Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Ohio's legislatively-established municipal and county courts possess jurisdiction within their territorial limits over certain civil and criminal matters with the same authority as other common pleas judges. Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court employees certified a union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative for 136 employees, not including judges. A 2016 collective bargaining agreement was to extend through December 2019 and stated that the court would respect its terms until the parties reached a new agreement, the union disclaimed the contract, or the employees decertified the union. In 2019, negotiations stalled. In December 2020, the Juvenile Court sought a declaration that the agreements were void or expired. The union counterclaimed for breach of contract. The Juvenile Court subsequently treated union members as nonunion employees, decided to stop deducting union dues from paychecks, imposed new work schedules, and eliminated grievance procedures.The union sued in federal court, citing the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Sovereign immunity bars the union’s claims against the Juvenile Court because it is an arm of the State of Ohio. Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for the union’s Contracts Clause claims against the individual defendants; qualified immunity barred the money-damages claims against them under the Takings Clause. View "Laborers' International Union of North America v. Neff" on Justia Law

Nancy Michaels worked for more than one year as a Data Processing Manager II (DPM II) before her employer, California’s Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), voided her appointment at the direction of the State Personnel Board (SPB). After the SPB issued a decision rejecting Michaels’s appeal of the voiding of her appointment, she filed a petition for writ of mandate in superior court. The superior court found that Michaels had served more than one year in her position and directed the SPB to vacate its decision. CalPERS appealed, contending: (1) because Government Code section 19257.5 did not define the date of “appointment,” that term had to refer to when a new hire starts working in a new position for a state employer; (2) interpreting Government Code section 18525 to refer to the dates of offer and acceptance of a employment offer “undermines California’s civil-service law;” (3) the trial court’s definition of “appointment” date yielded an “absurd result” that conflicted with the SPB’s constitutional mandate to ensure uniform application of state civil service law; (4) the application of offer-and-acceptance principles derived from contract law “introduces uncertainty” into the state civil service hiring process; and (5) Michaels was not prejudiced by having her DPM II position voided. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court correctly determined that the express language of section 18525 defined the term “appointment” to refer to the dates of offer and acceptance. As to CalPERS’s contentions regarding the wisdom of using the dates of offer and acceptance for determining the start of the one-year limitations period for voiding an appointment, the arguments concerned considerations of policy that were better addressed to the Legislature. As to CalPERS’s prejudice argument, the Court concluded its two contentions lack merit: (1) even if Michaels had notice of the possibility that her position would be voided, that notice did not allow CalPERS to act in an untimely manner; and (2) CalPERS’s assertion that Michaels could not avail herself of the statutes governing the limitations period for voiding an appointment would render the governing statutes a mere nullity. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Michaels v. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition sought by Petitioner to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing its order to strike the notice it received pursuant to W. Va. Code 55-7-13d regarding Respondent's belief that some or all of the fault in the matter should be assigned to the Monongalia County Commission, holding that Petitioner was entitled to the writ.Respondent was employed by the County Commission when he was injured his work. After resolving his workers' compensation claim Respondent sued Petitioner for further compensation. Thereafter, Petitioner filed the motion at issue. The circuit court granted Respondent's motion to strike the notice, concluding that fault could not be assigned to the County Commission, and, alternatively, that Petitioner failed to allege deliberate intention on the part of the County Commission. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of prohibition, holding (1) the circuit court committed clear error in ruling that the County Commission could not be named as a nonparty defendant under W.Va. Code 55-7-13d; and (2) section 55-7-13d did not require Petitioner to meet the deliberate-intention standard in order for fault to be assigned to the County Commission. View "State ex rel. March-Westin Co. v. Honorable Phillip D. Gaujot" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of a panel of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to the Kansas Workers Compensation Fund on the Fund's collateral action against Trademark, Inc., holding that there was no error.After Juan Medina received a workplace injury he sought compensation from his direct employer under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-501 et seq. Because the employer did not carry workers compensation insurance, Medina impleaded the Fund to obtain benefits. Thereafter, an ALJ awarded compensation to Medina, and the Fund paid Medina benefits. The Fund then filed this action under Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-532a against Trademark, the general contractor for whom Medina's employer was acting as a subcontractor at the time of the injury. The district court granted summary judgment to the Fund and denied attorney fees. The court of appeals panel affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the lower courts correctly interpreted section 44-532a as allowing the Fund to pursue an action against Trademark; but (2) the Fund was not entitled to attorney fees. View "Schmidt v. Trademark, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a Syrian national living in California as a legal permanent resident and is now a U.S. citizen. She is not and has never been a Kuwaiti national. In 2014, Plaintiff entered into a written employment contract with the Consulate to work as a secretary. Plaintiff alleges that the Consulate created a hostile work environment by harassing, discriminating, and retaliating against her on the basis of her gender, religion, and Syrian national origin, violated various wage and hour laws, and breached her employment contract. Claiming that she was constructively terminated from her employment, she filed suit.