Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denied Appellant unemployment benefits after it found that Appellant engaged in willful misconduct by repeatedly and deliberately disregarding her supervisor's instructions. Appellant appealed, arguing that the Commission erred in finding that she engaged in misconduct because although she may have acted negligently, she did not deliberately violate her supervisor's instructions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent and substantial evidence supported the Commission's finding that Appellant willfully failed to follow her supervisor's instructions, although able to do so, on eleven separate occasions after her supervisor warned her three times she needed to comply with the instructions.

Claimant James Mercer, was injured in an accident during his employment with Defendant, Nabors Drilling, USA, L.P. Claimant received workers' compensation disability and medical benefits. As a result of his accident, Claimant also filed suit against a third-party tortfeasor. Nabors intervened, seeking recovery of the workers' compensation benefits it paid to claimant. Without prior approval by Nabors, Claimant settled the tort suit with the third-party tortfeasor for an amount in excess of the workers' compensation benefits paid by Nabors. Subsequently, Claimant reimbursed Nabors for the full amount of workers' compensation benefits paid, deducting a proportionate share for attorney fees and costs. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether whether the court of appeal erred in reversing a judgment of the Office of Workers' Compensation (OWC), which held the employer was entitled to a credit against future medical benefits. Upon review, the Court concluded that OWC correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, and therefore reinstated the OWC's judgment.

The Court of Appeals held that the superior court improperly affirmed a damages award to Petitioner Valencia Scott on her workers' compensation claim because the ALJ erred in ruling Petitioner's deniability resulted from a fictional new accident as opposed to a change in condition, and that her claim for total temporary disability was thus not barred by the applicable statute of limitation. The Supreme Court granted review of the case to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a "fictional new accident" could not apply to situations where an employee who suffered a compensable injury and subsequently suffers a progressive worsening of that condition whereby she must cease working completely. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Petitioner sustained a foot injury and was awarded compensation. She subsequently returned to work in a new position that required no strenuous activity, but she developed knee and gait problems as a result of the wear and tear of ordinary life. This gradual worsening constituted a change of condition, not a new accident. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision.

The Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division awarded benefits to Appellant Gary Mitcheson after he fell at work and injured his tailbone in July of 2007. Approximately two years later, the Division issued a final determination denying payment for medical care that Appellant claimed was related to his workplace injury. Appellant requested a contested case hearing, and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the Division's determination. Appellant appealed to the district court, which upheld the OAH's order. On appeal, Appellant challenged the OAH order contending: (1) the order was arbitrary and unsupported by substantial evidence; (2) the OAH's denial of payment for treating Appellant's tailbone was arbitrary; and (3) the OAH order denying payment for medical care contrary to the "Rule Out" rule was contrary to law. Finding the issues Appellant raised on appeal to be without merit, the Supreme Court affirmed the OAH's decision.

Bridget Weaver and two other school administrators sued the Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County ("the Board") and Roy D. Nichols, in his official capacity as superintendent of the Mobile County Public School System (collectively, "Defendants") seeking a declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus, and injunctive relief. Weaver alleged that she had been partially terminated or demoted from her employment as an assistant principal pursuant to a reduction-in-force policy implemented by the defendants; that she was entitled to the benefit of policy no. 6.44, which mandated that "any tenured employee terminated or demoted pursuant to [a reduction-in-force policy] shall have a one-time recall right to a position for which he or she is certified and legally qualified"; and that, since the time of Weaver's partial termination or demotion, several assistant principals with less seniority than her have been placed in available assistant-principal positions. The trial court awarded backpay and ordered that she be offered an assistant-principal position once one became available. Defendants moved the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate its final judgment which was ultimately denied. Defendants appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs sued the wrong entities: the Board and Superintendent were entitled to immunity from suit with regard to their cases. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims against the board. Because both the Board and Superintendent appealed from void judgments, the Court dismissed their appeals for want of jurisdiction.

Claimant-Appellant Megan Peterson worked at a nursing home owned by The Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society (Good Samaritan). Claimant alleged that she sustained a work-related injury to her back when assisting a resident with a wheelchair. Good Samaritan denied the claim. Two doctors, who testified by deposition, disagreed whether Claimant suffered a work-related injury and whether employment was a major contributing cause of her back condition. The Department of Labor (Department), after considering the depositions and Claimant's medical records, determined that she failed to prove she sustained a compensable work-related injury. The Department also determined that Claimant failed to prove that her employment remained a major contributing cause of her condition and need for treatment. The circuit court affirmed. On de novo review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court concluded that one of the doctor's opinions was sufficient to meet Claimant's burden of proving that her employment caused a work-related injury and that was and remained a major contributing cause of her back condition and need for treatment.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether proof of California workers’ compensation payments could be admitted into evidence in a personal injury action in Nevada. Because Nevada, the forum state, and California, the state in which the payments were made, both have statutes that permit proof of workers' compensation payments to be allowed into evidence in personal injury actions, the Court concluded that Nevada law governed. Applying Nevada law, the Court held that evidence of the actual amount of workers' compensation benefits paid should have been admitted and that a clarifying jury instruction provided by statute should have been given. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Cumberland Teachers Association (union), appealed to the Supreme Court that confirmed an arbitrator's award in favor of the Cumberland School Committee (school committee). After protracted contract negotiations, the school committee and the union agreed on a three-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that would govern their relations for the 2006-2007, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 academic years. "However, the parties soon discovered that they had left the negotiating table with two very different understandings of how a key component of their agreement would be implemented." An arbitrator was selected and the parties agreed that the issue to be decided by the arbitrator was whether “the Cumberland School Committee place[d] the aggrieved teachers at the correct salary level for the 2007-08 school year?” On appeal to the Supreme Court, the union argued that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded a contract provision when he found that there was no written agreement about how the new salary schedule would be implemented for the 2007-2008 year. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the union did not demonstrate that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the contract or that he was completely irrational in arriving at his decision and award.

Claimant Crystal DeLeon sought workers' compensation benefits for a work-related injury to her back, neck and one shoulder. SAIF Corporation, her insurer, accepted the claim but awarded only temporary partial disability; the insurer did not award Claimant permanent partial disability. Claimant sought reconsideration, and the Department of Consumer and Business Services awarded her an eleven percent permanent partial disability for her shoulder. The insurer appealed the Department's award; the ALJ agreed with the insurer and reduced the permanent partial disability award to zero. Claimant appealed the ALJ's decision to the Workers' Compensation Board. The board reversed the ALJ and reinstated the eleven percent disability determination, and awarded attorney's fees. The issue on appeal concerned the authority of the Workers' Compensation Board to award attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Board indeed has statutory authority to award attorneys' fees.

A group of local volunteer fire and rescue departments ("LFRDs") and several of their former administrative employees brought suit against Defendants Montgomery County, Maryland, the County Council, and certain county officials contending that Defendants eliminated part of their funding in retaliation for opposing to legislation supported by Defendants. The district court dismissed the LFRDs' complaint, declining to inquire into Defendants’ alleged illicit motive behind an otherwise facially valid budgetary enactment, finding that certain individual defendants were protected by legislative immunity, and concluding that because the individual Plaintiffs were not County employees, they could not bring an abusive discharge claim under state law. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit found no error nor abuse of discretion in the district court's judgment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision.