Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on whether a truck driver (claimant) who sustained injuries while driving a truck that he leased directly from a trucking company, with restrictions that prohibited him from driving the truck for the use of any other company, was a “subject worker” within the meaning of ORS 656.027 such that the trucking company was required to provide workers’ compensation insurance coverage for claimant’s injuries. SAIF and Robert Murray, the owner of Bob Murray Trucking (BMT), a for-hire carrier, sought review of the Court of Appeals’ opinion affirming the final order of the Workers’ Compensation Board: that claimant was a subject worker of BMT under the workers’ compensation laws and did not qualify for the exemption to “subject worker” status contained in ORS 656.027(15)(c). To this the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the Workers’ Compensation Board’s final order. View "SAIF v. Ward" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the Workers' Compensation Board's decision reversing a decision by the Chief Administrative Law Judge (CALJ) denying Carlye Harper's motion to reopen her workers' compensation claim to seek vocational rehabilitation benefits, holding that there was no error.Harper suffered a work-related injury to her back and lower extremities. After a hearing, an ALJ awarded permanent partial disability income benefits. Approximately sixteen months later, Harper sought to file an application for vocational rehabilitation services pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.710. The CALJ overruled the motion to reopen. The Board reversed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the legislature intended section 342.710(3) to provide an independent ground for reopening, and claim preclusion did not bar adjudication of Harper's claim. View "Kindred Healthcare v. Harper" on Justia Law

Ohio's legislatively-established municipal and county courts possess jurisdiction within their territorial limits over certain civil and criminal matters with the same authority as other common pleas judges. Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court employees certified a union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative for 136 employees, not including judges. A 2016 collective bargaining agreement was to extend through December 2019 and stated that the court would respect its terms until the parties reached a new agreement, the union disclaimed the contract, or the employees decertified the union. In 2019, negotiations stalled. In December 2020, the Juvenile Court sought a declaration that the agreements were void or expired. The union counterclaimed for breach of contract. The Juvenile Court subsequently treated union members as nonunion employees, decided to stop deducting union dues from paychecks, imposed new work schedules, and eliminated grievance procedures.The union sued in federal court, citing the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Sovereign immunity bars the union’s claims against the Juvenile Court because it is an arm of the State of Ohio. Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for the union’s Contracts Clause claims against the individual defendants; qualified immunity barred the money-damages claims against them under the Takings Clause. View "Laborers' International Union of North America v. Neff" on Justia Law

Nancy Michaels worked for more than one year as a Data Processing Manager II (DPM II) before her employer, California’s Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), voided her appointment at the direction of the State Personnel Board (SPB). After the SPB issued a decision rejecting Michaels’s appeal of the voiding of her appointment, she filed a petition for writ of mandate in superior court. The superior court found that Michaels had served more than one year in her position and directed the SPB to vacate its decision. CalPERS appealed, contending: (1) because Government Code section 19257.5 did not define the date of “appointment,” that term had to refer to when a new hire starts working in a new position for a state employer; (2) interpreting Government Code section 18525 to refer to the dates of offer and acceptance of a employment offer “undermines California’s civil-service law;” (3) the trial court’s definition of “appointment” date yielded an “absurd result” that conflicted with the SPB’s constitutional mandate to ensure uniform application of state civil service law; (4) the application of offer-and-acceptance principles derived from contract law “introduces uncertainty” into the state civil service hiring process; and (5) Michaels was not prejudiced by having her DPM II position voided. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court correctly determined that the express language of section 18525 defined the term “appointment” to refer to the dates of offer and acceptance. As to CalPERS’s contentions regarding the wisdom of using the dates of offer and acceptance for determining the start of the one-year limitations period for voiding an appointment, the arguments concerned considerations of policy that were better addressed to the Legislature. As to CalPERS’s prejudice argument, the Court concluded its two contentions lack merit: (1) even if Michaels had notice of the possibility that her position would be voided, that notice did not allow CalPERS to act in an untimely manner; and (2) CalPERS’s assertion that Michaels could not avail herself of the statutes governing the limitations period for voiding an appointment would render the governing statutes a mere nullity. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Michaels v. