Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After the Acting General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board withdrew an unfair labor practice complaint that his predecessor had issued against a union, the aggrieved employer requested permission to appeal the complaint’s withdrawal to the Board. The Board denied the request, concluding that the Acting General Counsel’s decision was an unreviewable act of prosecutorial discretion. The employer then petitioned the Fifth Circuit for review of the Board’s order.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction over the petition for review, that Acting General Counsel’s designation was valid and that the Board permissibly determined that Acting General Counsel had discretion to withdraw the complaint against the Unions. The court explained that the Board’s own conclusion that the General Counsel has the discretion to withdraw unfair labor practice complaints in cases where a motion for summary judgment has been filed but no hearing has occurred, and the Board has neither issued a Notice to Show Cause nor transferred the case to itself fits squarely within the holding of UFCW. As such, it is a permissible interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) View "United Natural Foods v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Defendant Donald J. Trump and Appellant the United States of America appealed from a district court judgment denying their motion to substitute the United States in this action pursuant to the Westfall Act of 1988. In the Second Circuit’s prior opinion, the court vacated the district court’s judgment that Trump did not act within the scope of his employment, and the court certified to the D.C. Court of Appeals the following question: Under the laws of the District, were the allegedly libelous public statements made, during his term in office, by the President of the United States, denying allegations of misconduct, with regards to events prior to that term of office, within the scope of his employment as President of the United States?   The D.C. Court of Appeals reformulated our certified question in two parts, asking (1) whether the D.C. Court of Appeals should opine on the scope of the President of the United States’ employment and (2) how the court might clarify or modify the District of Columbia’s law of respondeat superior to resolve the issue in this appeal. The D.C. Court of Appeals answered the former part in the negative and provided additional guidance in response to the latter. Having vacated the district court’s judgment in the court’s prior opinion, the court remanded for further proceedings consistent with the guidance provided in the D.C. Court of Appeals’ opinion. View "E. Jean Carroll v. Donald J. Trump" on Justia Law

Claimant Hipolito Coria sought review of the Court of Appeals’ decision reversing a penalty that the Workers’ Compensation Board imposed on respondent SAIF for unreasonable claims processing. The board imposed the penalty pursuant to ORS 656.262(11)(a), which provides, in part, that, if an “insurer . . . unreasonably refuses to pay compensation,” the insurer “shall be liable for an additional amount up to 25 percent of the amounts then due,” plus penalty-related attorney fees. On review, the parties disagreed about the board’s reason for imposing the penalty. They also disagreed about many of the procedural and substantive legal requirements for imposing penalties pursuant to ORS 656.262(11)(a). The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the board’s imposition of the penalty was not supported by substantial reason because the board’s order failed to “articulate a rational connection between the facts and the legal conclusions it draws from them.” Consequently, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the board to explain its reasoning; necessarily, the Court did not reach the parties’ arguments about the legal requirements for imposing penalties pursuant to ORS 656.262(11)(a). View "SAIF v. Coria" on Justia Law

People working part-time may qualify for weekly unemployment benefits, but must accurately report their income so the Indiana Department of Workforce Development can reduce their benefits accordingly. A claimant who knowingly fails to disclose earnings on a weekly application must repay all benefits received for that week and is subject to a civil penalty of 25% of that forfeited amount. Grashoff omitted her part-time income on 24 weekly applications. The Department determined that she knowingly violated the law and assessed a forfeiture and penalty totaling $11,190. An ALJ affirmed the sanction. Grashoff did not seek state judicial review but filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the sanction violates the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The district court rejected the claim, classifying the entire forfeiture as remedial rather than punitive. The penalty is a punitive sanction subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny but is not grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Grashoff conceded that the difference between the benefits she received and the smaller amount she would have received had she reported her income is purely remedial. The remaining forfeiture amount, even when considered together with the 25% penalty, is not a grossly disproportionate sanction for Grashoff’s knowing violations of the law. View "Grashoff v. Payne" on Justia Law

