Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Rickel, a Fire Protection Specialist at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, was Assistant Chief of Training, responsible for determining training requirements, reviewing training records, and ensuring that firefighters’ certifications were current. Rickel applied for the Deputy Fire Chief position. Fire Chief Brusoe selected Gray. Rickel questioned the promotion and Gray’s candor in his application, asserting that several unidentified candidates had been promoted without required credentials. Gray responded that Rickel should update the training records. Rickel questioned Gray’s authority as his supervisor and claimed that his position did not require him to do so. Chief Brusoe informed Rickel that Gray was his supervisor. Gray instructed Rickel to update the records and documented that such a task was within his job description. The due date passed. The Executive Officer of Naval Air Station Jacksonville confirmed that the task was within Rickel’s responsibilities. Rickel did not respond to requests for status updates nor did he complete the work. Gray undertook the project, noting that it took 16.5 hours.Chief Brusoe proposed to remove Rickel for failure to follow instructions. Rickel appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, alleging unlawful retaliation for his protected disclosures. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s finding that Rickel had engaged in protected whistleblowing activity, which was a contributing factor in the removal decision but that the agency had proven “by clear and convincing evidence that it would have removed [Rickel] even in the absence of his protected activity.” View "Rickel v. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law

In this action for declaratory judgment the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the superior court denying Family Dollar Stores of Rhode Island, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment for Justin Araujo, the complainant in a proceeding before the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, holding that the hearing justice erred.Araujo filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that Family Dollar, his employer, had discriminated against him on the basis of an illness. The parties entered into a settlement agreement that included a release. At issue was whether the release unambiguously constituted a waiver by Araujo of his right to pursue all claims he could make against Family Dollar. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Araujo, entering judgment declaring that the release did not cover Araujo's discrimination claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the release unambiguously precluded Araujo from pursuing a discrimination charge with the Commission. View "Family Dollar Stores of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Araujo" on Justia Law

Appellant Nicholas Kroll appealed the Court of Chancery’s dismissal of his complaint. Kroll was terminated from his position as a police officer for the City of Wilmington (the “City”) on the ground that he failed to comply with a departmental requirement that he reside in the City. A second ground was that he violated a departmental regulation regarding dishonesty by giving a false or inaccurate address on annual, required residency affidavits. After his dismissal, he filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the City, its police department, and its mayor, in his official capacity, breached the police Collective Bargaining Agreement (the “CBA”) and his right to due process by modifying the definition of the term “residence” in October 2017, and applying the modified definition to him without giving the Fraternal Order of Police an opportunity to bargain the new definition on behalf of its members. The modification, Kroll argued, was material to the decision to terminate his employment. He also sought an injunction reinstating him as a City police officer with back pay. Appellees moved to dismiss, arguing the Court of Chancery lacked jurisdiction over the complaint’s subject matter. The Appellees argued, in part, that Kroll had an adequate remedy at law in the form of a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court. Appellees had not argued that Kroll’s complaint fell within the CBA grievance procedure (that issue was raised sua sponte by the Court of Chancery in its ruling). The parties agreed the disciplinary action taken against Kroll was not subject to the grievance procedure set forth in the CBA. Appellees agreed the Court of Chancery committed legal error by basing its decision on the CBA’s grievance procedure. They urged the Delaware Supreme Court, however, to affirm on the alternative grounds for dismissal that were asserted in the Court of Chancery. Finding the Court of Chancery did not address Appellees' arguments, the Supreme Court reversed judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kroll v. City of Wilmington" on Justia Law

