Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In a suit challenging the emergency temporary standards (ETS) promulgated by the California Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the trial court denied a request for a preliminary injunction suspending enforcement of the ETS. The trial court concluded that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of prevailing on the merits and found the public interest in curbing the spread of COVID-19 weighed “heavily” in favor of ongoing enforcement of the ETS.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erroneously applied a deferential standard of review, the findings of emergency lacked necessary findings, and the ETS exceeded the Board’s statutory authority. The administrative record demonstrated the Board did not abuse its discretion in adopting prescriptive standards in the ETS; the Board considered performance standards during the rulemaking process, including existing regulations, and concluded certain prescriptive standards were necessary to assure “to the extent feasible, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity.” The Board did not abuse its discretion in establishing regulations excluding workers exposed to COVID-19 cases from the workplace and mandating a continuation of pay, benefits, and seniority during such periods of exclusion. View "Western Growers Association v. Occupational Safety & Health Standards Board" on Justia Law

Lozano and Mitchell, former Los Angeles police officers, filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate challenging the city’s decision to terminate their employment. A board of rights found the two guilty on multiple counts of misconduct, based in part on a digital in-car video system (DICVS) recording that captured them willfully abdicating their duty to assist a commanding officer’s response to a robbery in progress and playing a Pokémon mobile phone game while on duty.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of relief, rejecting arguments that the city proceeded in a manner contrary to the law by using the DICVS recording in their disciplinary proceeding and by denying them the protections of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA, Gov. Code 3300). While Department personnel are not subject to discipline for minor infractions or purely private communications unrelated to their police work, commanding officers are not required to ignore egregious misconduct that is unintentionally captured on a DICVS recording. POBRA did not apply because when the sergeant called the officers in to discuss the radio calls, he did not have evidence that the officers had committed a crime or egregious misconduct. View "Lozano v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

North Dakota Workforce Safety & Insurance ("WSI") appealed after a district court affirmed an ALJ’s decision reversing WSI’s imposition of derivative premium liability on Brendel Construction, Inc. for unpaid premiums due from one of its subcontractors, Daniel Alvidrez. WSI determined Daniel Alvidrez and Alfredo Frias were roofing subcontractors of Brendel Construction. WSI investigators noticed Frias and Alvidrez each used the same Texas address, and because of this “cross-over information relating to Frias and Alvidrez, [WSI] established two separate accounts.” After unsuccessfully attempting to collect premium amounts from each, WSI imposed derivative liability on Brendel Construction. Brendel Construction appealed to the district court, and WSI cross appealed. The court affirmed imposition of liability as to the Frias account and dismissed as untimely WSI’s cross appeal concerning the Alvidrez account. In Brendel Construction I, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed as to the Frias account and reversed the dismissal of WSI’s cross appeal. On remand, the district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision determining Brendel Construction was not liable for the Alvidrez account. WSI appealed that last judgment. The Supreme Court determined that even if there was evidence Alvidrez had employees, WSI still had not provided reliable information to support its imposition of premium liability. Judgment was thus affirmed. View "Brendel Construction v. WSI" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court and appeals officer that Employee was incapacitated from earning "full wages" and therefore denying Employer and its insurer's petition for judicial review, holding that there was no error.At issue was whether Employee's inability to earn overtime due to his industrial injury amounted to being incapacitated from earning "full wages" such that he could seek to reopen his claim more than one year after its closing. The appeals officer concluded (1) Employee was incapacitated from earning full wages for the time specified under Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.400(1); (2) that Employee had satisfied the statute's period of incapacitation; and (3) therefore, Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.390(5) permitted Employee to submit an application to reopen his claim more than one year after it had closed. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the term "full wages" as used in section 616C.400(1) may include payments for overtime; and (2) substantial evidence supported the appeals officer's findings in this case. View "City of Henderson v. Wolfgram" on Justia Law

Joseph Motisi appealed a district court order and judgment denying his petition for writ of mandamus. Hebron Public School District employed Motisi as a teacher during the 2019-20 and 2020-21 school years. Prior to his employment with the District, Motisi worked as a teacher in another North Dakota school district for four years. On April 23, 2021, the District sent Motisi a Probationary Teacher Notice of Nonrenewal, informing him the District would not be renewing his teaching contract. Motisi sent a letter to the District on April 26, 2021, notifying the District of his acceptance of a continuing contract for the 2021-22 school year. The District then notified Motisi he was unable to accept an offer to renew a contract because his contract was nonrenewed. Motisi applied for a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and later for a writ of mandamus. The court issued an order denying Motisi’s petition for writ of mandamus, stating the sole issue was “whether Motisi is a probationary employee under N.D.C.C. 15.1-15-02(8)” and that “Motisi concedes that if he was a probationary teacher, the District complied with the law.” The district court rejected Motisi’s argument that because he had four years of experience at another school, he could not be considered a probationary teacher under the statute. The court ultimately found “[t]he District followed the requirements of the statute when it non-renewed Motisi’s contract” and “Motisi has not demonstrated that he has a clear legal right” to the renewed contract. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court did not err in interpreting N.D.C.C. 15.1-15-02(8), and affirmed judgment. View "Motisi v. Hebron Public School District" on Justia Law

