Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, the former employer of a retired longshoreman, challenged a Benefits Review Board (BRB) decision that overruled an ALJ twice and held petitioner liable for the longshoreman's hearing loss. The court held that the BRB erred in rejecting expert evidence in part and in then rejecting the ALJ's first conclusion based on his evaluation of the evidence. Further, the court need not reach the aggravation rule issue raised by petitioner. Because the BRB initially applied the wrong legal test and standard of review to the ALJ's decision, the court reversed.

After the Air Force announced it would conduct a reduction-in-force (RIF) at Luke Air Force Base, the Union made several proposals about how the RIF should be conducted and asked the Air Force to enter into negotiations. The Air Force claimed it had no duty to negotiate over three of the Union's proposals, prompting the Union to appeal the FLRA. The FLRA determined that the Air Force had an obligation to negotiate over two of the three disputed proposals and the Air Force subsequently petitioned for review of the unfavorable rulings. Because the Air Force's objections to the FLRA's rulings were either waived or unavailing, the petition for review was denied.

Plaintiff, an employee of the New York City Fire Department, applied for and received workers' compensation benefits from the city. Plaintiff subsequently commenced this action against the city and its Parks and Recreation Department, alleging both common law negligence and a cause of action under General Municipal Law 205-a. The city moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211, arguing that plaintiff's receipt of workers' compensation benefits barred his lawsuit. The court concluded that it was not the intent of the Legislature to allow recipients of workers' compensation benefits to sue their employers in tort under section 205-a. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether Appellant Six L's Packing Company and its claims administrator Broadspire Services, Inc. bore liability for workers' compensation benefits as a statutory employer of an injured truck driver employed as an independent contractor. Appellant owns and leases various farms and distribution and processing facilities in North America. Claimant suffered injuries in a vehicle accident on a Pennsylvania roadway while transporting Appellant’s tomatoes between a warehouse in Pennsylvania and a processing facility in Maryland. Appellant submitted evidence to establish that it did not own trucks or employ drivers, but, rather, utilized independent contractors to supply transportation services. Appellant thus took the position that it was not Claimant’s employer. The WCJ found Appellant liable for payment of workers' compensation benefits. On further appeal, the Commonwealth Court affirmed on essentially the same reasoning as that of the WCJ. In its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court, recognizing "a degree of ambiguity inherent in the overall scheme for statutory employer liability, arising out of differences in the definitions for “contractor” as used in various provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA); the idiosyncratic conception of subcontracting fashioned in Section 302(a) [of the Act]; the substantial overlap between Sections 302(a) and (b); and the apparent differences in the depiction of the concept of statutory employment as between the Act’s liability and immunity provisions. Viewing the statutory scheme as a whole, however, and employing the principle of liberal construction in furtherance of the Act’s remedial purposes, [the Court found] it to be plain enough that the Legislature meant to require persons (including entities) contracting with others to perform work which is a regular or recurrent part of their businesses to assure that the employees of those others are covered by workers’ compensation insurance, on pain of assuming secondary liability for benefits payment upon a default."

The issue before the Supreme Court was the proper method of calculating an hourly-wage claimant's average weekly wage under Section 309 of the Workers’ Compensation Act where the specific loss claimant suffered an initial incident, changed employers, and later suffered a work-related injury caused by the initial incident. Claimant Janice Weber-Brown worked for Appellant Lancaster General Hospital as a licensed practical nurse. In 1980, while cleaning the tracheotomy of a patient who was infected with the herpes simplex virus (HSV), the patient coughed, causing sputum to spray in Claimant’s left eye. Approximately two weeks after the incident, Claimant’s eye became swollen and infected, and Claimant believed she contracted HSV. Claimant left the employ of Lancaster General in 1985 for reasons unrelated to the eye incident. At that time, she earned $8 per hour and worked full-time. In the years following her departure from the hospital, Claimant’s eye became infected several more times. Each time, her symptoms subsided with treatment, and Claimant did not miss any work with her other employers due to her eye infections. In October 2006, however, Claimant’s eye again became infected and, this time, her infection did not respond to treatment. By February 2007, Claimant lost the vision in her left eye, and, in May 2007, she underwent a cornea transplant. The transplant did not improve her vision, and, as a result of her blindness, she was not able to return to work. At that time, Claimant earned $21 per hour. Lancaster General denied Claimant's allegations that she contracted HSV while working for the hospital, and challenged her claim that she be paid based on her then-current wage with her new employer. The WCJ determined Claimant suffered a work-related injury and held that the hospital pay Claimant's wage set at $21 per hour. Lancaster General appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the WCJ correctly held that the Claimant's weekly wage should have been based on her 2007 wages with her new employer, as those wages were earned with that employer at the time Claimant suffered her work-related injury.