Indiana legislators, lobbyists, and legislative staff enjoy a party on the day the legislature adjourns for the year. The March 2018 celebration was held at AJ’s Lounge in Indianapolis. Hill, the state’s Attorney General, appeared at the party and made passes at several women, moving from verbal to physical harassment, including groping. A special prosecutor concluded that criminal charges were inappropriate. The Indiana Supreme Court suspended Hill’s law license for 30 days, a punishment mitigated by his long, previously unblemished record. His bid for renomination failed. His term as Attorney General ended in January 2021.Women legislative employees filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, other statutes, and Indiana’s common law. The district judge dismissed all claims against Hill without prejudice to their renewal in state court and dismissed all claims against Indiana, ruling that it is not the plaintiffs’ employer. Claims against the House and Senate remain pending in the district court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals. Indiana cannot be treated as the plaintiffs’ “employer” under 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b), e–2(a). They were hired, and are supervised, by the House or Senate, which holds the sole power to discipline, fire, or reward them. The statute requires people to sue their own employers, so it is irrelevant whether the state employs the Attorney General. View "DaSilva v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court affirming the conclusion of the workers' compensation commissioner that Claimant's rotator cuff injury was a scheduled shoulder injury rather than an unscheduled whole body injury under Iowa Code 85.34(2), holding that there was no error.Claimant sustained a work-related injury that was diagnosed as a "full thickness rotator cuff tear that has retracted to the level of the glenoid, severe AC arthrosis, tendonitis and tearing of the biceps tendon." In seeking permanent partial disability benefits, Claimant argued that her injury qualified as an unscheduled injury to the body as a whole, entitling her to industrial disability benefits. The commissioner concluded that Claimant's rotator cuff injury was a scheduled injury to the shoulder, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly determined (1) Claimant's rotator cuff injury was a scheduled shoulder injury under Iowa Code 85.34(2)(n); and (2) substantial evidence supported the commissioner's finding that Claimant failed to prove her biceps tear resulted in a permanent disability to her arm under section 85.34(2)(m). View "Chavez v. MS Technology LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission denying Appellant's claim for additional medical benefits, holding that the Commission erred in determining that Appellant's claim for additional medical benefits was barred by the statute of limitations.In 2015, Appellant was injured while working for Liberty Trailer and sustained a compensable right-shoulder injury. In 2019, Appellant requested additional benefits. An administrative law judge found that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The Commission affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under a plain reading of Ark. Code Ann. 11-9-702(b)(1), Appellant's claim for additional medical benefits was timely. View "Wynne v. Liberty Trailer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the compensation court denying James Spratt's request seeking to modify his workers' compensation award, holding that the compensation court erred in holding that it lacked the statutory to do so and, alternatively, that the principal of finality precluded relief.Spratt injured his back while working for Crete Carrier Corporation and received a workers' compensation award granting medical rehabilitation services for his lumbar back. Spratt subsequently requested that the compensation court modify the original award so that he may receive thoracic back treatment. The compensation court denied Spratt's request for modification. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the compensation court erred in concluding that it lacked the power to modify the original award to treat Spratt's thoracic back; and (2) modification was not precluded by the law-of-the-case doctrine. View "Spratt v. Crete Carrier Corp." on Justia Law

In 1988, Pacifica voters approved Measure F, entitled “Firefighter Dispute Resolution Process Impasse Resolution Procedures: Minimum Wages and Benefits For Firefighters,” which prescribes procedures to be followed in the event of an impasse in labor disputes with Pacifica firefighters. Under this measure, absent other agreement, the top step salaries of fire captains in the city are to be set at an amount not less than the average for top step salaries of fire captains in five neighboring cities. After an impasse in negotiations occurred in 2019, the Pacifica Firefighters Association (PFFA) sought declaratory relief requiring the City to follow Measure F.The trial court denied the petition, finding Measure F preempted by state law, the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), Government Code section 3500, and an unlawful delegation of power. The court of appeal affirmed. Measure F is unenforceable as a usurpation of authority the Legislature granted exclusively to the city council in section 3505.7. View "Pacifica Firefighters Association v. City of Pacifica" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on whether a truck driver (claimant) who sustained injuries while driving a truck that he leased directly from a trucking company, with restrictions that prohibited him from driving the truck for the use of any other company, was a “subject worker” within the meaning of ORS 656.027 such that the trucking company was required to provide workers’ compensation insurance coverage for claimant’s injuries. SAIF and Robert Murray, the owner of Bob Murray Trucking (BMT), a for-hire carrier, sought review of the Court of Appeals’ opinion affirming the final order of the Workers’ Compensation Board: that claimant was a subject worker of BMT under the workers’ compensation laws and did not qualify for the exemption to “subject worker” status contained in ORS 656.027(15)(c). To this the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the Workers’ Compensation Board’s final order. View "SAIF v. Ward" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the Workers' Compensation Board's decision reversing a decision by the Chief Administrative Law Judge (CALJ) denying Carlye Harper's motion to reopen her workers' compensation claim to seek vocational rehabilitation benefits, holding that there was no error.Harper suffered a work-related injury to her back and lower extremities. After a hearing, an ALJ awarded permanent partial disability income benefits. Approximately sixteen months later, Harper sought to file an application for vocational rehabilitation services pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.710. The CALJ overruled the motion to reopen. The Board reversed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the legislature intended section 342.710(3) to provide an independent ground for reopening, and claim preclusion did not bar adjudication of Harper's claim. View "Kindred Healthcare v. Harper" on Justia Law