Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff served as the Chief of Police for the Sneads Police Department from March 2006 until October 2018. On October 9, 2018, the five-member Town Council terminated Plaintiff’s employment by a 4-to-1 vote. The Town Council did so under the charge that Plaintiff was disrespectful at best and insubordinate at worst. Plaintiff, on the other hand, claims his firing was in retaliation for things he said, disclosed, and reported, all regarding various matters related to the newer Councilmembers with whom he had a contentious relationship.   Plaintiff filed an eight-count action against the Town of Sneads, the Town Manager, Town Councilmembers, Town Council President, and Town Clerk (collectively, “Defendants”). He brought unlawful-retaliation claims against the Town of Sneads under the Florida Whistle-blower’s Act (“FWA”), the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), and the First Amendment. And he brought identical retaliation claims under the First Amendment against each of the five individual defendants. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all eight counts, and Plaintiff appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Plaintiff has not established that he satisfied all three of these requirements for each instance of his speech that he claims were protected under the FWA. Further, the court wrote that because the record evidence shows that the Town of Sneads terminated Plaintiff for insubordination, not his invocation of the FMLA, the court concluded that the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim was also proper. View "John "Burt" McAlpin v. Town of Sneads Florida, et al" on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation case, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Employee's appeal of the decision of the the administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissing Employee's petition claiming entitlement to workers' compensation benefits, holding that the circuit court correctly dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.Employee petitioned the Department of Labor for a hearing on his claim that he was entitled to additional workers' compensation benefits. When Employee did not disclose and identify his experts by the date set in the scheduling order, Employer/Insurer moved for summary judgment. The ALJ granted the motion, concluding that Employee did not create a genuine issue of material fact in dispute precluding summary judgment. View "Hussein v. Showplace Wood Products Inc." on Justia Law

In May 2020 Rehm expressed concern that Haven was not doing enough to protect her and other employees from COVID. Dillett, Haven’s Director of Operations and co-owner, did not appreciate Rehm’s suggestions. Rehm sent a staff-wide email criticizing Dillett’s handling of COVID health risks. Dillett fired her. After Rehm complained to the NLRB, Dillett threatened legal action. An ALJ found that Haven had unlawfully terminated and threatened Rehm, National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1). The Board ordered Haven to compensate Rehm for lost pay and expenses, offer to rehire her, notify her that it had removed references to her unlawful termination from her employee file, post notices of employee rights, and file a sworn certification of compliance.The Seventh Circuit summarily enforced that order in September 2021. Haven did not comply. In December 2022, the Seventh Circuit directed Haven to respond to the Board’s contempt petition. Haven disregarded a subsequent “show cause” order. The Seventh Circuit entered a contempt order, requiring Haven to pay a fine of $1,000, plus a fine of $150 per day for every day of the next week that Haven fails to comply, beginning on February 28, 2023. The daily fine will increase by $100 each day that Haven fails to comply beyond the next week. The court will forgive the fines if Haven files a sworn statement within seven days demonstrating full compliance. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Haven Salon + Spa, Inc" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Iowa Public Employee Relations Board (PERB) and the district court misinterpreted Iowa Code 20.32 by extending broader bargaining rights to nontransit employees in the same bargaining unit as public transit employees, holding that the plain meaning of the statute protects only transit employees, not nontransit employees in the same bargaining unit.The City of Ames sought guidance as to whether section 20.32 requires broader bargaining rights for nontransit employees in the same bargaining unit. PERB concluded that broader bargaining rights must be extended under the statute to nontransit employees in a bargaining unit consisting of at least thirty percent transit employees, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City was not required to provide broader bargaining rights to nontransit employees, regardless of the percentage of transit employees in the bargaining unit. View "City of Ames v. Iowa Public Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Kluge, an Army Reserve commissioned officer and a civilian employee of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), was ordered under 10 U.S.C. 12301(d) to report to active duty in support of a contingency operation, Operation Enduring Freedom. He was absent from his DHS job from January 15 to July 30, 2011. For the first few weeks, Kluge was on paid military leave; from February 27 until July 30, DHS did not pay him except for the July 4 holiday. Kluge sought to recover differential pay under 5 U.S.C. 5538 for himself and similarly situated service members employed by the federal government, naming the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) as the respondent.An administrative judge denied class certification and substituted DHS for OPM. DHS and Kluge stipulated that he was eligible for differential pay. The AJ determined that DHS owed Kluge $274.37 plus interest. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The court upheld a finding that putative class members lack commonality or that identifying class members and adjudicating their claims as a class would not be fairer or more efficient. There was no legal error or abuse of discretion in the substitution of DHS for OPM. Kluge failed to show any error in calculating the differential pay. View "Kluge v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