Whitmore began his federal government career in 1972. In 1990 his group transferred to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Prior to 2005, Whitmore regularly received better than satisfactory performance reviews, bonuses, and awards, and was never subject to discipline. In 2005, Whitmore began making public disclosures that OSHA was failing to enforce its recordkeeping requirements and acquiescing in industry reports of impossibly low numbers of injuries and illnesses. He provided comments to newspapers. Also in 2005, Whitmore provided an affidavit supporting a co-worker in her Equal Employment Opportunity complaint for alleged discrimination and retaliation by her managers at OSHA. Due to various medical and personal matters, Whitmore took significant leave from work. Following a number of additional incidents, he was removed from his position. The Merit Systems Protection Board upheld the termination. The Federal Circuit reversed. In analyzing whether the DOL had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Whitmore would have been removed regard-less of his whistleblowing disclosures (5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)), the MSPB excluded or ignored evidence offered by Whitmore necessary to adjudicate Whitmore’s retaliation claim, and otherwise applied the law incorrectly.

Sandy Johme was employed by St. John's Mercy Healthcare as a billing representative, and her work involved typing charges at a computer in an office. After making a pot of coffee at an office kitchen at work, Johme fell and injured herself. Johme was "clocked-in" as an employee at the time of her fall. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission awarded workers' compensation benefits to Johme after applying Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.020.3(2). The Supreme Court reversed the Commission's decision, holding that Johme was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because she failed to show that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment as specified in section 287.020.3(2).

Catherine Morris submitted a worker's compensation claim for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits, and the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division denied her claim. The Wyoming Medical Commission upheld the Division's denial of benefits. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not abuse its discretion in admitting a psychological report produced after the discovery cutoff; and (2) the Commission abused its discretion in limiting the scope of Morris' testimony to matters not discussed in the discovery deposition taken by the Division, but Morris did not object below to that limitation and thus waived her right to appeal that issue.

Appellant David Pittman brought a negligence action against Western Engineering Company and Evert Falkena (collectively, Appellees) after David's wife, Robin Pittman, died in a work-related accident while working for Western on a road construction crew. David's sole theory of liability was bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees and dismissed David's claim with prejudice, determining that the action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) David's negligence action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act because David accepted payment releasing Western, thus barring his action against Western by operation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-148; and (2) this employer immunity extends to Falkena, a fellow employee of Robin, under Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-111.

Mary Ann Wilkinson was employed by the Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama for several years, until the Board terminated her employment in December 2009. In July 2010, Wilkinson sued the Board, seeking compensation she alleged was due her pursuant to her employment contracts. The Board filed a motion to dismiss Wilkinsons complaint, in which it alleged that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., on the ground that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the Board, as a State agency, is immune from suit under Ala. Const. 1901, Art. I, sec. 14; that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., because it failed to state a claim; and that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., for improper venue. In its petition for a writ of certiorari, the Board argued this case presented an issue of first impression regarding whether the Board is a State agency that is entitled to section 14 immunity and whether the Board was entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Board of Adjustment. The Board argues that the Court of Civil Appeals erred when it concluded that the Board was not a State agency entitled immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Board was a State agency and therefore entitled to immunity pursuant to section 14, the courts of this State were without jurisdiction in this case, and the Board of Adjustment would have jurisdiction over Wilkinsons claims. For these reasons, the Court of Civil Appeals erred when it reversed the trial courts judgment dismissing Wilkinsons complaint against the Board and remanded the case for further proceedings.