Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

When calculating the income benefit for he claimant's work-related injury, the ALJ apportioned sixty-three percent of the twenty-one percent permanent impairment rating that existed at maximum medical improvement (MMI) to a pre-existing active condition, which was non-compensable. The court of appeals affirmed the workers' compensation board's decision to vacate the calculation on the ground that the ALJ should have subtracted the pre-existing active impairment rating that existed immediately before the injury from the impairment rating that existed at MMI and based the income benefit on the remainder. The employer appealed, arguing that nothing prevented the ALJ from apportioning the impairment rating at MMI based on permissible inferences drawn from the medical evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the board and court of appeals applied the correct methodology for determining the impairment rating upon which to base income benefits.

Appellee received temporary total disability compensation (TTC) for a period of a year and a half during which time Appellee also helped his wife with her business. Appellee was not paid for his services. Appellant Industrial Commission of Ohio learned of these activities, determined that they constituted "work," and concluded that TTC should not have been paid. Accordingly, the TTC award was vacated and overpayment was declared. In addition, the Commission found McBee had committed fraud by submitting disability paperwork during the relevant time period, in which Appellee certified he was not working. The court of appeals overturned the finding of fraud after concluding that the evidence did not prove McBee knew that his unpaid activities for his wife's company constituted "work" for purposes of TTC eligibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no evidence that McBee knowingly misled the Commission because there was no evidence McBee knew his unpaid activities constituted work that would preclude TTC.

Petitioner sought review of the Secretary of Labor's decision in favor of petitioner's former employee who intervened in this case. In contradiction to the findings of an ALJ, the Secretary's Administrative Review Board (ARB) found that petitioner gave pretextual, shifting explanations for terminating the employee and found that the employee suffered disparate treatment in comparison to other similarly situated employees. Consequently, the ARB found that the employee proved that petitioner fired him for engaging in conduct protected by the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA), 42 U.S.C. 5851. The court concluded that the ARB erred by reviewing the ALJ's decision de novo rather than observing the Secretary's regulation requiring substantial review. The court also concluded that the ARB failed to follow Eleventh Circuit precedent when analyzing its contrary factual findings. Therefore, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant in this case attempted to challenge an agency decision denying her claim for unemployment benefits. Appellant filed a timely petition for review of agency action pursuant to Wyo. R. App. P. 12 (Rule 12). The district court dismissed the petition due to procedural deficiencies. Appellant subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration based on Wyo. R. Civ. P. 60 (Rule 60). The district court denied the motion. Appellant then appealed the order denying her motion for reconsideration. At issue on appeal was whether, when a district court enters a final judgment in a Rule 12 agency appeal, a party can file a Rule 60 motion to set aside the court's judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that a Rule 60 motion is not an avenue available to mount a challenge to a district court's final decision in an agency appeal.

Petitioner was employed by the West Virginia Division of Culture and History (Division) as an at will employee. Petitioner was later terminated from his employment. Petitioner filed a grievance with the Public Employees Grievance Board. An ALJ denied the Division's motion to dismiss and authorized the filing of an amended grievance. Petitioner subsequently filed an amended grievance, which a succeeding ALJ dismissed. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Petitioner's grievance for failure to state a ground upon which relief may be granted, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by affirming the decision of the Board without a hearing before an ALJ; and (2) the second ALJ had authority to enter a dismissal order after the previous ALJ denied the Division's motion to dismiss.

This appeal was brought by Appellant following two separate orders of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Allied Warehousing Services, Inc., the Appellee, dismissing Appellant's workers' compensation fraud and common law fraud claims and granting summary judgment to Appellee, finding it to be a special employer of Appellant for the purpose of workers' compensation immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment on Appellant's workers' compensation and common law fraud claims because there was no basis to conclude that the alleged fraudulent conduct had any prejudicial effect on the decision of the ALJ regarding the suspension of Appellant's temporary total disability benefits; and (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to Appellee on Appellant's negligence claim on the basis that Appellee was Appellant's special employer, thus entitling Appellee to workers' compensation immunity from such a negligence claim.

Appellant Lola Watkins appealed a final order entered in the circuit court, which affirmed a decision by the ALJ of the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board denying Appellant's grievance of her termination from employment as a teacher. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ's denial of Appellant's grievance was not clearly wrong, as (1) the ALJ properly concluded that the Board proved by a preponderance of the evidence the basis for Appellant's termination; (2) Appellant was afforded adequate notice that the Board intended to present matters relating to her employment history at the grievance hearing; and (3) Appellant failed to make a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge.

Michael Manuel, the sole owner of Toner Plus, Inc., closed his business on May 30, 2009. Manuel then filed a personal claim for unemployment compensation benefits. The South Dakota Department of Labor determined that Manuel was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits because he "voluntarily" dissolved his business and did not have "good cause" for doing so under S.D. Codified Laws 61-6-13 to -13.1 The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ALJ did not err in finding the Department met its burden of showing Manuel's decision to terminate his employment with Toner Plus was voluntary; and (2) the Court did not need to address whether Manuel had "good cause" for voluntarily terminating his employment.

Appellant had an allowed workers' compensation claim arising from a 2002 injury. Appellant retired from Appellee a year later and never worked again. In 2009, the Industrial Commission of Ohio denied Appellant's application for temporary total disability compensation (TTC) after finding, among other things, that Appellant had abandoned the work force for reasons unrelated to his injury. Appellant subsequently filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion in denying TTC. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant could not credibly assert that he had lost income due to his industrial injury, and therefore, the Commission did not err in denying TTC.

Defendant, Tudor's Biscuit World of America, appealed the circuit court's order denying its motion to alter or amend the court's order denying its motion to set aside the default judgment rendered against it in this workplace injury action. Tudor's asserted (1) the circuit court erred in its application of the "reasonable time" requirement set forth in W.V. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to its motion to set aside the default judgment, arguing that such timeliness requirement was inapplicable to void judgments; and (2) the circuit court improperly applied and weighed the factors set forth in Parsons v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corporation in denying its motion for relief from judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court should have properly set aside the default judgment, as (1) Tudor's motion to set aside the default judgment was filed within a reasonable period of time; and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in its analysis of the Parsons factors to the extent that such analysis resulted in its denial of Plaintiff's motion for relief from default judgment, and therefore, to that extent, erred in denying Tudor's subsequent motion to alter or amend.