Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against defendant Roark-Whitten Hospitality 2 (RW2) seeking relief for what the EEOC alleged were unlawful employment practices by RW2 on the basis of race, color, national origin, and retaliation. Those unlawful employment practices allegedly occurred after RW2 purchased and began operating a hotel in Taos, New Mexico in 2009. The aggrieved employees were all employed at the hotel prior to RW2’s purchase, and were all either terminated or constructively discharged at some point after the purchase. After the action was initiated, the EEOC filed amended complaints seeking to add as defendants two additional entities, Jai Hanuman, LLC (Jai), which purchased the hotel from RW2 in 2014, and SGI, LLC (SGI), which purchased the hotel from Jai in 2016. The district court dismissed the EEOC’s claims against SGI on the grounds that the EEOC failed to adequately allege a basis for successor liability against SGI. As for RW2 and Jai, the district court, acting pursuant to a motion for civil contempt filed by the EEOC, entered default judgment against them and then conducted a hearing on the issue of damages. After conducting that hearing, the district court dismissed the EEOC’s claims against Jai on the grounds that the EEOC failed to adequately allege a basis for successor liability against Jai, and it ordered RW2 to pay compensatory damages to the EEOC in the total amount of $35,000. The EEOC appealed, arguing: (1) the district court erred in dismissing its claims against defendants SGI and Jai; and (2) the district court erred in awarding only $35,000 in compensatory damages for the eleven aggrieved individuals. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the EEOC’s claims against defendant SGI, affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the EEOC’s claims against defendant Jai, reversed the district court’s damage award against defendant RW2, and remanded for further proceedings. View "EEOC v. Roark-Whitten Hospitality, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court granting a preliminary injunction in favor of Plaintiffs, holding that the grounds on which the trial court relied in entering the preliminary injunction had become moot.Plaintiffs were five Arkansas residents who had been receiving pandemic-related unemployment benefits through Pandemic Unemployment Assistance, Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation, and Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation prior to the State's termination of its participation in these programs. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Defendants - Governor Asa Hutchison and Arkansas Division of Workforce Services Director Charisse Childers - lacked the authority under Ark. Code Ann. 11-10-312 to terminate the State's participation in the programs. The trial court granted Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction ordering Defendants to reengage in the terminated programs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the grounds for the preliminary injunction had been rendered moot by the General Assembly's passage of Act 1 of the First Extraordinary Session of 2021. View "Hutchinson v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendants, in their capacities as the state's general treasurer and the executive director of the Employees' Retirement System of the State of Rhode Island (collectively, ERSRI), holding that the trial court did not err.Plaintiff brought this action asserting a declaratory judgment claim and filing an administrative appeal challenging ERSRI's decision to implement an offset against disability benefits any amount paid or payable under the workers' compensation law and claiming estoppel to prevent recovery of more than $24,000 in overpayments. The trial justice granted partial summary judgment for ERSRI. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in upholding ERSRI's decision to offset workers' compensation benefits paid pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 28-33-45 against disability retirement benefits payable to a member of the state retirement system. View "Tiernan v. Magaziner" on Justia Law

Claimant Christina Zayas, a paratransit bus driver, sued her employer, DART/State of Delaware (“Employer”), for injuries she sustained in a 2016 work incident where a passenger physically assaulted her (the “Incident”). In 2019, Zayas underwent left shoulder arthroscopic surgery performed by Dr. Evan Crain (“Dr. Crain”). After the surgery, Zayas was placed on total disability from May 2019 through October 2019. Zayas filed Petitions to Determine Additional Compensation Due relating to the Incident. Specifically, she sought payment of medical expenses, total disability benefits, and acknowledgement of the compensability of the surgery Dr. Crain performed in 2019. Zayas’ hearing was scheduled for November 2019. Prior to the Hearing, the parties stipulated that the limited issue in dispute was whether the May 2019 surgery was causally related to the Incident. The Board held that Zayas failed to meet her burden of proof that the surgery in 2019 was causally related to the Incident. Notably, although the Board had excluded them, the Board stated in its Decision that Medical Records by Zayas' physician were admissible. A review of the record indicated the Medical Records were never admitted into evidence; and the Superior Court did not consider this inconsistency, or the issues Zayas had raised regarding the medical testimony and records. Nevertheless, the Superior Court affirmed the Board’s decision and found that substantial evidence existed to support the Board’s legal conclusions. On appeal, Zayas again argued the Board erred by not admitting her Medical Records and that it abused its discretion by admitting the Employer's expert's deposition testimony during the Hearing. The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that because Dr. Tadduni, the Employer's expert, refused to answer relevant questions, Zayas was deprived of the opportunity to elicit relevant information. "In essence, Dr. Tadduni unilaterally determined that he would not answer questions concerning Dr. Cary’s treatment of Zayas. In admitting Dr. Tadduni’s testimony, and simultaneously excluding the Medical Records, the Board’s actions prevented Zayas from adequately presenting her case, violated fundamental notions of fairness, and thereby abused its discretion." As a result, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Superior Court's judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Zayas v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The Workers’ Compensation Commission and an Administrative Judge (AJ) had ordered Gamma Healthcare and Employers Insurance Company of Wausau (Employer/Carrier) to replace Sharon Grantham’s septic and HVAC systems and to pay for insurance on a handicapped-accessible van. The Commission, sua sponte, issued a separate order sanctioning the Employer/Carrier for causing an unnecessary delay by appealing the AJ’s order to the full Commission without reasonable grounds. The Employer/Carrier appealed. While this case was pending before the Court of Appeals, Sharon Grantham died. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case as moot. The Court of Appeals applied the general rule followed by federal courts by vacating the outstanding Commission and AJ orders. The appeals court reversed and rendered the Commission’s sanctions order against the Employer/Carrier, determining that the Commission had abused its discretion by its imposition of the sanction, reasoning that the Employer/Carrier had a reasonable legal argument for its appeal. Grantham’s estate filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Mississippi Supreme Court granted. The Supreme Court concluded that in light of Grantham’s untimely death and the concession by her estate, it agreed with the Court of Appeals that this case was moot. "However, the main issue is not whether the case is moot. Rather it is whether the Court of Appeals erred by vacating the Commission’s and the AJ’s valid orders to replace the septic and HVAC systems in a case that became moot on appeal due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties. Additionally, did the court err by following federal vacatur law instead of existing Mississippi law?" These were issues of first impression. the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals did not err and that the federal vacatur rule was appropriate. The Commission’s orders were vacated properly. Furthermore, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ reversing and rendering of the Commission’s sanctions award. View "Gamma Healthcare Inc., et al. v. Estate of Sharon Burrell Grantham" on Justia Law

