Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting Employer's motion to dismiss a petition for judicial review as untimely, holding that the district court correctly dismissed Claimant's petition for judicial review.Claimant sustained a work injury and pursued workers' compensation benefits. The workers' compensation benefits ordered Employer to pay temporary total disability benefits related to Claimant's right extremity injury but rejected Claimant's claim that she had also sustained a right shoulder occupational injury. According to Iowa Code 17A.19(3), Claimant had thirty day to file a petition for judicial review. Claimant's attorney failed to file the petition by the deadline. When the attorney realized his oversight, Claimant filed a petition for judicial review. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err. View "Askvig v. Snap-On Logistics Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the appellate division of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ) granting Plaintiff's petition for award of compensation, holding that an employee is not required to give notice of his occupational disease claim to his former employer's insurer when the employer no longer exists.Nearly twenty years after retiring from his employment Plaintiff underwent surgery for lung cancer and was later diagnosed with asbestosis. Plaintiff filed five petitions for award of compensation, each alleging a different date of injury and naming and different employer and insurer pairing. The ALJ (1) found that Plaintiff's last injurious exposure to asbestos occurred when he was working for Auburn Sheet Metal, which was insured by Maine Employers' Mutual Insurance Company (MEMIC) but no longer existed, and (2) granted Plaintiff's petition for an award of compensation. The appellate division concluded that Plaintiff was not required to provide notice to MEMIC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate division did not err in concluding that the workers' compensation statute does not impose on an injured employee whose employer no longer exists the duty to give notice to the insurer. View "Desgrosseilliers v. Auburn Sheet Metal" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the Board vacating an order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) and remanding the claim back to him to enter an award terminating Michael O'Bryan's benefits at age seventy, holding that the court of appeals did not err.O'Bryan received a work-related injury at age sixty-five, leading to his disability. The ALJ found O'Bryan to be permanently totally disabled and awarded him benefits that would continue as long as he remained disabled. On appeal, the Board held that newly-amended version of Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(4) applied to O'Bryan's benefits and that they should terminate when he reached the age of seventy. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the statute was constitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that O'Bryan's challenges to the amendment to section 342.730(4) were unavailing. View "O'Bryan v. Zip Express" on Justia Law

Dr. Metzinger brought an Equal Pay Act (EPA) suit against her employer, the VA, in the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging that the government violated 29 U.S.C. 206(d), by paying her less than her male subordinates. She sought over $10,000 in damages. The government argued that the Court of Federal Claims had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over EPA claims against the government for over $10,000. In the alternative to dismissal, the government requested that the district court transfer Metzinger’s EPA claim to the Claims Court under 28 U.S.C. 1631. Metzinger opposed dismissal but allowed that if the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, it should transfer the EPA claim. The district court agreed that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and transferred Metzinger’s EPA claim to the Claims Court under 28 U.S.C. 1631.Metzinger appealed to both the Fifth and Federal Circuits. The Fifth Circuit summarily dismissed. In a joint filing, the government reversed course, agreeing with Metzinger that the district court possessed jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit affirmed the transfer to the Claims Court. Precedent dictates that district courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over EPA claims against the government for over $10,000. View "Metzinger v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Former and current Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) employees were relocated to Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin Islands at the DEA’s request for two to five years. Each received a one-time relocation incentive bonus under 5 U.S.C. 5753(b), which provides that “[t]he Office of Personnel Management may authorize the head of an agency to pay a [relocation incentive] bonus” to an individual who relocates to accept a position. Each bonus was equivalent to 25% of each employee’s yearly salary. The employees allege they are entitled to a relocation incentive bonus for each year of their relocation, rather than the one-time bonus they received.The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal of that claim, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The claim was not based on a statute or regulations that are money mandating, as required for jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1). The statute and implementing regulations use discretionary language. View "Bell v. United States" on Justia Law

An Angel Brothers construction crew was installing a drainage pipe alongside a road. For two days, the crew had adequate protection from cave-ins. On day three, the work was too close to the street to continue with “benching” the walls of the excavation. Angel’s safety manager told foreman Vidal to use a trench box, which is placed in the ditch and has walls that guard against cave-ins. Vidal did not follow those instructions. Vidal admitted that he allowed Fonseca to work without the trench box because Fonseca would only need to spend 10-15 minutes inside the excavation; installing the trench box would have blocked the adjoining intersection and taken more time. Vidal and another employee stood by while Fonseca worked in the trench.An OSHA Compliance Officer happened to visit the worksite and issued a citation for violating the requirement that “[e]ach employee in an excavation shall be protected from cave-ins by an adequate protective system,” 29 C.F.R. 1926.652(a)(1). An ALJ assessed a $35,000 penalty. The Commission affirmed, reasoning that Vidal’s knowledge as a supervisor flowed to the company, that the company did not prove that it effectively enforced safety rules or disciplined employees for safety violations, and that the conduct was willful. The Fifth Circuit upheld the findings. Imputing the supervisor’s knowledge of the safety violation to the employer is appropriate in this situation under basic agency principles. View "Angel Brothers Enterprises, Ltd. v. Walsh" on Justia Law

