Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Dr. Standley was employed by the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration. Standley contends that over several years he sought to ensure that the Space and Atmospheric Burst Reporting System (SABRS) for nuclear detection, was funded and supported, believing this was required under section 1065 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008. He claims his superiors attempted to block funding and his work on SABRS. In 2015, Standley sent an email entitled “Obstruction of Public law 110- 118, NDAA 2008, Maintenance of Space-based Nuclear Detonation Detection System” to the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, with copies to Department of Defense representatives, and the Office of Special Counsel. Following several additional unsuccessful attempts to change DOE's position, Standley filed an unsuccessful appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board, alleging that DOE and its employees retaliated against him for his efforts to change the DOE policy by not selecting him for any of three DOE Director positions posted in 2014-2017. Standley claimed he was engaging in protected whistleblowing when he opposed efforts to defund SABRS. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision. Section 1065 does not require that the DOE provide its SABRS program to the Secretary of Defense. The court acknowledged “Standley’s well-intentioned beliefs about the mission,” and his pro se status, but found his challenges to a government policy decision with which he disagreed unavailing. View "Standley v. Department of Energy" on Justia Law

OSHA investigated DRTG, a Houston construction company, following a worksite fatality. DRTG employees provided DRTG’s business address, which is also the home address of DRTG’s sole owner. On September 13, OSHA issued a citation and a notice of a proposed penalty to DRTG, mailed to the provided address by USPS certified mail. After an unsuccessful delivery attempt was made on September 16, USPS left a standard delivery slip saying that the certified mailing would be held at the Post Office for pick-up; DRTG never retrieved the mailing. OSHA sent the citation by UPS Next Day Air on September 23. According to UPS tracking, the citation was successfully delivered to DRTG’s doorstep on September 24. DRTG had 15 working days to file a notice of contest, which OSHA calculated from the date of the UPS delivery as October 16. DRTG did not file the notice by the deadline. The citation became a final order on October 16, 29 U.S.C. 659(a). The next day, an OSHA representative spoke with Padron regarding documentation required by the citation. A "next of kin letter" sent by OSHA to a DRTG employee who was the deceased employee’s cousin, was received on October 18, was immediately forwarded to DRTG’s counsel.On November 5, OSHA received DRTG’s notice of contest, which was ultimately rejected as untimely. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. DRTG was properly served with notice. View "D.R.T.G. Builders, L.L.C. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals holding that the decision of the North Carolina Industrial Commission should be reversed and this case remanded to the Commission for recalculation of Plaintiff's average weekly wage, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Plaintiff, an injured employee, received temporary disability benefits. Plaintiff later requested that his claim be assigned for a hearing, claiming that Defendant, his employer, had unilaterally lowered the amount of temporary total disability benefits that he had been receiving with respect to his back injury and that the parties could not agree with respect to the amount of benefits to which Plaintiff was entitled. The Commission determined that the fifth method for calculating Plaintiff's average weekly wage was appropriate for use in this case. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the findings and conclusions that the Commission made in support of its average weekly wages determination appeared to rest upon a misapplication of the applicable legal standard. View "Nay v. Cornerstone Staffing Solutions" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Hampshire Supreme Court arose from the New Hampshire Division of State Police's decision to terminate State Trooper Thomas Owens after an internal investigation. The Trooper appealed his termination to the New Hampshire Personnel Appeals Board (PAB), which reinstated him. The Division appealed, arguing that the PAB’s reinstatement of the Trooper was unjust and unreasonable because he was no longer qualified to be a state trooper. It also argued that the PAB erred as a matter of law when it reinstated the employee in contravention of public policy. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the PAB. View "Appeal of New Hampshire Division of State Police" on Justia Law

Joseph alleged that Atwater terminated his employment as chief of police in violation of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) Gov. Code 3304(c): no chief of police may be removed from office without being provided written notice of the reasons “and an opportunity for administrative appeal.” Joseph claims the hearing offered by Atwater was not mutually scheduled, was not before a mutually selected neutral hearing officer, did not require the city to bear the burden of proof as to just cause for his termination, and did not require Atwater to present witnesses and allow them to be cross-examined. The trial court denied Joseph’s petition, concluding he was an at-will employee. Joseph’s employment agreement stated he could be removed as police chief for any reason; if the removal was not for willful misconduct, he had the option of continuing his employment by returning to the position of police lieutenant.The court of appeal reversed. Joseph was an at-will employee only as police chief and had rights to employment as a lieutenant that could be terminated only for cause. Before Atwater could terminate his right to employment as a lieutenant, it was required by POBRA to provide him with the type of administrative appeal afforded public safety officers who are terminable only for cause, including a full evidentiary hearing before a neutral fact-finder. View "Joseph v. City of Atwater" on Justia Law

