Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

McIntosh, employed by the Department of Defense, was responsible for approving travel expenses for government contracts. McIntosh, on several occasions refused to approve invoices and refused to provide contract information to her coworkers. Her supervisor, Boswell, informed McIntosh that her actions amounted to a “refus[al] to perform [her] job requirements.” McIntosh filed grievances, alleging that she was being forced to disclose unauthorized information and was harassed. The agency investigated and denied McIntosh’s grievances. McIntosh took sick leave for the day of her scheduled performance review, before Boswell’s retirement. Boswell requested medical documentation. McIntosh returned to work after Boswell retired. Cohen became her supervisor. Upon her return, McIntosh submitted a letter from her doctor, stating that she “should be excused from work due to illness from 3/22/2017 through 3/24/2017.” Employee Relation determined that the documentation was not acceptable. McIntosh never provided additional documentation but reiterated her grievances and requested reassignment. She declined to speak to Cohen and went home. Cohen placed McIntosh on paid leave and issued a Notice of Proposed Removal. The deciding official, Van Winkle, sustained the removal.The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed, finding that the Department would have removed McIntosh even absent her protected whistleblowing activity. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Board’s administrative judges are improperly appointed principal officers under the Appointments Clause and that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s decision. View "McIntosh v. Department of Defense" on Justia Law

Abbey Dickerson appealed to the Judicial Department Personnel Board of Review (“Board”) after she was terminated by the Eighteenth Judicial District (“District”). As required by the Personnel Rules, the Board appointed an attorney (who happened to be a retired court of appeals judge) to serve as the hearing officer on her case. Following an evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer changed the disciplinary action to a ninety-day suspension without pay. The District then appealed to the Board, but the Board affirmed the hearing officer’s decision. Because the District remained concerned about Dickerson’s suitability to return to her position, however, it sought review of the Board’s final order by filing a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) claim in Denver district court. The question presented by this case for the Colorado Supreme Court asked whether the Board was either a “governmental body” or a “lower judicial body” within the meaning of C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), such that its decision to affirm, modify, or reverse a disciplinary action could be challenged in district court. The Supreme Court held that the Personnel Rules precluded district court review of a final order by the Board. View "Colorado Judicial Dept. 18th Judicial District" on Justia Law

Petitioner Andrew Shouse was terminated from his employment as a captain of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Office (RCSO, the Department, or respondent), following an administrative hearing. Findings on the record reflected petitioner engaged in improper sexual relationships with subordinates under his command, misappropriated county equipment and electronic mail for his personal use, was insubordinate in violating a direct order prohibiting him from contacting any person with whom he had had a personal relationship during the pendency of the investigation, and unbecoming conduct discrediting the Sheriff’s Department. Following an administrative appeal, the findings were sustained. Petitioner petitioned for writ of mandate seeking review of his dismissal, and, upon denial of that petition, he appealed. The sole legal issue presented was whether petitioner’s rights pursuant to the Public Safety Officer’s Bill of Rights (POBRA) were violated where the investigation into his alleged improper conduct was not completed within one year of discovery. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Shouse v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying a motion for summary judgment filed by Adam Goodman and Paul Underwood (collectively, Petitioners) in this personal injury case arising from an accident in which Blake Auton was injured, holding that the allegations against Petitioners were those of pure negligence, which were barred by workers' compensation immunity.In its order denying summary judgment, the circuit court concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Goodman was action within the scope of his employment while he was driving a garbage truck that backed over Auton and that additional discovery was required relating to Underwood's actions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with direction for the circuit court to grant summary judgment to Petitioners, holding (1) Petitioners were both clearly acting in furtherance of their employer's business when the accident occurred; and (2) therefore, workers' compensation immunity barred the cause of action and entitled Petitioners to summary judgment. View "Goodman v. Auton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decisions of the lower tribunals resolving Claimant's permanent total disability (PTD) claim in his favor after denying his petition to reopen his occupational pneumoconiosis permanent partial disability (OP PPD) claim for further evaluation, holding that the lower tribunals erred in part.At issue in the instant consolidated appeals were Claimant's attempt to reopen his OP PPD claim for further evaluation and his claim for permanent total disability (PTD) due to his various impairments. While Claimant's PTD claim was still being litigated, he unsuccessfully filed two petition to reopen his OP PPD claim. The lower tribunals denied Claimant's reopening petitions but awarded him PTD. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) W. Va. Code 23-4-16(e) does not preclude reopening of a permanent disability claim because another permanent disability claim is pending; and (2) the lower tribunals were not clearly wrong in determining that Claimant was permanently and totally disabled. View "Delbert v. Murray American Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

