued notice of his decision by mail to the parties. BNSF received the decision the next day. A legal secretary discovered the decision under papers on her desk nineteen days after it was received. By that time, the decision had become final and "not appealable." BNSF filed a notice of appeal, asking for an extension of time in which to file its notice of appeal. Respondent objected to the request. The Commission denied BNSF's appeal. BNSF sought judicial review; The Commission and Respondent filed separate motions to dismiss BNSF's petition. BNSF then appealed the district court's dismissal of its petition, arguing that the district court erred in interpreting the fourteen-day filing deadline as "jurisdictional" and asked the Supreme Court to hold that the Commission had authority to extend the deadline to file the appeal. The case came before the Supreme Court a second time, the last issue to decide was whether BNSF had shown good cause for its untimely filing. Upon review, the Court concluded BNSF failed to justify relief from the deadline.

This appeal arose out of Ryan Dorman's petition for an extension of his worker's compensation temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and for reimbursement of travel expenses incurred in travelling from Idaho to Cheyenne to obtain medical care. In May 2006, Dorman sought treatment from an Idaho physician for treatment of his alleged work-related injury. Due to the nature of Dorman's injury, he consulted multiple physicians, first in Idaho, then in Wyoming. With each consultation, the doctors indicated that the injury was outside of their scope of expertise, and referred Doman to another specialist. During the period that Dorman was changing physicians, the Division and Dorman negotiated a stipulation concerning his TTD benefits and other benefits. This followed OAH and district court decisions that largely reversed the Division's earlier determinations concerning TTD benefits and Dorman's need for continued medical treatment. The Stipulated Order also provided that medical benefits would be paid as directed by the district court's order. After the Division paid the stipulated TTD benefits, Dorman submitted a letter to the Division requesting extended benefits The Division thereafter issued a final determination denying them, and further denied several applications for travel expense reimbursement for Dorman's trips to Idaho and Cheyenne. The matters were referred to the OAH where a combined hearing was held on the denial of TTD benefits, denial of travel reimbursement, and denial of diagnostic testing related to Dorman's injury. The OAH upheld the denial of TTD benefits on the ground that Dorman had failed to make the required showing that the Idaho and Cheyenne doctors were the closest available medical providers. Dorman appealed the portion of the OAH order denying extended TTD benefits and travel reimbursement to the district court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the OAH denial of the travel reimbursement: Dorman could not prove that reimbursement of travel expenses was not supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law.