Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs, firefighters and their union, alleged retaliation for protected First Amendment activity. Mayor Copeland, a former firefighter of 26 years, had implemented cost-cutting measures, including freezing the firefighters' salaries and benefits. During Copeland’s reelection campaign, the firefighter’s political action committee endorsed Copeland’s opponent and other candidates who opposed Copeland’s policies. Copeland was reelected. Several firefighters protested at Copeland’s inauguration. Copeland vetoed an ordinance to restore some of the benefits and directed Fire Chief Serna to develop a new schedule. An 8/24 schedule, whereby a firefighter would work eight hours and then be off 24 hours was proposed. No other fire department in the country has adopted that schedule, which assigns firefighters to different shifts every day. In a secretly-recorded conversation, Serna said: “You can call it retaliation.” The defendants proposed to give up the schedule in exchange for the Union giving up its right to lobby the Common Council. The Union rejected the proposal; the city implemented the 8/24 schedule. The Council later returned the firefighters’ to a 24/48 schedule. Copeland sued the Council, alleging that the ordinance violated his executive power. The state court agreed with Copeland and struck the ordinance—leaving the 8/24 schedule in effect.The Seventh Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction, ordering the city to immediately begin reinstating the old work schedule. There was no evidence that the 8/24 schedule would result in cost savings; the firefighters would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction. View "International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 365 v. City of East Chicago, Indiana" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the orders entered by the district court on review of the Human Rights Commission's (HRC) final agency decision regarding Plaintiff's sexual discrimination claims against Defendant, her former employer, holding that the district court erred in part.The hearing officer found discrimination and awarded Plaintiff $415,786. The HRC affirmed the finding of discrimination and slightly altered the hearing officer's damages calculations, resulting in an increase in the overall award. The district court upheld the finding of discrimination but concluded that the HRC's use of a four-year cap for front pay damages was arbitrary and capricious, thus increasing Plaintiff's front-pay damage award. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in affirming the determination that Plaintiff was exposed to a hostile and abusive work environment and was subjected to sexual harassment and retaliation; (2) erred in reversing the HRC's front-pay damage award; and (3) did not abuse its discretion in its determination of Plaintiff's attorney fee award. View "Norval Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Lawson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the opinion and order of the Workers' Compensation Board denying Officer Tracy Toler's petition for reconsideration of the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) declining to award Toler an additional two percent impairment rating for pain, holding that a physician that is not licensed in Kentucky does not meet the definition of "physician" under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.0011(32).Dr. Craig Roberts conducted an independent medical examination on Toler and assessed a six percent whole person impairment rating. To contest the rating, Toler's employer filed a report by Dr. Christopher Brigham believing a four percent impairment rating was more appropriate. The ALJ found Dr. Brigham's opinion to be more credible than Dr. Roberts' and did not award Toler an additional two percent impairment rating for pain. On appeal, Toler argued that Brigham did not qualify as a "physician" under section 342.0011(32). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ALJ's opinion and order, holding that Dr. Brigham did not meet the statutory definition of "physician" under the statute, and therefore, his report was inadmissible. View "Toler v. Fiscal Court" on Justia Law

The collective bargaining contract between the Washington State Council of County and City Employees, AFSCME Council 2 (Union) and the City of Spokane expired on December 31, 2020. Prior to its expiration, the Union wrote to the City’s labor relations manager that it desired to engage in traditional labor negotiations for renewal of the contract and included proposed ground rules for negotiations. The rules included a condition that the negotiating meetings be closed to the public. In response, the City informed the Union it intended to conduct the bargaining negotiations open to the public, consistent with the 2019 revision of section 40 of the city charter. Through counsel, the Union drafted an opinion letter pointing out that the City’s open bargaining rule was a violation of state law to which the City responded that it had not implemented open bargaining and were willing to negotiate in good faith. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review was whether the municipal ordinance, requiring all collective bargaining between the city and union representatives be conducted in a manner open to the public, was preempted by state law and unconstitutional under the Washington State Constitution. The trial court ruled that section 40 of the city charter was preempted by state law; to this, the Supreme Court concurred and affirmed judgment. View "Wash. State Council of County & City Emps. v. City of Spokane" on Justia Law

Cliff Provins appealed a district court judgment affirming an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) decision that affirmed a Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”) order denying liability for his post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and ending disability benefits in November 2019. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the ALJ did not err in concluding Provins’s PTSD was not compensable, and a reasoning mind could reasonably conclude his physical injuries did not cause his PTSD. View "Provins v. WSI, et al." on Justia Law