Chavez-Cortez filed a representative cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA, Lab. Code 2698), seeking civil penalties for wage-and-hour violations. The suit was dismissed for failure to satisfy the requirement of notice to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA). Relying on precedent (Khan), the defendants argued that the notice provided did not inform the LWDA “of the claims of any other alleged similarly situated but unidentified individuals” or that Chavez-Cortez “intended to pursue this matter on behalf of these unnamed individuals.”The court of appeal reversed. The notice at issue in Khan differs substantially from plaintiffs’ notice; here, the plaintiffs’ notice alerted the agency and defendants to ongoing Labor Code violations that were not by nature isolated or unique to plaintiffs. The notice was not deficient for failing to reference other aggrieved employees implicated by the representative action. Plaintiffs’ letter provided fair notice to the agency of representative claims for meal breaks, rest breaks, and overtime violations. View "Santos v. El Guapos Tacos, LLC" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's consideration was whether Appellant, the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (“Board”), erred in reversing the award of unemployment compensation (“UC”) benefits to Appellee Caitlin Quigley (“Claimant”) by sua sponte concluding she was ineligible for such benefits, where the issue of her eligibility was not raised in her appeal to the Board or below. In . 2017, Claimant was laid off from her job as the Director of Communication and Development of a Philadelphia area nonprofit service corporation. As a result, she applied for UC benefits In the questionnaire accompanying her application for benefits, she noted that she had been engaged in a “sideline business”1 since 2015, which involved providing writing and editing services on a freelance basis to another nonprofit corporation. Claimant also indicated in the questionnaire that she anticipated a reduced income in 2017 from these activities, and she attached to the questionnaire, pursuant to its instructions, a copy of Schedule C of her 2016 federal tax return showing the income she had received from this sideline business during that year. The service center issued a “Notice of Determination,” in which it ruled that Claimant was eligible to receive UC benefits. After receipt of this decision, Claimant considered the amount of prorated income attributed to her sideline business (and deducted from her benefits) to be too high. Consequently, proceeding pro se, she filed a petition for appeal with the Department in which she explained: "I understand that it makes sense to prorate it, but the sideline business is not a significant source of income for me." After reconsideration of her appeal, the Board found Claimant ineligible for benefits, and denied further reconsideration. After careful review, the Supreme Court determined that the Board did err, and, consequently, affirmed the decision of the Commonwealth Court, which reversed the Board’s ruling and remanded. View "Quigley v. UCBR" on Justia Law

Jonathan Peters (Claimant) was employed by Cintas Corporation (Employer) as a uniform sales representative. In this position Claimant worked half-days in Employer’s Allentown, Pennsylvania branch office on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays, and traveled the remainder of those days, as well as Thursdays and Fridays, to meet with, and present products to, potential customers in the region around Reading, Pennsylvania. Following his last sales appointment on February 27, 2015, Claimant attended an Employer-sponsored event at a pub in Allentown called the Tilted Kilt. After leaving the event Claimant was injured in a motor vehicle accident. Alleging that the motor vehicle accident occurred during the course of his employment with Employer, Claimant filed a claim petition seeking partial disability benefits from February 28, 2015 to April 2, 2015, and total disability benefits from April 3, 2015 onwards. Employer responded, specifically denying that Claimant was in the course of his employment at the time of the motor vehicle accident. In a November 2016 decision, the WCJ denied and dismissed Claimant’s claim petition. The WCJ explained that for his injuries to be compensable under the Act, Claimant had the burden of demonstrating that he was in the course of his employment with Employer at the time of the motor vehicle accident, which required him to show that he was actually engaged in the furtherance of Employer’s business or affairs at the time of the accident. The WCJ wrote that he did not doubt that work was discussed at the event but that work-related discussions do “not transform every meeting into a business meeting.”Claimant then appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, finding Claimant remained in the course of his employment through the event at the Tilted Kilt. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Peters v. WCAB" on Justia Law

Valles began working for the State Department as a passport specialist in 2011. In 2016, Valles served a three-day suspension for charges concerning inappropriate sexual and political comments made to co-workers and customers. In 2018, Valles served a five-day suspension for failure to follow instructions and failure to protect personally identifiable information. In 2019, Valles received a performance appraisal of “Fully Successful” for 2018.The agency nonetheless proposed Valles’ removal based on four charges from 18 specifications dating between July 2018 and February 2019. Some of the alleged conduct occurred during the 2018 evaluation period. The charges included failure to follow instructions, failure to properly move along applications and provide updates, leaving a passport application on a photocopier, failure to follow policies concerning the handling of fees, not maintaining control over applications, leaving his adjudication stamp unsecured, and drinking from a wine glass at his workstation in the public counter.An administrative judge upheld the termination. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The agency proved all the charges and established a nexus between the proven misconduct and the agency’s ability to carry out its mission. The penalty was reasonable, considering all the relevant “Douglas” factors, including the repeated nature and seriousness of the misconduct, Valles’ prior discipline, his seven years of federal service and job performance, the consistency of the penalty with similar cases, and the lack of rehabilitation potential on Valles’ part. View "Valles v. Department of State" on Justia Law