Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2015, Levine, an African-American woman, applied for the position of supervisor of customer services at the main post office in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Levine had then worked for USPS for over 27 years, in a variety of positions. USPS did not select Levine for the position. Instead, it hired a white employee, Peare, whom Levine alleges was significantly less qualified than Levine. USPS disputes Levine’s allegations that the failure to hire her was racially discriminatory under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e.The district court granted USPS summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting various factual disputes. Levine met her burden of producing enough evidence to convince a reasonable jury that USPS’s proffered reasons for not promoting her may have been a mere pretext for racial discrimination, so USPS was not entitled to summary judgment. The parties dispute the position’s requirements. Levine possesses three post-secondary degrees and has had seven different awards from USPS. Peare’s formal academic training ended with high school and she had worked for USPS for nearly eight years. Levine provided abundant evidence that she is arguably more qualified for the position than Peare. USPS’s reliance on Peare’s purportedly superior interview warrants similar scrutiny as does USPS’s contention that Peare had more relevant experience than Levine. View "Levine v. DeJoy" on Justia Law

The Mine Safety and Health Administration (“MSHA”) is an agency within the Department of Labor whose mission is to administer the provisions of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act (“Mine Act”). The Mine Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”), acting through MSHA, to promulgate mandatory safety and health standards, inspect mines, issue citations and orders for violations of the Act or mandatory standards, and propose penalties for those violations. An inspector for MSHA discovered a crane at Westfall operating on-site with no working service brakes. Eight years after the sentence was deemed a final order, and only after MSHA had begun enforcement proceedings against the operator for failing to pay its delinquent penalties, Westfall filed a motion to reopen the matter. A two-member majority of the Commission granted the motion. The DC Circuit granted the Secretary’s petition for review, reversed the Commission’s decision dismissing Westfall’s motion to reopen as moot, and remanded the case for a prompt disposition. The court explained that the Commission’s decision relies on a ground not raised or addressed by the parties, lacks substantial evidence to support its principal findings, and ignores the potential applicability of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) covering motions to reopen. View "Secretary of Labor v. Westfall Aggregate & Materials, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing this action brought by Academic Labor United (ALU) requesting declaratory judgments that graduate assistants were foreclosed from exercising the collective bargaining rights provided to public employees under Haw. Const. art. XIII, 2 and Haw. Rev. Stat. 89, holding that there was no error.ALU, which represented graduate student employees of the University of Hawaii who wish to engage in collective bargaining, brought this suit arguing that a pair of 1972 decisions of the Hawaii Public Employment Relations Board determined that graduate assistants were not "employees" under chapter 89 and were thus foreclosed from exercising collective bargaining rights. The circuit court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because ALU had not invoked Hawaii Administrative Rules 12-42-9 to clarify whether its members are employees under chapter 89 and had not exhausted its administrative remedies, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over ALU's action. View "Academic Labor United v. Bd. of Regents of the University of Haw." on Justia Law

The Commission on Teacher Credentialing (Commission) and its Committee of Credentials (Committee) (collectively, defendants) appealed the grant of mandamus relief to petitioner Russell Earnest, setting aside the Committee’s disciplinary recommendation against him and enjoining the Commission from acting on that recommendation. Defendants argued the trial court erred in finding: (1) Earnest was excused from exhausting his administrative remedies; and (2) the Committee lacked jurisdiction to conduct a formal review pursuant to Education Code1 section 44242.5 (d). They further asserted the trial court should have denied the petition under the doctrine of judicial restraint. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded all three factors outlined in Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd., 35 Cal.4th 1072 (2005) weighed in favor of excusing Earnest from exhausting his administrative remedies. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court found that although section 44242.5 (b)(3) generally provided a jurisdictional basis for the Committee to commence initial reviews, as discussed post, the provision was also incorporated in section 44242.5 (d)(3) to provide a jurisdictional basis for the Committee to commence formal reviews. It was this jurisdictional provision the Committee relied upon in commencing a formal review of Earnest’s fitness to hold a credential. The Court thus concluded the plain language of section 44242.5(b)(3) imposed the onus on the employer to determine whether to provide a notifying statement to the Committee, and thus only the employer may determine whether an enumerated action was the “result of an allegation of misconduct,” triggering the Committee’s jurisdiction. Applying that interpretation to the facts of this case, the Court concluded the Committee did not have jurisdiction to commence a formal review of Earnest’s fitness to hold a credential. The grant of mandamus relief was thus affirmed. View "Earnest v. Com. on Teacher Credentialing" on Justia Law