Dr. Edenfield is a VAMC anesthesiologist. VAMC physicians had obtained informed consent for endoscopic procedures on the day of the procedure. A 2016 policy allowed mid-level practitioners (nurse practitioners, physician assistants) to obtain informed consent from patients. The change was approved by the National Center for Ethics in Health Care, the Credentialing Committee (several Quillen VAMC service chiefs), the Medical Executive Board (20 physicians), the Medical Center Director, and the regional Veteran Integrated Service Network. Edenfield argued that it was against VA policy for midlevel practitioners to obtain informed consent for endoscopic procedures, quoting the Veterans Health Administration Handbook. Edenfield resigned as the supervisor of the Pre-Operative Clinic. Two years later, although his supervisor recommended that Edenfield receive a pay increase, a VAMC panel denied him a raise. Edenfield alleged retaliation and resigned as Chief of Anesthesiology, then filed an unsuccessful complaint with the Office of Special Counsel, citing the Whistleblower Protection Act. The Merit Systems Protection Board denied Edenfield’s request for corrective action, finding that his statements were not protected disclosures under 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8).The Federal Circuit reversed. Edenfield’s interpretation reflected an ambiguity In the Handbook and was reasonable; the Board erred in holding that Edenfield did not have a reasonable belief that he was making a protected disclosure and erred by relying on information that would not have been readily ascertainable by a disinterested observer. Such information cannot support a finding that Edenfield’s belief was unreasonable. View "Edenfield v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversing the rulings of the compensation judge finding that C. Jeremy Lagasse was entitled to contingent fees under Minn. Stat. 176.081, subd. 1(c) and that Larry Horton was entitled to partial reimbursement of fees under Minn. Stat. 176.081, subd. 7, holding that the WCCA incorrectly applied subdivision 1(c) in its standard of review.Horton, who was injured during his employment with Aspen Waste Systems and sought permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits through Aspen's insurer (Insurer), retained Lagasse to represent him in the matter. The compensation judge determined that Lagasse was entitled to contingent fees and that Horton was entitled to partial reimbursement of fees. The WCCA reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) the WCCA incorrectly applied subdivision 1(c); and (2) the compensation judge and the WCCA incorrectly applied subdivision 7. View "Lagasse v. Horton" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the circuit court's judgment affirming the decision of the Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission granting Respondent's request for compensation for his hernia, holding that the court of special appeals did not err.In granting Respondent's request for compensation, the Commission found that Respondent sustained an accidental injury during employment, that his current hernia was the result of the accidental injury, and that, as a result of the hernia, Respondent was totally disabled for several months. The circuit court and court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the court of special appeals did not err when it (1) held that "definite proof" under L&E 9-504(a)(1) applies to the quality of evidence presented and not the standard of proof a claimant must meet; and (2) concluded that Respondent met his burden of persuasion when producing medical evidence to a preponderance of the evidence standard. View "United Parcel Service v. Strothers" on Justia Law

Ascolese, a compliance officer, brought a False Claims Act (FCA) retaliation claim against his former employer, MBP, in connection with a qui tam action involving a federally-funded public housing construction project for the Philadelphia Housing Authority (PHA). In 2009–2010, Congress amended the FCA, 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1)(A), to expand the scope of protected conduct shielded from retaliation and the type of notice an employer must have of the protected conduct. The new standard is whether Ascolese showed he engaged in protected conduct in furtherance of an FCA action or other efforts to stop or more violations of the FCA and that he was discriminated against because of his protected conduct. The court believed that the pre-amendment standard was required by the Third Circuit, and concluded that Ascolese failed to show MBP was on notice that he was attempting to stop MBP from violating the FCA and not merely doing his job.The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. The right question is whether Ascolese pled facts that plausibly showed MBP was on notice he tried to stop MBP’s alleged FCA violation. Ascolese sufficiently pled that he engaged in protected conduct when he went outside of his chain of command to report his concerns of fraudulent work to the PHA. View "Ascolese v. Shoemaker Construction Co" on Justia Law

From December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019, the federal government partially shut down because of a lapse in appropriations. Plaintiffs continued to work as “excepted employees” who work on “emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of property” and whom the government can “require[] to perform work during a covered lapse in appropriations,” 31 U.S.C. 1341(c)(2), 1342. During the shutdown, the government was barred from paying wages to excepted employees by the Anti-Deficiency Act, which prohibits the government from “authoriz[ing] an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation.” The government paid their accrued wages after the shutdown ended. Plaintiffs sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for failure “to timely pay their earned overtime and regular wages,” 29 U.S.C. 260; any employer who does not timely pay minimum or overtime wages is liable for liquidated damages equal to the amount of the untimely paid wages. The Claims Court has the discretion to award no liquidated damages if the employer shows “reasonable grounds for believing that [the] act was not a violation of the Act.”The Federal Circuit ordered the dismissal of the case. As a matter of law, the government does not violate the FLSA when it pays excepted employees for work performed during a government shutdown at the earliest date possible after a lapse in appropriations ends, View "Avalos v. United States" on Justia Law