Erasmo Paredes sustained an on-the-job injury in late 2019. He continued working for his employer, Schlumberger Technology Corp., until January 30, 2020. His employer's insurance carrier, Travelers Indemnity Company of America, provided voluntary medical treatment to Paredes from January 3, 2020, through February 14, 2020. Paredes's CC-Form 3 Claim for Compensation was filed on December 3, 2020, alleging an injury date of December 29, 2019. This claim was filed ten months after Paredes's last medical treatment, but within one year from the date of his injury. Travelers's counsel entered an appearance in the Workers' Compensation case on December 22, 2020. On February 18, 2021, the affidavit of Travelers's claims handler was filed with attachments indicating Travelers provided medical treatment to Paredes in the total amount of $1,371.47. No disability benefits were paid. On the same date, counsel for Travelers filed the CC-Form 10 Answer and Notice of Contested Issues on behalf of Schlumberger raising the defense of statute of limitations pursuant to Section 69(A)(1) of Title 85 A. 1 Schlumberger also denied compensable injuries, alleged pre-existing conditions pursuant to 85A O.S. Supp. 2019, § 2(9)(b)(6), and denied benefits. An ALJ issued an order that was filed on May 13, 2021, concluding that Paredes's claim was not barred by Section 69(A)(1). Schlumberger appealed to the Workers' Compensation Commission ("Commission"), and the parties filed written arguments. Oral argument before the Commission was held on January 14, 2022. The Commission, sitting en banc, affirmed the Decision of the ALJ by order filed January 18, 2022. Schlumberger appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court seeking review of the Commission's interpretation of 85A O.S. Supp. 2019, § 69(A)(1). Finding no error in the Commission's interpretation, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of America" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the district court and court of appeals that the workers' compensation commissioner erred in granting Employer's motion for summary judgment and dismissing Employee's review-reopening petition, holding that Employee was permitted to pursue a claim for a permanent injury in a review-reopening proceeding despite an earlier adjudication that her injury was not permanent.Employee was injured during the course and work of her employment. Employee filed a petition seeking workers' compensation for a permanent disability, but the deputy commissioner refused to order additional benefits beyond those that Employer had already paid. Employee filed a petition for review-reopening with the workers' compensation commission. The commission determined that Employee's claim for permanent disability benefits was barred by principles of res judicata. The district court reversed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the agency erred in dismissing Employer's review-reopening petition. View "Green v. North Central Iowa Regional Solid Waste Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Relator's petition in this original action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the city of Sheffield Lake and its mayor (collectively, the city) to produce documents in response to a public records request sent by Relator, holding that Relator failed to establish that he was entitled to the requested relief.Relator, a city police officer and the city's only black officer at the time, submitted a public records request for records relating to an incident in which Anthony Campo, the city's former police chief, resigned after placing a "KKK" sign across the back of Relator's coat to cover the word "POLICE," donned a paper KKK hat and told Relator he should wear one on his next police call. The city provided only partial responses to the request. Relator then brought this mandamus action. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding (1) the evidence showed that the city made reasonable efforts to locate the documents; and (2) Relator's requests for awards of statutory damages, attorney fees, and court costs are also denied. View "State ex rel. Pool v. Sheffield Lake" on Justia Law

In 2015, Levine, an African-American woman, applied for the position of supervisor of customer services at the main post office in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Levine had then worked for USPS for over 27 years, in a variety of positions. USPS did not select Levine for the position. Instead, it hired a white employee, Peare, whom Levine alleges was significantly less qualified than Levine. USPS disputes Levine’s allegations that the failure to hire her was racially discriminatory under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e.The district court granted USPS summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting various factual disputes. Levine met her burden of producing enough evidence to convince a reasonable jury that USPS’s proffered reasons for not promoting her may have been a mere pretext for racial discrimination, so USPS was not entitled to summary judgment. The parties dispute the position’s requirements. Levine possesses three post-secondary degrees and has had seven different awards from USPS. Peare’s formal academic training ended with high school and she had worked for USPS for nearly eight years. Levine provided abundant evidence that she is arguably more qualified for the position than Peare. USPS’s reliance on Peare’s purportedly superior interview warrants similar scrutiny as does USPS’s contention that Peare had more relevant experience than Levine. View "Levine v. DeJoy" on Justia Law

The Mine Safety and Health Administration (“MSHA”) is an agency within the Department of Labor whose mission is to administer the provisions of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act (“Mine Act”). The Mine Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”), acting through MSHA, to promulgate mandatory safety and health standards, inspect mines, issue citations and orders for violations of the Act or mandatory standards, and propose penalties for those violations. An inspector for MSHA discovered a crane at Westfall operating on-site with no working service brakes. Eight years after the sentence was deemed a final order, and only after MSHA had begun enforcement proceedings against the operator for failing to pay its delinquent penalties, Westfall filed a motion to reopen the matter. A two-member majority of the Commission granted the motion. The DC Circuit granted the Secretary’s petition for review, reversed the Commission’s decision dismissing Westfall’s motion to reopen as moot, and remanded the case for a prompt disposition. The court explained that the Commission’s decision relies on a ground not raised or addressed by the parties, lacks substantial evidence to support its principal findings, and ignores the potential applicability of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) covering motions to reopen. View "Secretary of Labor v. Westfall Aggregate & Materials, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing this action brought by Academic Labor United (ALU) requesting declaratory judgments that graduate assistants were foreclosed from exercising the collective bargaining rights provided to public employees under Haw. Const. art. XIII, 2 and Haw. Rev. Stat. 89, holding that there was no error.ALU, which represented graduate student employees of the University of Hawaii who wish to engage in collective bargaining, brought this suit arguing that a pair of 1972 decisions of the Hawaii Public Employment Relations Board determined that graduate assistants were not "employees" under chapter 89 and were thus foreclosed from exercising collective bargaining rights. The circuit court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because ALU had not invoked Hawaii Administrative Rules 12-42-9 to clarify whether its members are employees under chapter 89 and had not exhausted its administrative remedies, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over ALU's action. View "Academic Labor United v. Bd. of Regents of the University of Haw." on Justia Law