The question in this case was whether a lump-sum payment that a school district made to settle a principal’s age-discrimination claim should have been included in that employee’s retirement benefit calculation. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court disregarded the Retirement Code’s statutory definition of “compensation” and instead deferred to the intent of the settling parties to treat the payment as retirement-covered compensation. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "Whalen v. Public School Empl. Ret Board" on Justia Law

Appellant Vincent Lorino worked as an equipment operator for the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“Employer”) when he slipped on the running board of the truck he used for work and fell backwards, injuring his lower back and left hip. Employer accepted liability for a low back sprain/tear and a left hip sprain/tear pursuant to two medical-only notices of compensation payable (“NCP”). In February 2017, Employer referred Appellant for an independent medical examination (“IME”). The IME examiner determined Appellant had fully recovered from his injuries, that any pain Appellant experienced was the result of pre-existing degenerative disc disease, and that Appellant required no further treatment. As a result, Employer filed a petition to terminate Appellant’s treatment. Appellant retained counsel for the hearing on Employer’s termination petition. At the hearing, Appellant testified he had been receiving treatment from Dr. Shivani Dua, who administered epidural steroid injections to alleviate the pain in his back and left hip. Appellant explained that while the steroid injections would alleviate his pain for a few months, the pain would slowly return, at which point he would need to return for additional injections. Appellant indicated he received his most recent injection approximately two to three weeks before the IME. At the conclusion of the hearing, Appellant requested, in addition to continued medical benefits, attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 440 of the Workers' Compensation Act, asserting that, because he received only medical benefits, he was unable to retain the services of an attorney based on a traditional contingent fee arrangement, and instead was required to enter into an hourly-rate fee agreement. At issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was the propriety of the Commonwealth Court’s construction of Section 440 of the Act as precluding an award of attorney’s fees to a claimant when an employer established a reasonable basis for seeking a termination of benefits. The Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court’s interpretation of Section 440 was contrary to the statute’s express language, and, therefore, reversed in part and remanded. View "Lorino v. WCAB (Commonwealth of PA)" on Justia Law

After petitioner was injured on the job while employed by Ameri-Force, he successfully obtained a workers' compensation award after filing a claim with the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs of the U.S. Department of Labor. The Fifth Circuit concluded that petitioner is entitled to attorney's fees under the plain text of 33 U.S.C. 928(b) and reversed the decision of the Benefits Review Board, remanding for further proceedings. In this case, all the criteria of an award of attorney's fees under section 928(b) are satisfied as to the claims examiner's August 24, 2016 recommendation. View "Rivera v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the denial of his application for appointment to the medical staff of a dialysis clinic. The superior court denied plaintiff's request for a writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. In this case, the hearing officer, applying burdens specified in the bylaws, concluded that (1) the clinic sustained its initial burden of presenting evidence to support the denial of staff privileges and (2) plaintiff did not sustain his burden of proving that the denial "lacks any substantial factual basis, or is otherwise arbitrary or capricious."The Court of Appeal reversed and concluded that plaintiff is entitled to a writ of administrative mandamus vacating the hearing officer's decision. The court concluded that the burden of proof contained in the medical staff bylaws is not consistent with the preponderance of the evidence standard required by Business and Professions Code section 809.3, subdivision (b)(2). The court also concluded that the statute controls in the event of an inconsistency, the application of the bylaws' more demanding burden of proof constituted procedural error, the error deprived plaintiff of a fair hearing and, therefore, was prejudicial. View "Bichai v. DaVita, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court denying Respondents' motion to dismiss Petitioner's petition for judicial review of the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission summarily denying Petitioner's second request for modification of an earlier order, holding that the circuit court erred.The Commission issued an order approving Petitioner's request for four additional weeks of physical therapy for her left shoulder that was injured due to a workplace accident. More than three years later, Petitioner filed a request for modification of the earlier order denying her request for authorization of surgery. The Commission denied the request without a hearing. Petitioner then filed a second request for modification, which the Commission denied without a hearing. The circuit court denied Petitioner's petition for judicial review. The court of special appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission's summary denial of Petitioner's request for modification was not subject to judicial review. View "Sanders v. Board of Education of Harford County" on Justia Law