Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

O’Connell began working for the County in 1999 and became a participant in the Benefit Fund, with the County transferring a portion of his salary to the Fund as his employee contribution (40 ILCS 5/9-108). In 2001, O’Connell was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. In 2017, after exhausting his paid leave, O’Connell obtained an ordinary disability benefit (50% of his salary). The Board stated that based on his years of service, the benefit would expire in August 2021. The County separated him from the position effective July 1, 2019. The Board ceased paying the ordinary disability benefit to O’Connell; the County ceased making contributions to the Fund on O’Connell’s behalf.O’Connell filed suit, alleging that the Illinois Pension Code and the pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, 5) entitled him to continued ordinary disability benefit payments even though the County had terminated his employment. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of his complaint. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. O’Connell maintained standing to seek relief for reinstatement of his ordinary disability benefit by the Board and of contributions by the County and stated a sufficient cause of action for declaratory judgment and for mandamus. Once the Board grants the employee the ordinary disability benefit, Pension Code section 9-157 then enumerates triggering events, which do not include termination of employment, that halt the benefit. View "O'Connell v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

The Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act provides early retirement benefits to law enforcement officers (LEOs), 5 U.S.C. 8412(d) after obtaining sufficient "LEO credit," which may be awarded for time served in either a primary law enforcement position or secondary (supervisory or administrative) law enforcement position if an employee is “transferred directly” to a secondary position after serving in a primary position. Klipp worked for the TSA, 1991-2009. In a parallel case, Klipp was determined to be entitled to LEO credit for 1991–98, but not for 1998–2008; his 2004–2009 position was not eligible for LEO credit, although it was a secondary position, because there was a break in service between his primary position and his secondary position.Klipp then sought primary LEO credit for his post-2004 position. In 2004, TSA hired Klipp as a Supervisory Criminal Investigator-Assistant Federal Security Director-Law Enforcement (AFSD-LE) for the New Orleans International Airport. The government never hired subordinate officers or investigators for him to supervise. In 2005, Klipp’s position title changed to “nonsupervisory” criminal investigator. Klipp argued that LEO credit can be awarded if the applicant’s actual duties were primarily LEO duties, even if the position description denotes a secondary position. The Merit Systems Protection Board denied Klipp's request for retroactive LEO retirement coverage for 2005-2009. The Federal Circuit vacated. The Board did not properly analyze whether 50 percent or more of Klipp’s actual duties were LEO duties under circuit precedent. View "Klipp v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The San Diego City Attorney brought an enforcement action under the California Unfair Competition Law, Business and Professions Code sections 17200, et seq. (UCL), on behalf of the People of California against Maplebear Inc. DBA Instacart (Instacart). In their complaint, the State alleged Instacart unlawfully misclassified its employees as independent contractors in order to deny workers employee protections, harming its alleged employees and the public at large through a loss of significant payroll tax revenue, and giving Instacart an unfair advantage against its competitors. In response to the complaint, Instacart brought a motion to compel arbitration of a portion of the City’s action based on its agreements with the individuals it hired (called "Shoppers"). The trial court denied the motion, concluding Instacart failed to meet its burden to show a valid agreement to arbitrate between it and the State. Instacart appealed, arguing that even though the State was not a party to its Shopper agreements, it was bound by its arbitration provision to the extent the State sought injunctive relief and restitution because these remedies were “primarily for the benefit of” the Shoppers. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and affirmed the trial court’s order. View "California v. Maplebear Inc." on Justia Law

Daniel Sharp suffered an injury to his lower back from an accident at work in 2015. After surgery, he was repeatedly advised to lose weight by the medical providers treating his injury. However, Sharp gained considerable weight instead. The Industrial Commission found that Sharp’s functional ability had diminished between 2016, when he reached maximal medical improvement (MMI) after surgery, and 2019, when his permanent disability hearing was held. The Commission attributed the worsening of Sharp’s condition to his weight gain, which it held to be a superseding cause of any increase in Sharp’s disability post-MMI. Accordingly, the Commission evaluated Sharp’s disability based on his condition at MMI, despite the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in Brown v. Home Depot, 272 P.3d 577 (2012), requiring that a claimant’s disability be evaluated based on circumstances at time of the hearing. After review in this case, the Supreme Court held that the Commission erred by departing from "Brown," by applying an incorrect standard to determine that Sharp was not entitled to compensation due to the aggravation of his injury, and by reaching certain factual conclusions not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Therefore, the Commission’s decision was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Sharp v. Thomas Bros Plumbing" on Justia Law

Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”) sued law firm Boechler, P.C., and Jeanette Boechler, individually, to collect unpaid workers’ compensation premiums and penalties, and to enjoin them from employing others until they complied with the North Dakota Workers Compensation Act, including paying the premiums and penalties. The firm appealed the district court’s ultimate judgment holding the firm liable for the premiums and penalties, and Boechler appealed the order dismissing the personal liability claim against her without prejudice. Finding no reversible error in the district court’s judgments, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "WSI v. Boechler, PC, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner State Employees’ Association of New Hampshire, Inc. SEIU, Local 1984 (SEA), and intervenors New Hampshire Troopers Association, New Hampshire Troopers Association-Command Staff, New Hampshire Probation and Parole Officers Association, and New Hampshire Probation and Parole-Command Staff Association, appealed a Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) order denying petitioner’s request for declaratory relief. They argued the PELRB erred by ruling that the state legislature’s vote accepting a fact-finder’s report and recommendations pursuant to RSA 273-A:12, III (2010) was not binding upon respondent State of New Hampshire. In 2018, the unions and the State began negotiating the terms of a multi-year collective bargaining agreement. After the negotiations reached an impasse, the parties proceeded to impasse resolution procedures and engaged a neutral fact finder to assist them with resolving their disputes. The unions accepted the fact-finder’s report, but the Governor did not. In addition, the Governor declined to submit the report to the Executive Council for its consideration. The parties treated the Governor’s actions as a rejection of the report pursuant to RSA 273-A:12, II; from there the matter was submitted to the legislature. The legislature voted to adopt the fact-finder’s report. The unions took the position that the legislature’s vote was binding upon the State with respect to the cost items set forth in the report. The State took the opposite position, asserting that the legislature’s vote was merely advisory and did not result in a binding agreement between the parties. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the legislature’s vote was advisory and did not bind the State. View "Appeal of New Hampshire Troopers Association et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner is an experienced airline pilot. When he was interviewing for a new position, he was asked to take a urine test. Unable to provide an adequate sample, Petitioner left the site. Under FAA guidelines, walking out before providing a drug test sample is considered a refusal. The potential employer reported Petitioner's refusal to the FAA. The FAA sought to revoke Petitioner's pilot and medical certifications. However, at a hearing in front of the National Safety Transportation Board, the Board agreed with the FAA in sustaining the refusal, but reduced Petitioner's sanction to a 180-suspension.The D.C. Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, finding that by walking out before providing a sufficient urine sample, Petitioner's conduct was properly considered a refusal. In so holding, the court noted that the trial court credited the FAA witnesses while questioning the veracity of Petitioner's testimony.The D.C. Circuit also granted the FAA's cross-petition, finding that the Board was required to defer to the FAA under these circumstances. View "Ydil Pham v. NTSB" on Justia Law

Seventeen retired city employees who receive retiree health benefits through CalPERS under the city’s Medical After Retirement (MAR) plan filed suit. Five were union members before their retirement. The memorandums of understanding (MOU) and other benefits documents applicable to each of the bargaining units state: “ The City shall pay the PERS required Minimum Employer Contribution (MEC) per month on behalf of each active and retired employee who participates in the City’s health insurance plans.” The city pays the MEC to CalPERS and then deducts that amount from the retiree’s premium reimbursement owed under the MAR plan.Plaintiffs alleged the practice amounted to improper use of their MAR benefits, resulted in improper reductions of benefits, and violated Government Code section 228923 and the applicable MOUs. The city argued the complaint was barred by issue preclusion based on a 2017 administrative proceeding between the city and the union, following a union grievance. The trial court dismissed, based upon issue preclusion, stating: “[T]he emphasis is not on a concept of identity of parties but on the practical situation.” The court of appeal reversed, citing due process requirements. There is no basis for concluding that the plaintiffs should reasonably have expected to be bound by, or were even aware of, the union’s grievance proceeding. The city has not demonstrated that the claims are barred for failure to allege exhaustion of administrative procedures. View "Bullock v. City of Antioch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the opinion and award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission denying Plaintiff relief on her claim for disability compensation from Defendants, holding that there was no error.On appeal, the court of appeals held that Plaintiff's claim was not time-barred under N.C. Gen. Stat. 97-24 and thus reversed the Commission's dismissal of Plaintiff's claim based on a 2014 injury. The court remanded the case to the Commission for a determination as to whether Plaintiff suffered a compensable injury under the Workers' Compensation Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's claim was not barred by section 97-24. View "Cunningham v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co." on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment against public school teacher Sheri Mimbs, on the basis that Mimbs failed to institute her whistleblower action within one year after discovering the alleged acts of retaliation. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded Mimbs’s complaint was timely with respect to one of the acts giving rise to her retaliation claim. Therefore, the Court reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the school district. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Mimbs v. Henry County Schools" on Justia Law