The California Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (Division) debarred the following from acting as public works contractors: (1) GRFCO, Inc. (GRFCO), a contractor; (2) George Rogers Frost, the principal in GRFCO; (3) Garcia Juarez Construction (GJC), a contractor and apparent alter ego of GRFCO; and (4) James Craig Jackson, the principal in GJC and an employee of GRFCO. The Division found that, in six instances, the contractors violated apprenticeship requirements, and in two instances, Frost and Jackson had made false certifications under penalty of perjury. The trial court denied the contractors’ petition for administrative mandate. On appeal, the contractors contended: (1) there was insufficient evidence that the apprenticeship violations were knowing; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the false certification findings; (3) the contractors were debarred because they refused to join a union, in violation of the First Amendment; (5) the Division, hearing officer, and/or the investigator were biased; and (5) the hearing officer erred by denying the contractors' request to reopen, which was based on new evidence of bias. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "GRFCO, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2014, National Park Service (NPS) entered a contract with Perini to perform work on Ellis Island and hired Jacobs to provide contract management services on that contract. Jacobs assigned Weber to the project. Weber observed what he believed to be discrepancies between Perini’s work and its billing practices and disclosed those discrepancies to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), which concluded that there was no misconduct. In 2015, the NPS informed Jacobs that it would not extend its contract, purportedly because there was not enough work. Weber told OIG that he believed NPS’s decision was due to his reports and that he feared Jacobs would not retain him. Jacobs ultimately discharged Weber, who filed an OIG complaint in December 2015. In April 2016, Weber agreed to, an extension of OIG’s 180-day statutory deadline to complete its investigation. In February 2017, beyond the 360-day extended deadline, OIG completed and transmitted its report, with redacted copies to Weber and Jacobs. More than three years later, Jacobs asserted that it had never received the report.Jacobs subsequently declined to respond, asserting that the report was issued after the statutory deadline, 41 U.S.C. 4712, and that OIG lacked jurisdiction. The final determination and order were issued in December 2021, well beyond the 30-day deadline, and concluded that Jacobs had engaged in a prohibited reprisal against Weber. The Third Circuit denied an appeal, holding that the deadlines are not jurisdictional. View "Jacobs Project Management Co v. United States Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

Rueter worked for NOAA under his supervisor, Dr. Bolden. In November 2014, two female employees of agency contractors informed Bolden of incidents that had occurred at a Halloween costume party and the following morning, when Rueter engaged in inappropriate conduct directed at them. In June 2015, Rueter loudly yelled disrespectful accusations at Bolden in her office. In November 2016, Rueter’s second-level supervisor issued a letter to Rueter proposing that he be removed from his position for misconduct. Rueter filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). The agency stayed the removal action for several months at OSC’s request. In September 2017, Rueter’s third-level supervisor rescinded the first proposed removal letter and issued a second notice of proposed removal, which charged conduct unbecoming a federal employee and disrespectful conduct toward a supervisor, explaining in detail the specifications supporting each charge.Rueter, claiming that his removal was retaliation for his complaints against Bolden, unsuccessfully appealed his subsequent removal to the Merit Systems Protection Board. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting Rueter’s claims that three internal, ex parte emails deprived him of due process, that the Board improperly denied his request to have certain testimony at the removal hearing, and that he was improperly denied in camera inspection of certain documents. The emails did not provide new and material evidence nor apply undue pressure on the deciding official to remove Rueter. View "Rueter v. United States Department of Commerce" on Justia Law

The United Auto Workers union (“UAW”) and three pro-union Tesla employees filed multiple charges with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) alleging unfair labor practices against Tesla. An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Tesla had committed most of the alleged violations, and the NLRB issued an order largely affirming the ALJ. Both Tesla and the UAW filed petitions for review, and the NLRB filed a cross-application to enforce its order. Tesla and the UAW each challenged two of the NLRB’s findings through this appeal.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petitions for review. The court held that the NLRB’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, and it did not abuse its broad remedial discretion in declining to issue a notice-reading remedy. The court explained that the UAW cited no authority mandating a notice reading to remedy repeated violations in the absence of intervening cease-and-desist orders. And, as Tesla emphasizes, the company at most continued to commit violations after having a complaint filed against it, not after being ordered to cease its conduct. Moreover, given the deferential standard of review and the “special respect” given to the NLRB’s choice of remedy in light of its policy expertise and its broad, discretionary remedial powers, the court declined to disturb the NLRB’s order in this regard. View "Tesla v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Kent County Memorial Hospital and Michael Dacey, M.D., in his individual capacity and as President of Kent Hospital, and dismissing Richard Gilbert, M.D.'s suit challenging the Hospital Board of Trustees' revocation of Dr. Gilbert's privileges at Kent Hospital, holding that dismissal was proper.In granting summary judgment for Defendants, the district court concluded that Dr. Gilbert had not rebutted the presumption that Defendants were immune from liability in damages under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA), 42 U.S.C. 11101-11152, and immune from suit under Rhode Island state law. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the Board was entitled to HCQIA immunity; and (2) the Board was entitled to immunity under R.I. Gen. Laws 23-17-23(b). View "Gilbert v. Kent County Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the district court and employment appeal board affirming the decision of the department of workforce development denying Appellant's claim for unemployment benefits, holding that Appellant's claims on appeal were unavailing.Appellant, an apprentice electrician, attended a week-long training as part of his apprenticeship curriculum, and his employer didn't pay him for that week. Appellant filed a claim for unemployment benefits under Iowa Code 96.4(3), arguing that he met the statute's criteria that he be able to work, available for work, and actively seeking work. The department of workforce development denied the claim, and the employment appeal board and district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the board's decision that Appellant had not established his eligibility for benefits was not an erroneous interpretation of the law, unsupported by substantial evidence in the record, or an abuse of the board's discretion. View "Dornath v. Employment Appeal Bd." on Justia Law