Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent-Appellant Chad Cringle appealed a district court order that remanded his case to the Montana Human Rights Commission for further proceedings in his discrimination complaint against Petitioner-Appellee BNSF Railway Company (BNSF). The issue on appeal was whether BNSF demonstrated sufficient grounds to excuse its noncompliance with a fourteen-day filing deadline. In 2008, Respondent filed a complaint with the Montana Department of Labor and Industry charging that BNSF had illegally discriminated against him in employment. Following proceedings on the issues of damages and affirmative relief, the hearing officer issued a final decision in Respondent's favor. That same day, the hearing officer issued notice of his decision by mail to the parties. BNSF received the decision the next day. A legal secretary discovered the decision under papers on her desk nineteen days after it was received. By that time, the decision had become final and "not appealable." BNSF filed a notice of appeal, asking for an extension of time in which to file its notice of appeal. Respondent objected to the request. The Commission denied BNSF's appeal. BNSF sought judicial review; The Commission and Respondent filed separate motions to dismiss BNSF's petition. BNSF then appealed the district court's dismissal of its petition, arguing that the district court erred in interpreting the fourteen-day filing deadline as "jurisdictional" and asked the Supreme Court to hold that the Commission had authority to extend the deadline to file the appeal. The case came before the Supreme Court a second time, the last issue to decide was whether BNSF had shown good cause for its untimely filing. Upon review, the Court concluded BNSF failed to justify relief from the deadline.

This appeal arose out of Ryan Dorman's petition for an extension of his worker's compensation temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and for reimbursement of travel expenses incurred in travelling from Idaho to Cheyenne to obtain medical care. In May 2006, Dorman sought treatment from an Idaho physician for treatment of his alleged work-related injury. Due to the nature of Dorman's injury, he consulted multiple physicians, first in Idaho, then in Wyoming. With each consultation, the doctors indicated that the injury was outside of their scope of expertise, and referred Doman to another specialist. During the period that Dorman was changing physicians, the Division and Dorman negotiated a stipulation concerning his TTD benefits and other benefits. This followed OAH and district court decisions that largely reversed the Division's earlier determinations concerning TTD benefits and Dorman's need for continued medical treatment. The Stipulated Order also provided that medical benefits would be paid as directed by the district court's order. After the Division paid the stipulated TTD benefits, Dorman submitted a letter to the Division requesting extended benefits The Division thereafter issued a final determination denying them, and further denied several applications for travel expense reimbursement for Dorman's trips to Idaho and Cheyenne. The matters were referred to the OAH where a combined hearing was held on the denial of TTD benefits, denial of travel reimbursement, and denial of diagnostic testing related to Dorman's injury. The OAH upheld the denial of TTD benefits on the ground that Dorman had failed to make the required showing that the Idaho and Cheyenne doctors were the closest available medical providers. Dorman appealed the portion of the OAH order denying extended TTD benefits and travel reimbursement to the district court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the OAH denial of the travel reimbursement: Dorman could not prove that reimbursement of travel expenses was not supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law.

The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denied Appellant unemployment benefits after it found that Appellant engaged in willful misconduct by repeatedly and deliberately disregarding her supervisor's instructions. Appellant appealed, arguing that the Commission erred in finding that she engaged in misconduct because although she may have acted negligently, she did not deliberately violate her supervisor's instructions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent and substantial evidence supported the Commission's finding that Appellant willfully failed to follow her supervisor's instructions, although able to do so, on eleven separate occasions after her supervisor warned her three times she needed to comply with the instructions.

Claimant James Mercer, was injured in an accident during his employment with Defendant, Nabors Drilling, USA, L.P. Claimant received workers' compensation disability and medical benefits. As a result of his accident, Claimant also filed suit against a third-party tortfeasor. Nabors intervened, seeking recovery of the workers' compensation benefits it paid to claimant. Without prior approval by Nabors, Claimant settled the tort suit with the third-party tortfeasor for an amount in excess of the workers' compensation benefits paid by Nabors. Subsequently, Claimant reimbursed Nabors for the full amount of workers' compensation benefits paid, deducting a proportionate share for attorney fees and costs. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether whether the court of appeal erred in reversing a judgment of the Office of Workers' Compensation (OWC), which held the employer was entitled to a credit against future medical benefits. Upon review, the Court concluded that OWC correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, and therefore reinstated the OWC's judgment.

