Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Marsh, an employee of Petitioner New River Electrical Corporation, suffered severe burns when he picked up a live electrical wire at a job site. No one had tested, tagged, or grounded the transformer connected to the cable that shocked Marsh. Two supervisors attempted to conceal these breaches of New River’s standard safety protocols. They were subsequently terminated. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) investigated the accident, determined that New River committed three serious violations of the applicable safety regulations, and fined the company $38,802. An ALJ affirmed, finding that New River had not established the affirmative defense of “unpreventable employee misconduct,” but decreased the penalty to $12,934. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission declined to review that decision.The Fourth Circuit reversed. The ALJ improperly relieved OSHA of the burden of proving that New River had constructive knowledge of these violations as part of the prima facie case. When the supervisory employee commits the violation, the employer loses its “eyes and ears” to detect and prevent misconduct. To avoid unfairly imposing liability on an employer for a rogue supervisor, OSHA must prove that a supervisor’s misconduct was “reasonably foreseeable” to establish the employer had constructive knowledge. View "New River Electrical Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission" on Justia Law

In 2020, the FLRA adopted a new threshold for when collective bargaining is required. Under the new standard, the duty to bargain is triggered only if a workplace change has "a substantial impact on a condition of employment." Labor unions challenged the FLRA's decision to alter the bargaining threshold, maintaining that the FLRA's new standard is both inconsistent with the governing statute and insufficiently explained.The DC Circuit held that the FLRA's decision to abandon its de minimis exception in favor of a substantial-impact threshold was not sufficiently reasoned, and thus is arbitrary and capricious in violation of section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. In this case, the cursory policy statement that the FLRA issued to justify its choice to abandon thirty-five years of precedent promoting and applying the de minimis standard and to adopt the previously rejected substantial-impact test is arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, the court granted the labor unions' petitions for review and vacated the FLRA's policy statement. View "American Federation of Government Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law

Unions challenged a Policy Statement of the Federal Labor Relations Authority that announced for the first time that zipper clauses (provisions that foreclose midterm bargaining) are mandatory bargaining subjects. The Authority determined that, if an agency and a union intractably disagree over a zipper clause proposal, the agency may bring the proposal to the impasses panel—which has the authority to put it (or a different clause reflecting what it determines to be a better resolution) into the parties’ term agreement. Before 2020, the Authority had not issued any Policy Statement in over 35 years.The D.C. Circuit vacated the Policy Statement. The Authority structured its consideration of the zipper clause question in two steps, first holding that the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute does not entitle employees to demand midterm bargaining even when the parties’ agreement is silent on the matter. The Authority then relied on that holding as “necessary” to its conclusion that proposed contractual zipper clauses expressly foreclosing midterm bargaining are mandatory bargaining subjects. The first holding was arbitrary. The Authority’s errors “include miscasting Supreme Court precedent, relying on conclusory assertions, and mischaracterizing its dramatic shift of the bargaining baseline as allowing the parties to resolve the issue.” View "American Federation of Government Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Department of Workforce Development rejecting Eden Senior Care's application to succeed the unemployment insurance account of Friendly Village Nursing and Rehab's previous owner, holding that Eden failed to demonstrate excusable neglect for the untimely filing of its application.After purchasing Friendly Village, Eden untimely filed its successorship application. The Labor and Industry Review Commission concluded that the record was insufficient to establish that Eden's application was late because of excusable neglect. Eden appealed, arguing that the Commission erred in failing to consider whether the interests-of-justice factors supported a finding of excusable neglect. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission applied the correct legal standard; and (2) there was no basis on which to excuse Eden's neglect in filing its successorship application after the statutory deadline. View "Friendly Village Nursing and Rehab, LLC v. State, Department of Workforce Development" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the decision of the Medical Commission upholding the denial of Appellant's request for benefits, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's denial of coverage.In 2007, Appellant suffered a compensable injury to her left knee. More than a decade later, Appellant submitted requests to the Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division to cover treatment for her right knee, ankles and back and further applied for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits. The Division denied both requests, and the Commission affirmed the ruling. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings that (1) Appellant's right knee, ankle, and back injuries were not second compensable injuries; and (2) Appellant did not qualify for PTD benefits under the odd lot doctrine. View "Ross v. State, ex rel., Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division" on Justia Law

