Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Cristobal Ramirez brought a Title VII employment discrimination case and represented himself in district court. He survived summary judgment (in part) and proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the presentation of his evidence, Defendant, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), orally moved for judgment as matter of law. The district court granted the motion on the sole ground that Plaintiff's claim was time-barred because he did not contact an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Counselor within forty-five days of the alleged discrimination. Plaintiff, still appearing in the case pro se, appealed to the Eleventh Circuit where he was appointed counsel. Upon review, and with the benefit of counseled briefing and oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court. Because the EEOC found that there was a satisfactory reason for Plaintiff's delay in making initial contact with the EEO Counselor, and because the DOT did not challenge that finding, but, instead, undertook investigation and conciliation, the DOT and the district court were bound by the EEOC’s finding.

Appellant Brandon Bentley, a deputy sheriff with the Spartanburg County Sheriff's Department, alleged that he developed Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PSTD) and depression after he shot and killed a suspect who attempted to assault him. An Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission unanimously found that Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof in establishing a compensable mental injury that arose out of an "unusual or extraordinary condition" of employment for a Spartanburg County deputy sheriff. "Whether the shooting and killing of a suspect by a deputy sheriff while on duty is an extraordinary and unusual employment condition such that mental injuries arising from that incident are compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act" was the issue central to this case. Appellant asked the Supreme Court to reframe the issue, take it out of its particular employment context, and ask "whether killing another human being is "unusual." Upon review, the Court held that Appellant's testimony that he "might be in a situation where he might have to shoot someone," similar testimonies by Sheriff Wright that officers were aware of the possibility that they might be required to shoot and kill, Appellant's training in the use of deadly force, and the department's policy addressing when deadly force should be used constituted substantial evidence supporting the Appellate Panel's conclusion that Appellant's involvement in the shooting was not "extraordinary and unusual," but was a standard and necessary condition of a deputy sheriff's job.

Plaintiff-Appellee Gary Lederman sued his former employer, Frontier Fire Protection, Inc., to recover overtime pay he alleged was owed to him under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). A jury found Frontier liable and awarded Lederman $17,440.86 in damages. Frontier challenged the jury instructions issued by the district court. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the district court should not have instructed the jury that Frontier bore a heightened burden of proof in establishing its entitlement to an FLSA exemption. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellant Elizabeth A. Bertsch appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Defendant-Appellee Overstock.com, on her hostile work environment and retaliation claims, and appealed the denial of leave to amend to add a disparate-treatment claim, all under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-e17. Plaintiff claimed that working next to another employee "notorious" for viewing sexually explicit videos at work and making misogynistic comments made work a hostile work environment. Despite her "clean" record, she and the offending co-worker were reprimanded for contributing to the work environment and instructed to work more cooperatively. Cooperative efforts ultimately failed, and Plaintiff was eventually fired; the employer elected to terminate Plaintiff because the situation between Plaintiff and the co-worker "was not ever going to resolve itself." Overstock viewed Plaintiff as a "difficult, high-maintenance employee who left the company with no choice but to part ways." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies prior to bringing her disparate treatment claim before the Court. Accordingly, the Court held Plaintiff could not bring her Title VII action based on claims that were not part of the timely-filed EEOC charge for which she received a right-to-sue letter. Otherwise, the Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the hostile work environment sexual harassment claim (and denial of leave to amend). The Court reversed the district court on Plaintiff's retaliation claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellant Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on behalf of Jessica Chrysler ("Employee"), appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee The Picture People ("Employer"). The district court granted summary judgment on the basis that Employee could not establish that she was qualified (with or without accommodation) to perform an essential function of her job as a "performer" in Employer's store. It also concluded that Employee's retaliation claim failed because she could not perform an essential function of the job, and that she offered no evidence that Employer's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons were pretextual. Upon review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit found no error and affirmed.

Plaintiff Arthur Rooney appealed a district court's order in favor of Defendant City of Cut Bank in his wrongful termination suit. Plaintiff appealed the court's decision that his termination did not violate Montana's Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act (WDEA). The City cross-appealed the District Court's earlier interlocutory order denying the City's motion to dismiss the WDEA claim. The Supreme Court reversed an interlocutory ruling, and did not reach the issues raised by Plaintiff. The Court affirmed the District Court's judgment in favor of the City on this alternative ground. The Supreme Court concluded Plaintiff was afforded "full and fair adjudication of his claims in the proceedings before the Police Commission." When the City moved for relief from the District Court's order ruling that the WDEA claim was distinct from the appeal of the Police Commission decision, it was correct that issue preclusion applied.

An injured employee (Employee) sought workers' compensation benefits for a work-related injury. A claims adjuster with Employer's workers' compensation insurer's (Insurer) third party administrator denied the claim. The Division of Workers' compensation determined that Employee was entitled to medical and temporary income benefits. Employee subsequently brought a bad faith action against Insurer, its third party administrator, and the claims adjuster (Defendants). During discovery, Employee sought communications made between Insurer's lawyer and Employer during the administrative proceedings. Defendants argued that the attorney-client privilege protected the communications. The trial court held that the privilege did not apply. The court of appeals subsequently denied mandamus relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the attorney-client privilege did not protect the communications between Insurer and its insured.

Employee suffered an injury during the course of his employment that was compensable under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. Petitioner insurance company provided workers' compensation coverage to Employee's employer. Petitioner disputed the impairment rating of twenty percent assigned by the doctor in the administrative proceedings. A hearing officer issued a decision finding that Employee had an impairment rating of twenty percent. The Division of Workers' Compensation upheld the decision. Petitioner appealed. The trial court granted Employee's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a reviewing court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to resolve an impairment rating appeal if the only rating presented to the agency was invalid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the absence of a valid impairment rating does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Remanded.

In this case the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether Iowa's workers' compensation statute allows a claimant to recover healing period benefits - after he had reached maximum medical improvement and returned to substantially similar work following a work-related injury - for a period of approximately thirteen weeks of postsurgical convalescence during which he was unable to work. The workers' compensation commission awarded such benefits, and the district court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that Iowa Code 85.34(1) did not authorize the benefits under the circumstances of this case. The Supreme Court vacated in part the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the district court's judgment affirming the award, holding that section 85.34(1) did authorize an award of healing period benefits in this case.

Plaintiff Roderick McGarry appealed a final judgment in favor of Defendant Town of Cumberland School Department which granted defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The trial justice concluded that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that defendant had discriminated against him on the basis of his age. After a jury trial, the verdict was returned in plaintiff's favor. However, the trial justice granted defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. On appeal to the Supreme Court, plaintiff contended the trial justice's post-trial Rule 50 ruling was in error and argued that the jury verdict should be reinstated. Specifically, plaintiff contended that the trial justice erred by granting judgment as a matter of law because: (1) defendant failed to offer a nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring plaintiff; and (2) the trial justice erred in ruling that an adverse inference resulting from the spoliation of evidence, without additional extrinsic evidence, could not satisfy plaintiff's burden of proof (plaintiff contended that he did present such extrinsic evidence). Upon review, the Supreme Court partly affirmed the superior court, and partly reversed. The Court found the trial justice erred in granting defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court agreed with the trial justice in granting defendant's motion for a new trial. The case was remanded to the superior court for further proceedings.