The Court of Appeals held that the superior court improperly affirmed a damages award to Petitioner Valencia Scott on her workers' compensation claim because the ALJ erred in ruling Petitioner's deniability resulted from a fictional new accident as opposed to a change in condition, and that her claim for total temporary disability was thus not barred by the applicable statute of limitation. The Supreme Court granted review of the case to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a "fictional new accident" could not apply to situations where an employee who suffered a compensable injury and subsequently suffers a progressive worsening of that condition whereby she must cease working completely. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Petitioner sustained a foot injury and was awarded compensation. She subsequently returned to work in a new position that required no strenuous activity, but she developed knee and gait problems as a result of the wear and tear of ordinary life. This gradual worsening constituted a change of condition, not a new accident. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision.

The Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division awarded benefits to Appellant Gary Mitcheson after he fell at work and injured his tailbone in July of 2007. Approximately two years later, the Division issued a final determination denying payment for medical care that Appellant claimed was related to his workplace injury. Appellant requested a contested case hearing, and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the Division's determination. Appellant appealed to the district court, which upheld the OAH's order. On appeal, Appellant challenged the OAH order contending: (1) the order was arbitrary and unsupported by substantial evidence; (2) the OAH's denial of payment for treating Appellant's tailbone was arbitrary; and (3) the OAH order denying payment for medical care contrary to the "Rule Out" rule was contrary to law. Finding the issues Appellant raised on appeal to be without merit, the Supreme Court affirmed the OAH's decision.

Bridget Weaver and two other school administrators sued the Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County ("the Board") and Roy D. Nichols, in his official capacity as superintendent of the Mobile County Public School System (collectively, "Defendants") seeking a declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus, and injunctive relief. Weaver alleged that she had been partially terminated or demoted from her employment as an assistant principal pursuant to a reduction-in-force policy implemented by the defendants; that she was entitled to the benefit of policy no. 6.44, which mandated that "any tenured employee terminated or demoted pursuant to [a reduction-in-force policy] shall have a one-time recall right to a position for which he or she is certified and legally qualified"; and that, since the time of Weaver's partial termination or demotion, several assistant principals with less seniority than her have been placed in available assistant-principal positions. The trial court awarded backpay and ordered that she be offered an assistant-principal position once one became available. Defendants moved the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate its final judgment which was ultimately denied. Defendants appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs sued the wrong entities: the Board and Superintendent were entitled to immunity from suit with regard to their cases. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims against the board. Because both the Board and Superintendent appealed from void judgments, the Court dismissed their appeals for want of jurisdiction.

Claimant-Appellant Megan Peterson worked at a nursing home owned by The Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society (Good Samaritan). Claimant alleged that she sustained a work-related injury to her back when assisting a resident with a wheelchair. Good Samaritan denied the claim. Two doctors, who testified by deposition, disagreed whether Claimant suffered a work-related injury and whether employment was a major contributing cause of her back condition. The Department of Labor (Department), after considering the depositions and Claimant's medical records, determined that she failed to prove she sustained a compensable work-related injury. The Department also determined that Claimant failed to prove that her employment remained a major contributing cause of her condition and need for treatment. The circuit court affirmed. On de novo review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court concluded that one of the doctor's opinions was sufficient to meet Claimant's burden of proving that her employment caused a work-related injury and that was and remained a major contributing cause of her back condition and need for treatment.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether proof of California workers’ compensation payments could be admitted into evidence in a personal injury action in Nevada. Because Nevada, the forum state, and California, the state in which the payments were made, both have statutes that permit proof of workers' compensation payments to be allowed into evidence in personal injury actions, the Court concluded that Nevada law governed. Applying Nevada law, the Court held that evidence of the actual amount of workers' compensation benefits paid should have been admitted and that a clarifying jury instruction provided by statute should have been given. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Cumberland Teachers Association (union), appealed to the Supreme Court that confirmed an arbitrator's award in favor of the Cumberland School Committee (school committee). After protracted contract negotiations, the school committee and the union agreed on a three-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that would govern their relations for the 2006-2007, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 academic years. "However, the parties soon discovered that they had left the negotiating table with two very different understandings of how a key component of their agreement would be implemented." An arbitrator was selected and the parties agreed that the issue to be decided by the arbitrator was whether “the Cumberland School Committee place[d] the aggrieved teachers at the correct salary level for the 2007-08 school year?” On appeal to the Supreme Court, the union argued that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded a contract provision when he found that there was no written agreement about how the new salary schedule would be implemented for the 2007-2008 year. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the union did not demonstrate that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the contract or that he was completely irrational in arriving at his decision and award.