The San Francisco Police Department allowed officers to carry secondary firearms when on duty, and to carry loaded handguns when off duty. A Department bulletin stated officers are responsible for ensuring that firearms under their control are secure at all times and provided specific guidelines for securing firearms in an unattended vehicle.Officer Cabuntala regularly carried an approved secondary firearm on duty and regularly transported it in his vehicle. On August 11, 2017, the city assigned Cabuntala to a training session in a different county. He drove his personal vehicle to the site, with his personal firearm in the vehicle. Firearms were not allowed at the training session. When the training was over, Cabuntala drove home but failed to follow his usual practice of securing his personal firearm inside his house. He left it unsecured inside his vehicle. Cabuntala’s vehicle was broken into. The firearm was stolen and was used to kill Plaintiff’s son. The trial court entered summary judgment, finding Cabuntala was not acting within the scope of his employment. The court of appeal reversed. In the context of policing, a jury could reasonably find the officer’s failure to safely secure his weapon is “not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer’s business.” View "Perez v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Department of Employment Security (MDES) appeals from the circuit court’s order reversing the MDES Board of Review’s determination that Danny Leeton was an employee of Dover Trucking, LLC (Dover). Because the agency’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the circuit judge erred by reversing it. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and MDES' decision was reinstated. View "Mississippi Department of Employment Security v. Dover Trucking, LLC" on Justia Law

Bryant was a VA police officer, assigned to the Columbus Community Based Out-Patient Clinic in Columbus, Georgia. The VA issued Bryant a notice of proposed removal under 38 U.S.C. 714 based on conduct unbecoming a federal employee. The notice alleged that while sheriff's officers were attempting to serve Bryant “with a Temporary Family Violence Order of Protection,” Bryant made inappropriate statements and displayed a lack of professionalism; Bryant “ma[de] threats” that “caused these [officers] to fear for their safety,” which was “unacceptable” and “inexcusable” for a “[f]ederal [p]olice [o]fficer entrusted with carrying a loaded firearm each day.”The deciding official found that the charge was supported by substantial evidence and decided to remove Bryant from employment. Bryant contested whether the charged conduct occurred and whether removal was an appropriate penalty under the Douglas factors, and alleged as an affirmative defense of reprisal for protected whistleblowing activity. The administrative judge found that “the agency proved the charge by substantial evidence.” The Federal Circuit vacated in part. The Merit Systems Protection Board applied the wrong standard and, on remand, must apply a “preponderance of the evidence” standard to determine whether the conduct occurred and apply the Douglas factors to the penalty. Bryant failed to prove his affirmative defense of whistleblower reprisal. View "Bryant v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Bannister has been employed by the VA for over two decades. While working as a pharmacist at the Baton Rouge Southeast Louisiana Veterans Health Care System, Bannister received a notice of proposed removal under 38 U.S.C. 714 based on conduct unbecoming a federal employee. The notice alleged that Bannister had repeatedly spoken rudely and inappropriately to veterans and coworkers, had “yell[ed] and scream[ed]” at pharmacy personnel after being informed that she had been assigned to provide curbside triage to patients.The VA issued a final decision sustaining the charge but mitigating the proposed penalty to a 30-day suspension. After considering Bannister’s “written replies” “along with all the evidence developed and provided to [Bannister],” the deciding official “found that the charge as stated in the notice of proposed removal [was] supported by substantial evidence.” Bannister contested whether the charged conduct occurred, and she alleged as an affirmative defense that the VA suspended her in reprisal for protected whistleblowing activity. The Merit Systems Protection Board upheld Bannister’s suspension.The Federal Circuit rejected her whistleblower claim but found that the Board’s decision as to the underlying suspension rested on an incorrect statement of law. On remand, the Board should apply the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof. View "Bannister v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the opinion of the court of appeals vacating the administrative law judge's (ALJ) award of temporarily total disability (TTD) benefits and affirmed the portion of the court of appeals' opinion vacating the award of permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits insofar as it applied to the enhancement, holding that the court of appeals erred in part.Plaintiff sustained a work-related injury while working for Defendant. An ALJ awarded Plaintiff TTD benefits, PPD benefits, and medical benefits. The ALJ applied the two-times multiplier from Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(c)2 to Plaintiff's PPD benefits. The court of appeals vacated the ALJ's award of TTD benefits and vacated the award of PPD benefits insofar as it applied to the enhancement. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the ALJ did not err in awarding Plaintiff TTD benefits; and (2) the ALJ erred in enhancing Plaintiff's PPD benefits by the two-times multiplier. View "French v. Rev-A-Shelf" on Justia Law