While at a bar at the U.S. Embassy compound in Baghdad, Iraq, Plaintiff was shoved by an intoxicated co-worker. She was reluctant to report the incident, but she eventually acquiesced to requests of the State Department and her employer. Because of her report, Plaintiff’s employer attempted to transfer her to a different position. After initially refusing the transfer, she was fired. Plaintiff filed suit under the Defense Contractor Whistleblower Protection Act (DCWPA). The district court dismissed her complaint without prejudice, allowing leave to amend.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s action under DCWPA against Valiant Integrated Services, LLC, and The Electronic On-Ramp, Inc. The panel held that to survive a motion to dismiss under the DCWPA, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that: (1) she made a disclosure that she reasonably believed was evidence of a violation related to a Department of Defense contract; and (2) her employer discharged, demoted, or otherwise discriminated against her because of that disclosure. The panel held that Plaintiff did not plausibly allege a reasonable belief that her complaint about the shoving incident encompassed one of the acts described in Section 4701(a)(1)(A)-(C). The panel held that, in the context of a defense contract, a violation of law is related to the contract if it is related to the purpose of the contract or affects the services provided by the defense contractor to the Department of Defense. The panel concluded that, under this standard, Plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege a sufficient nexus between the shove and the Department of Defense-Valiant contract. View "SANA KAPPOUTA V. VALIANT INTEGRATED SERVICES, ET AL" on Justia Law

The State of Vermont appealed a decision of the Vermont Labor Relations Board sustaining a grievance filed by the Vermont State Employees’ Association (VSEA) on behalf of several classified employees. The Board determined that the State violated the employees’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA) when it appointed another employee to a vacant position before the application deadline for that position had expired. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that the Board correctly interpreted the CBA and therefore affirmed. View "In re Grievance of Marc Abbey et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the compensation court concluding that a claimant who sustains injuries along the same extremity sustains an injury to a single member for workers' compensation purposes, holding that the compensation court's decision was based on an incorrect interpretation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-121(3).Claimant injured her right wrist and right elbow upon falling at work. Claimant filed a claim for benefits, asserting that the workers' compensation court should award her permanent disability benefits based on her loss of earning capacity. At issue was section 48-121(3), which provides for discretionary loss of earning capacity where there is a "loss or loss of use of more than one member of parts of more than one member[.]" The compensation court refused to consider an award based on the loss of earning capacity because "an injury to the wrist and the elbow of the same arm is still an injury to a single member and does not entitle an employee to a loss of earning power.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the compensation court erred in its interpretation of section 48-121(3). View "Espinoza v. Job Source USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Jesse Keidel appealed a district court judgment affirming an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision denying Keidel permanent partial impairment (PPI) benefits. In May 1996, Keidel suffered a work-related injury to the meniscus of his left knee. Keidel had surgery in December 1996. In October 1997, Keidel underwent a second surgery to his left knee, a high tibial osteotomy. The doctor performing an independent medical evaluation in May 1998 opined that Keidel’s left knee condition was a “combination of his significant preexisting left knee degenerative joint disease and the work-related permanent aggravation.” Following a permanent impairment evaluation, WSI denied Keidel a PPI award because Keidel’s 15% whole body impairment was below the statutory 16% threshold for an impairment award. In January 2019, Keidel had left total knee replacement surgery. In June 2020, Keidel underwent a second permanent impairment evaluation. The evaluating doctor, Dr. Redington, determined Keidel had a 24% whole person impairment for the left total knee replacement. "Giving [Keidel] the benefit of the doubt, I will apportion 50% of the impairment rating of the left knee to pre-existing conditions." In November 2020, WSI denied an impairment award for Keidel’s left knee because his overall impairment rating after apportionment after the second evaluation was 12%, which was below the 14% threshold for an impairment award under then current version of N.D.C.C. § 65-05-12.2. At a hearing, Keidel argued the apportionment of his left knee impairment due to preexisting arthritis was litigated and decided in a 2000 hearing. Keidel argued administrative res judicata prohibited WSI from litigating whether his permanent impairment could be apportioned to a preexisting condition. The ALJ and district court concluded administrative res judicata did not apply. Finding no error in that judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Keidel v. WSI, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted writs of prohibition and mandamus ordering Judge John P. O'Donnell of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court to stop exercising jurisdiction over the underlying case and to dismiss the underlying case, holding that the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation was entitled to the writs.The City of Cleveland and the City of Parma sued the Bureau in separate actions. The Supreme Court held that the court of claims had exclusive jurisdiction over Cleveland's action. Judge O'Donnell then dismissed Parma's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Thereafter, Parma filed the underlying lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment. Judge O'Donnell denied the Bureau's motion to dismiss. Parma also filed an action against the Bureau in the court of claims, which dismissed the complaint on limitations grounds. The Bureau then brought this action against Judge O'Donnell, arguing that the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over the underlying case. The Supreme Court granted relief, holding that the Court of Claims Act, Ohio Rev. Code 2743.01 et seq., patently and unambiguously divested the common pleas court of jurisdiction. View "State ex rel. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation v. O'Donnell" on Justia Law