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the Consulate’s motion to dismiss. The commercial activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2), applied. The employment of diplomatic, civil service, or military personnel is governmental and the employment of other personnel is commercial unless the foreign state shows that the employee’s duties included “powers peculiar to sovereigns.” The district court properly exercised its discretion in finding that Plaintiff, who was employed as an administrative assistant, was not a civil servant and that her duties did not include “powers peculiar to sovereigns.” View "Mohammad v. General Consulate of the State of Kuwait in Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) reversing the administrative law judge's award and denying Claimant permanent total disability benefits, holding that Claimant's brief preserved nothing for appellate review because it failed to comply with the mandatory and straightforward rules governing the contents of an appellant's briefs.After the Commission denied Claimant's claim, Claimant appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that each of Claimant's points on appeal was defective because each point relied on wholly failed to follow the simple template provided in Rule 84.04. View "Lexow v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the superior court affirming the decision of the Board of Review for the North Carolina Department of Commerce adopting the decision of the appeals referee ruling that Frank Lennane was disqualified for unemployment benefits, holding that there was no error.At issue was whether Lennane's leaving work was attributable to his employer, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. 96-14.5(a), to avoid disqualification for unemployment benefits. The lower courts affirmed the administrative decision that Lennane was disqualified for unemployment benefits because he failed to show good cause attributable to the employer for leaving. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while Lennane left work for good cause, he failed to satisfy his burden to show that his leaving work was "attributable to the employer" as a matter of law. View "In re Lennane" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Medical Commission Panel denying Appellant's application for additional benefits and an increase to her impairment rating, holding that the Medical Panel's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.In 2014, Appellant suffered a workplace injury. In 2019, Appellant applied for additional benefits, including surgery for carpal tunnel syndrome, and an increase to her impairment rating. The Medical Panel denied both requests, determining (1) Appellant's carpal tunnel syndrome was not related to her workplace injury, and (2) Appellant's claim for an increased impairment rating was unsubstantiated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Medical Panel's ultimate determinations were supported by substantial evidence and were not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law. View "Reichenberg v. State, ex rel., Department of Workforce Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against defendant Roark-Whitten Hospitality 2 (RW2) seeking relief for what the EEOC alleged were unlawful employment practices by RW2 on the basis of race, color, national origin, and retaliation. Those unlawful employment practices allegedly occurred after RW2 purchased and began operating a hotel in Taos, New Mexico in 2009. The aggrieved employees were all employed at the hotel prior to RW2’s purchase, and were all either terminated or constructively discharged at some point after the purchase. After the action was initiated, the EEOC filed amended complaints seeking to add as defendants two additional entities, Jai Hanuman, LLC (Jai), which purchased the hotel from RW2 in 2014, and SGI, LLC (SGI), which purchased the hotel from Jai in 2016. The district court dismissed the EEOC’s claims against SGI on the grounds that the EEOC failed to adequately allege a basis for successor liability against SGI. As for RW2 and Jai, the district court, acting pursuant to a motion for civil contempt filed by the EEOC, entered default judgment against them and then conducted a hearing on the issue of damages. After conducting that hearing, the district court dismissed the EEOC’s claims against Jai on the grounds that the EEOC failed to adequately allege a basis for successor liability against Jai, and it ordered RW2 to pay compensatory damages to the EEOC in the total amount of $35,000. The EEOC appealed, arguing: (1) the district court erred in dismissing its claims against defendants SGI and Jai; and (2) the district court erred in awarding only $35,000 in compensatory damages for the eleven aggrieved individuals. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the EEOC’s claims against defendant SGI, affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the EEOC’s claims against defendant Jai, reversed the district court’s damage award against defendant RW2, and remanded for further proceedings. View "EEOC v. Roark-Whitten Hospitality, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court granting a preliminary injunction in favor of Plaintiffs, holding that the grounds on which the trial court relied in entering the preliminary injunction had become moot.Plaintiffs were five Arkansas residents who had been receiving pandemic-related unemployment benefits through Pandemic Unemployment Assistance, Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation, and Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation prior to the State's termination of its participation in these programs. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Defendants - Governor Asa Hutchison and Arkansas Division of Workforce Services Director Charisse Childers - lacked the authority under Ark. Code Ann. 11-10-312 to terminate the State's participation in the programs. The trial court granted Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction ordering Defendants to reengage in the terminated programs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the grounds for the preliminary injunction had been rendered moot by the General Assembly's passage of Act 1 of the First Extraordinary Session of 2021. View "Hutchinson v. Armstrong" on Justia Law