Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this workers' compensation case, an ALJ determined that injuries Claimant sustained in an automobile accident while returning to Kentucky from yearling sales held in New York came within the course and scope of his employment with Defendant, Gaines Gentry Thoroughbreds. The workers' compensation board and court of appeals affirmed. Gaines Gentry appealed, arguing that the ALJ erred by awarding benefits because Claimant's injury was not work-related under the dual purpose, positional risk, or traveling employee doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ALJ reasonably found that Gaines Gentry instructed Claimant to travel to New York in a van with its yearlings in order to attend to them; and (2) the ALJ properly concluded under he circumstances that an accident that occurred while Claimant was returning to Kentucky to resume his usual duties for Gaines Gentry was work-related.

After serving eighteen months as the superintendent of Bourbon County public schools, Appellant Arnold Carter transferred into the position of consultant to the school district pursuant to an "exit strategy." The details of Carter's resignation and consulting contract were discussed and determined in a closed session during a meeting of the Bourbon County Board of Education. Appellee Jamie Smith, a parent and concerned citizen, challenged the Board's actions as violative of Kentucky's Open Meetings Act. The circuit court found Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.801(1)(f) permitted the Board's closed session discussion of Carter's resignation but not its discussion of Carter's consulting contract and consequently voided the consulting contract. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Board violated the Act when it discussed Carter's resignation and consulting contract in closed session; and (2) Carter's consulting contract was voidable as a matter of law and was properly voided by the circuit court.

Employee filed state discrimination claims against Employer. Employee first filed her claims with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which dismissed her claims. In the meantime, Employee filed a civil action in the U.S. district court. Employer moved for summary judgment, claiming that Employee's charge was time-barred because it was received by the EEOC more than 300 days after her demotion. Employee argued that the intake questionnaire she submitted to the EEOC constituted a valid charge and was within the 300-day statutory time period. The U.S. district court granted summary judgment for Employer. Employee's claims later went to the Equal Rights Division (ERD) of the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, which found concluded that Employee's claims had merit. An ALJ dismissed the proceeding on the basis of claim preclusion. The Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) affirmed. On remand, the ALJ again dismissed, concluding (1) Employee's claims were untimely, and (2) the doctrine of issue preclusion prevented Employee from relitigating the issue of when her charge was filed with the EEOC. LIRC affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that applying the doctrine of issue preclusion in this case did not comport with principles of fundamental fairness. Remanded.

Appellant Nancy Forster was terminated from the position of state public defender by the board of trustees of the state office of public defender. Forster subsequently filed a wrongful discharge action against the office of the public defender without first appealing administratively her termination. The circuit court dismissed Forster's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Forster appealed, arguing that the circuit court erroneously granted the State's motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed without reaching the merits of Forster's claim, holding that Forster failed to exhaust the available and primary administrative remedy provided to at-will, executive service State employees under Md. Code Ann. State Pers. & Pens. 11-305, even though she was not given written notice by the board of trustees of the availability of that avenue of appeal, as section 11-305 does not require the appointing authority to provide notice of the available administrative appeal.

An employer petitioned the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board for reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for payments it made to a disabled worker. The Fund opposed the petition. After a hearing, the Board granted the petition. The Fund asked the Board to reconsider its decision in December 2009. The hearing officer told the parties that he would inform them in writing by the end of January 2010 about what action the Board was taking on the reconsideration request. Instead, in April 2010 the hearing officer sent a prehearing conference summary indicating that the reconsideration request had been denied by operation of statute. The next day the Fund filed a notice of appeal and a motion to accept a late-filed appeal with the Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission. The Commission denied the Fund's request to file its appeal late and dismissed the appeal. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the Fund filed a timely appeal, it reversed the Commission's decision and remand for consideration of the Fund's appeal.

In consolidated negligence actions under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, against two railroad defendants, a former employee, alleged cumulative, or wear-out, injuries to the neck, knees, left elbow and thumb, and accidental injury to the left forearm while driving a spike. The district court entered judgment for defendants. The First Circuit affirmed. The aggravation claims were untimely, and no fact-finder could reasonably have inferred that plaintiff became aware of a work connection with his knee pain and neck injury only after mid-September of 2004. The court rejected claims based in negligence, alleging inadequate tools and failure to obtain ergonomic studies of the activities required to perform plaintiff’s jobs and upheld admission of evidence of malingering.

The State of Illinois, facing a significant and unprecedented fiscal deficit, brokered a series of compensation agreements with the exclusive bargaining representative for 40,000 state employees. The parties trimmed several hundred million dollars in fiscal years 2011 and 2012 by deferring general wage increases and instituting a voluntary furlough program. Despite these measures, the fiscal year 2012 budget did not contain sufficient appropriations for deferred wage increases due employees of 14 state agencies. The state froze the pay of those employees, repudiating agreements with the union. The district court dismissed a suit that alleged violations of the Contracts Clause and the Equal Protection Clause and state law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the Contracts Clause claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The court noted that the state’s actions did not bar a breach of contract suit. There was a rational relationship between those actions and a legitimate governmental purpose, precluding an equal protection claim.

After Employee, an electrician, received a work-related injury, Employee sought additional workers' compensation benefits, alleging that Employer committed a violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), which proximately caused his industrial injury. The requirement in question directs employers to supply protective apparatus to employees working on specified electrical equipment. A staff hearing officer (SHO) for the Industrial Commission of Ohio granted Employee's VSSR application after finding that Employer had violated Ohio Adm. Code 4123:1-5-12(A). Employer filed a complaint in mandamus, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion in finding a VSSR. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employer violated section 4123:1-5-12(A) because it did not supply Employee with protective equipment for the main breaker cabinet Employer worked on when he was injured.

On November 7 2006, Courtney George was elected prosecuting attorney for Phelps County. George did not receive any salary increases during her term in office despite a report issued by the Missouri Citizens' Commission on Compensation for Elected Officials on December 1, 2006 increasing the salary for associate circuit judges in 2007 and 2008. In 2010, George filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against the elected members of the county commission and others (Respondents), requesting a preliminary order compelling Respondents to approve increased compensation rates and to issue her underpayment of her salary for the duration of her term in office. The circuit court issued a preliminary order in mandamus but later quashed the order. At issue on appeal was whether a midterm increase in compensation for a full-time prosecuting attorney violates the provision of the Missouri Constitution prohibiting the compensation of government officers from being increased during the term of office. The Supreme Court made permanent the preliminary writ of mandamus, holding that because the midterm increase in compensation in this case resulted from the application of a statutory formula for calculating compensation in place before George took office, the increase did not violate the Constitution.

These appeals arose from an ALJ's order, affirmed by the Benefits Review Board, finding that Gary Looney suffered disabling obstructive lung disease arising out of his work as a coal miner and awarding his widow black lung benefits payable by Looney's former employer. The court determined that the award of benefits was supported by the record and affirmed the award of benefits to Looney, denying his former employer's petition for review.