Nathaniel Sheehan lost his job during the COVID-19 pandemic. He applied for and began receiving unemployment benefits. This appeal arose out of the Idaho Department of Labor’s (“IDOL”) later determination that Sheehan was: (1) ineligible for unemployment benefits; and (2) required to repay the benefits he had already received. Sheehan represented himself throughout this case. He appealed these decisions to the Idaho Industrial Commission (“Commission”), claiming he had received misleading instructions concerning notice from IDOL. The Commission dismissed his appeal and later denied his motion for reconsideration. Sheehan then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. "While Sheehan presents a poignant story rife with compelling circumstances, we are bound to follow the rules and law of jurisdictional authority." The Court affirmed the Idaho Industrial Commission. View "Sheehan v. Sun Valley Company" on Justia Law

In 2017, Jeremy Thornhill said that he had injured his back while working. He sought workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, Walker-Hill and its insurance carrier, Zurich American Insurance Company of Illinois, but the Employer/Carrier denied that Thornhill had sustained a compensable injury. Ultimately, the parties agreed to compromise and settled pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 71-3-29 (Rev. 2021). Thornhill submitted the settlement to the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission for approval. After examining the application, the Commission approved the settlement and dismissed Thornhill’s case with prejudice. Pursuant to the settlement, Thornhill signed a general release, which reserved his right to pursue a bad faith claim. Believing he had exhausted his administrative remedies, Thornhill filed a bad faith suit against the Employer/Carrier; the Employer/Carrier moved to dismiss the case, arguing the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because the Commission never made a factual finding that he was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court concurred it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding that Thornhill had exhausted his administrative remedies and that the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear his bad faith claim. The appeals court determined that “Thornhill exhausted his administrative remedies because he fully and finally settled his workers’ compensation claim against the Employer/Carrier, the Commission approved the settlement, and there is nothing left pending before the Commission.” To this, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed. The circuit court judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Thornhill v. Walker-Hill Environmental, et al." on Justia Law

Pursuant to Rule 8.548(b)(2) of the California Rules of Court, the Ninth Circuit requested that the Supreme Court of California decide the certified question presented below: Do non-convicted incarcerated individuals performing services in county jails for a for-profit company to supply meals within the county jails and related custody facilities have a claim for minimum wages and overtime under Section 1194 of the California Labor Code in the absence of any local ordinance prescribing or prohibiting the payment of wages for these individuals? View "ARMIDA RUELAS, ET AL V. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Cariene Cadena and similarly situated employees (Appellants) are employed by Customer Connexx LLC (Connexx) to operate a call center in Las Vegas, Nevada. Appellants’ primary responsibilities are to provide customer service and scheduling to customers over a “softphone,” operated only through their employer-provided computers.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendant Customer Connexx LLC and remanded for further proceedings in a collective action brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act by call center workers. The panel concluded that the district court correctly identified the workers’ principal duties as answering customer phone calls and scheduling appliance pickups. Agreeing with the Tenth Circuit, the panel held that the workers’ duties could not be performed without turning on and booting up their work computers, and having a functioning computer was necessary before the workers could receive calls and schedule appointments. Accordingly, turning on the computers was integral and indispensable to the workers’ duties and was a principal activity under the FLSA. It, therefore, was compensable.   The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment on the FLSA claim and remanded to the district court for consideration of whether time spent shutting down computers was compensable, whether the time spent booting up and down the computers was not compensable under the de minimis doctrine, and whether Connexx had no knowledge of the alleged overtime such that it was not in violation of the FLSA’s overtime requirements. View "CARIENE CADENA, ET AL V. CUSTOMER CONNEXX LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Medical Commission Hearing Panel (Commission) upholding that decision of the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division denying Claimant's request for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits for a work-related injury that Claimant asserted made him unemployable, holding that the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was unaffected by any error of law.At issue was Claimant's request for PTD benefits for a work-related back injury Claimant suffered in 2002. The Division denied Claimant's application for PTD benefits, and the Commission upheld the Division's denial of PTD benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission correctly determined that Claimant did not meet his burden of proving he was entitled to PTD benefits under the odd lot doctrine. View "Genner v. State, ex rel. Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division" on Justia Law