The State redesigned the dental insurance plan offered to public retirees in 2014, narrowing coverage but also decreasing premiums paid by retirees. The Retired Public Employees of Alaska challenged the redesign. After a bench trial the superior court concluded that the new plan unconstitutionally diminished retirees’ accrued benefits. The State appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by determining the dental plan was a constitutionally protected “accrued benefit” and by refusing to consider premium rates for retirees as relevant to the diminishment analysis. The Alaska Supreme Court agreed with the State on the second point only: "The Alaska Constitution does protect public retirees’ option to purchase dental insurance as an accrued benefit, but both coverage for retirees and price to retirees influence the value of this option." The Court therefore vacated and remanded for the superior court to reevaluate the plan changes and incorporate premium pricing into its analysis. View "Tshibaka v. Retired Public Employees of Alaska, Inc." on Justia Law

The Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (820 ILCS 320/1), states that “an important State interest” requires that an employer “who employs a full-time law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer, or firefighter, who ... suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay the entire premium of the employer’s health insurance plan for the injured employee, the injured employee’s spouse, and for each dependent child.” The Act does not define “catastrophic injury,” which the Illinois Supreme Court has found “synonymous with an injury resulting in a line-of-duty disability under section 4-110 of the [Illinois Pension] Code”Peoria’s ordinance was amended to define “catastrophic injury” as “[a]n injury, the direct and proximate consequences of which permanently prevent an individual from performing any gainful work.” The term “gainful work,” which does not appear in the Act, is defined as “[f]ull- or part-time activity that actually is compensated or commonly is compensated.”The Union sought a declaratory judgment that the amendment violates the Act. The circuit court granted the Union summary judgment. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The ordinance’s definitions are inconsistent with the requirements of the Act and are therefore preempted; the ordinance is not a valid exercise of Peoria’s home rule authority. View "International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 50 v. City of Peoria" on Justia Law

Dr. Smolinski is a Supervisory Physician in the Traumatic Brain Injury Clinic of the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC), an Army hospital in Germany. He was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army and occasionally saw patients at LRMC as a visiting provider. The Army purportedly changed the salary Smolinski was offered and delayed his move to a new position. Smolinski’s subsequent complaint under the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 1221, alleged those actions were retaliation for his wife’s 2017 patient complaint, his 2018 testimony in an investigation into an officer, and his 2019 Office of Special Counsel (OSC) complaints.The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed his complaint, citing lack of jurisdiction because Smolinski failed to establish that those activities were protected disclosures. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. Smolinski failed to allege sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim that his wife’s patient complaint was a protected disclosure, and did not exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his claim of retaliation for his OSC complaints. With respect to Smolinski’s claims alleging retaliation for his 2018 testimony, however, the court reversed the dismissal and remanded for the Board to consider those claims on the merits. View "Smolinski v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission finding that Defendant was not entitled to an award of workers' compensation benefits because his injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, holding that there was no error.Defendant, a field service specialist for DISH Network, Inc,. was an a car accident after he choked on a sandwich and blacked out while traveling to his first appointment. Defendant sought workers' compensation benefits. The ALJ awarded benefits, but the Commission denied compensation because Defendant failed to prove his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to establish that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. View "Boothe v. DISH Network, Inc." on Justia Law

The Secretary of Labor, through OSHA, enacted a vaccine mandate, to be enforced by employers. The mandate preempted contrary state laws and covered virtually all employers with at least 100 employees, with exemptions for employees who exclusively work remotely or outdoors. It required that covered workers receive a COVID–19 vaccine or obtain a medical test each week at their own expense, on their own time, and also wear a mask at work. Challenges were consolidated before the Sixth Circuit, which allowed OSHA’s rule to take effect.The Supreme Court stayed the rule. Applicants are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Secretary lacked the authority to impose the mandate. The rule is “a significant encroachment into the lives—and health—of a vast number of employees,” not plainly authorized by statute; 29 U.S.C. 655(b) empowers the Secretary to set workplace safety standards, not broad public health measures. Although COVID–19 is a risk in many workplaces, it is not an occupational hazard in most. COVID–19 spreads everywhere that people gather. Permitting OSHA to regulate the hazards of daily life would significantly expand OSHA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization. The vaccine mandate is unlike typical OSHA workplace regulations. A vaccination “cannot be undone.” Where the virus poses a special danger because of the particular features of an employee’s job or workplace, targeted regulations are permissible but OSHA’s indiscriminate approach fails to distinguish between occupational risk and general risk. The equities do not justify withholding interim relief. States and employers allege that OSHA’s mandate will force them to incur billions of dollars in unrecoverable compliance costs and will cause hundreds of thousands of employees to leave their jobs. View "National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration" on Justia Law