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition sought by Petitioner to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing its order to strike the notice it received pursuant to W. Va. Code 55-7-13d regarding Respondent's belief that some or all of the fault in the matter should be assigned to the Monongalia County Commission, holding that Petitioner was entitled to the writ.Respondent was employed by the County Commission when he was injured his work. After resolving his workers' compensation claim Respondent sued Petitioner for further compensation. Thereafter, Petitioner filed the motion at issue. The circuit court granted Respondent's motion to strike the notice, concluding that fault could not be assigned to the County Commission, and, alternatively, that Petitioner failed to allege deliberate intention on the part of the County Commission. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of prohibition, holding (1) the circuit court committed clear error in ruling that the County Commission could not be named as a nonparty defendant under W.Va. Code 55-7-13d; and (2) section 55-7-13d did not require Petitioner to meet the deliberate-intention standard in order for fault to be assigned to the County Commission. View "State ex rel. March-Westin Co. v. Honorable Phillip D. Gaujot" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of a panel of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to the Kansas Workers Compensation Fund on the Fund's collateral action against Trademark, Inc., holding that there was no error.After Juan Medina received a workplace injury he sought compensation from his direct employer under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-501 et seq. Because the employer did not carry workers compensation insurance, Medina impleaded the Fund to obtain benefits. Thereafter, an ALJ awarded compensation to Medina, and the Fund paid Medina benefits. The Fund then filed this action under Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-532a against Trademark, the general contractor for whom Medina's employer was acting as a subcontractor at the time of the injury. The district court granted summary judgment to the Fund and denied attorney fees. The court of appeals panel affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the lower courts correctly interpreted section 44-532a as allowing the Fund to pursue an action against Trademark; but (2) the Fund was not entitled to attorney fees. View "Schmidt v. Trademark, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a Syrian national living in California as a legal permanent resident and is now a U.S. citizen. She is not and has never been a Kuwaiti national. In 2014, Plaintiff entered into a written employment contract with the Consulate to work as a secretary. Plaintiff alleges that the Consulate created a hostile work environment by harassing, discriminating, and retaliating against her on the basis of her gender, religion, and Syrian national origin, violated various wage and hour laws, and breached her employment contract. Claiming that she was constructively terminated from her employment, she filed suit.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the Consulate’s motion to dismiss. The commercial activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2), applied. The employment of diplomatic, civil service, or military personnel is governmental and the employment of other personnel is commercial unless the foreign state shows that the employee’s duties included “powers peculiar to sovereigns.” The district court properly exercised its discretion in finding that Plaintiff, who was employed as an administrative assistant, was not a civil servant and that her duties did not include “powers peculiar to sovereigns.” View "Mohammad v. General Consulate of the State of Kuwait in Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) reversing the administrative law judge's award and denying Claimant permanent total disability benefits, holding that Claimant's brief preserved nothing for appellate review because it failed to comply with the mandatory and straightforward rules governing the contents of an appellant's briefs.After the Commission denied Claimant's claim, Claimant appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that each of Claimant's points on appeal was defective because each point relied on wholly failed to follow the simple template provided in Rule 84.04. View "Lexow v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the superior court affirming the decision of the Board of Review for the North Carolina Department of Commerce adopting the decision of the appeals referee ruling that Frank Lennane was disqualified for unemployment benefits, holding that there was no error.At issue was whether Lennane's leaving work was attributable to his employer, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. 96-14.5(a), to avoid disqualification for unemployment benefits. The lower courts affirmed the administrative decision that Lennane was disqualified for unemployment benefits because he failed to show good cause attributable to the employer for leaving. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while Lennane left work for good cause, he failed to satisfy his burden to show that his leaving work was "attributable to the employer" as a matter of law. View "In re Lennane" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Medical Commission Panel denying Appellant's application for additional benefits and an increase to her impairment rating, holding that the Medical Panel's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.In 2014, Appellant suffered a workplace injury. In 2019, Appellant applied for additional benefits, including surgery for carpal tunnel syndrome, and an increase to her impairment rating. The Medical Panel denied both requests, determining (1) Appellant's carpal tunnel syndrome was not related to her workplace injury, and (2) Appellant's claim for an increased impairment rating was unsubstantiated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Medical Panel's ultimate determinations were supported by substantial evidence and were not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law. View "Reichenberg v. State, ex rel., Department of Workforce Services" on Justia Law