Ash challenged the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) denial of his application for disability retirement benefits. Ash asserted disparate treatment based on race and prior protected activity. The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) affirmed. Ash appealed.The Federal Circuit transferred the case to the District of Maryland. Because this case involves an action that is appealable to the MSPB and a discrimination allegation, it is a mixed case. Under 5 U.S.C. 7703(b)(1)(A), an appellant generally must appeal a final MSPB decision to the Federal Circuit but if the appellant has been affected by an action that the appellant may appeal to the MSPB and alleges that a basis for the action was discrimination prohibited by enumerated federal statutes, then the appellant has a “mixed case” and must seek judicial review in federal district court. One of those enumerated federal statutes is 42 U.S.C, 2000e16, which prohibits racial discrimination with respect to “personnel actions.” An appeal arising from a benefits decision can be a “personnel action” giving rise to a mixed case. An OPM decision that adversely affects retirement “rights or benefits,” like the Ash decision, is a “personnel action,” 5 U.S.C. 8461(e), that is appealable to the MSPB and alleges discrimination. View "Ash v. Office of Personnel Management" on Justia Law

The California Personnel Board (Board) sustained a complaint brought by Vickie Mabry-Height, M.D., against the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) alleging discrimination based on age, race, and gender in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The Board concluded that Dr. Mabry-Height established a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination based on certain conduct, and the Department failed to rebut the presumption of discrimination by offering evidence that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for this conduct. The Department petitioned the trial court for a writ of administrative mandamus seeking an order setting aside the Board’s decision. The petition was denied, and judgment was entered in favor of Dr. Mabry-Height. The Department appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

Bourke was exposed to fumes during his employment with the Veterans Administration. He received treatment at a VA hospital and contends that medical malpractice there caused him serious injuries. He sought compensation from the Department of Labor under the Federal Employees Compensation Act for on-the-job injuries and from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for medical malpractice. The Department of Labor processed Bourke’s claim but found that he had not shown that his asserted injuries had been caused by exposure to fumes. The VA (handling the FTCA claim) concluded that, once Bourke applied to the Department of Labor, all other sources of relief were precluded. Bourke sued under the Tort Claims Act, conceding the Department of Labor’s conclusion that conditions at work did not cause the medical issues for which he was treated by the VA, and alleging medical malpractice.The district court rejected his complaint on the ground that the Federal Employees Compensation Act offers his sole avenue of relief.; once the Department of Labor adjudicates a claim, the applicant must accept the result because 5 U.S.C. 8116(c) forecloses other sources of relief and 5 U.S.C. 8128(b)(2) blocks judicial review of the Department’s decisions.The Seventh Circuit vacated. Bourke is not seeking judicial review of the Department of Labor’s decision. Someone who loses before the Department cannot contest that outcome in court but may pursue other remedies that are compatible with the Department’s views. View "Bourke v. United States" on Justia Law

Marsh, an employee of Petitioner New River Electrical Corporation, suffered severe burns when he picked up a live electrical wire at a job site. No one had tested, tagged, or grounded the transformer connected to the cable that shocked Marsh. Two supervisors attempted to conceal these breaches of New River’s standard safety protocols. They were subsequently terminated. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) investigated the accident, determined that New River committed three serious violations of the applicable safety regulations, and fined the company $38,802. An ALJ affirmed, finding that New River had not established the affirmative defense of “unpreventable employee misconduct,” but decreased the penalty to $12,934. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission declined to review that decision.The Fourth Circuit reversed. The ALJ improperly relieved OSHA of the burden of proving that New River had constructive knowledge of these violations as part of the prima facie case. When the supervisory employee commits the violation, the employer loses its “eyes and ears” to detect and prevent misconduct. To avoid unfairly imposing liability on an employer for a rogue supervisor, OSHA must prove that a supervisor’s misconduct was “reasonably foreseeable” to establish the employer had constructive knowledge. View "New River Electrical Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission" on Justia Law

In 2020, the FLRA adopted a new threshold for when collective bargaining is required. Under the new standard, the duty to bargain is triggered only if a workplace change has "a substantial impact on a condition of employment." Labor unions challenged the FLRA's decision to alter the bargaining threshold, maintaining that the FLRA's new standard is both inconsistent with the governing statute and insufficiently explained.The DC Circuit held that the FLRA's decision to abandon its de minimis exception in favor of a substantial-impact threshold was not sufficiently reasoned, and thus is arbitrary and capricious in violation of section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. In this case, the cursory policy statement that the FLRA issued to justify its choice to abandon thirty-five years of precedent promoting and applying the de minimis standard and to adopt the previously rejected substantial-impact test is arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, the court granted the labor unions' petitions for review and vacated the FLRA's policy statement. View "American Federation of Government Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law