Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (820 ILCS 320/1), states that “an important State interest” requires that an employer “who employs a full-time law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer, or firefighter, who ... suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay the entire premium of the employer’s health insurance plan for the injured employee, the injured employee’s spouse, and for each dependent child.” The Act does not define “catastrophic injury,” which the Illinois Supreme Court has found “synonymous with an injury resulting in a line-of-duty disability under section 4-110 of the [Illinois Pension] Code”Peoria’s ordinance was amended to define “catastrophic injury” as “[a]n injury, the direct and proximate consequences of which permanently prevent an individual from performing any gainful work.” The term “gainful work,” which does not appear in the Act, is defined as “[f]ull- or part-time activity that actually is compensated or commonly is compensated.”The Union sought a declaratory judgment that the amendment violates the Act. The circuit court granted the Union summary judgment. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The ordinance’s definitions are inconsistent with the requirements of the Act and are therefore preempted; the ordinance is not a valid exercise of Peoria’s home rule authority. View "International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 50 v. City of Peoria" on Justia Law

Dr. Smolinski is a Supervisory Physician in the Traumatic Brain Injury Clinic of the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC), an Army hospital in Germany. He was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army and occasionally saw patients at LRMC as a visiting provider. The Army purportedly changed the salary Smolinski was offered and delayed his move to a new position. Smolinski’s subsequent complaint under the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 1221, alleged those actions were retaliation for his wife’s 2017 patient complaint, his 2018 testimony in an investigation into an officer, and his 2019 Office of Special Counsel (OSC) complaints.The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed his complaint, citing lack of jurisdiction because Smolinski failed to establish that those activities were protected disclosures. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. Smolinski failed to allege sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim that his wife’s patient complaint was a protected disclosure, and did not exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his claim of retaliation for his OSC complaints. With respect to Smolinski’s claims alleging retaliation for his 2018 testimony, however, the court reversed the dismissal and remanded for the Board to consider those claims on the merits. View "Smolinski v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission finding that Defendant was not entitled to an award of workers' compensation benefits because his injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, holding that there was no error.Defendant, a field service specialist for DISH Network, Inc,. was an a car accident after he choked on a sandwich and blacked out while traveling to his first appointment. Defendant sought workers' compensation benefits. The ALJ awarded benefits, but the Commission denied compensation because Defendant failed to prove his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to establish that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. View "Boothe v. DISH Network, Inc." on Justia Law

The Secretary of Labor, through OSHA, enacted a vaccine mandate, to be enforced by employers. The mandate preempted contrary state laws and covered virtually all employers with at least 100 employees, with exemptions for employees who exclusively work remotely or outdoors. It required that covered workers receive a COVID–19 vaccine or obtain a medical test each week at their own expense, on their own time, and also wear a mask at work. Challenges were consolidated before the Sixth Circuit, which allowed OSHA’s rule to take effect.The Supreme Court stayed the rule. Applicants are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Secretary lacked the authority to impose the mandate. The rule is “a significant encroachment into the lives—and health—of a vast number of employees,” not plainly authorized by statute; 29 U.S.C. 655(b) empowers the Secretary to set workplace safety standards, not broad public health measures. Although COVID–19 is a risk in many workplaces, it is not an occupational hazard in most. COVID–19 spreads everywhere that people gather. Permitting OSHA to regulate the hazards of daily life would significantly expand OSHA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization. The vaccine mandate is unlike typical OSHA workplace regulations. A vaccination “cannot be undone.” Where the virus poses a special danger because of the particular features of an employee’s job or workplace, targeted regulations are permissible but OSHA’s indiscriminate approach fails to distinguish between occupational risk and general risk. The equities do not justify withholding interim relief. States and employers allege that OSHA’s mandate will force them to incur billions of dollars in unrecoverable compliance costs and will cause hundreds of thousands of employees to leave their jobs. View "National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration" on Justia Law

Norton operated a pressure washer on a Tampa Convention Center dock that had no guardrails or barricades and was surrounded on three sides by water. Norton fell into the bay while working and drowned. He was wearing rubber boots and was not wearing a personal flotation device. During an investigation, an OSHA officer did not identify any incidents of employees falling off the dock before Norton’s accident, but did learn that two employees who had pressure washed the same dock voluntarily wore personal flotation devices. OSHA issued a citation to C&W for its failure to provide and require the use of a personal flotation device and proposed a $12,675 penalty.Eleventh Circuit precedents required proof either that the use of personal flotation devices was an industry custom or that C&W had “clear actual knowledge that personal protective equipment was necessary under the circumstances.” OSHA did not present any evidence of industry custom. An ALJ concluded that C&W had “clear actual knowledge" that personal protective equipment was necessary, given “an open and obvious hazard.” The Eleventh Circuit vacated the citation. The Commission misapplied the standard for actual knowledge in the absence of industry custom. A finding that C&W had actual knowledge of the requirement to provide and require the use of personal flotation devices for employees when they pressure washed the dock was not supported by substantial evidence. View "C&W Facility Services, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Social Security retirement benefits are calculated using a formula based on past earnings, 42 U.S.C. 415(a)(1)(A). Under the “windfall elimination” provision, benefits are reduced when a retiree receives a separate pension payment based on employment not subject to Social Security taxes. Pension payments exempt from the windfall reduction include those "based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service.”A “military technician (dual status),” 10 U.S.C. 10216, is a “civilian employee” assisting the National Guard. Such technicians are required to maintain National Guard membership and must wear uniforms while working. For their work as full-time civilian technicians, they receive civil-service pay. If hired before 1984, they receive Civil Service Retirement System pension payments. As part-time National Guard members, they receive military pay and pension payments from a different arm of the government.The SSA applied the windfall elimination provision to the benefits calculation for Babcock, a dual-status technician. The district court and Sixth Circuit upheld that decision, declining to apply the uniformed-services exception.The Supreme Court affirmed. Civil Service Retirement System pensions generally trigger the windfall provision. Babcock’s technician work was not service “as” a National Guard member. A condition of employment is not the same as the capacity in which one serves. The statute states: “For purposes of this section and any other provision of law,” a technician “is” a “civilian employee,” “authorized and accounted for as” a “civilian.” While working in a civilian capacity, technicians are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. They possess characteristically civilian rights concerning employment discrimination, workers’ compensation, disability benefits, and overtime work; technicians hired before 1984 are “civil service” members, entitled to pensions as civil servants. Babcock’s civil-service pension payments are not based on his National Guard service, for which he received separate military pension payments. View "Babcock v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

In a suit challenging the emergency temporary standards (ETS) promulgated by the California Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the trial court denied a request for a preliminary injunction suspending enforcement of the ETS. The trial court concluded that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of prevailing on the merits and found the public interest in curbing the spread of COVID-19 weighed “heavily” in favor of ongoing enforcement of the ETS.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erroneously applied a deferential standard of review, the findings of emergency lacked necessary findings, and the ETS exceeded the Board’s statutory authority. The administrative record demonstrated the Board did not abuse its discretion in adopting prescriptive standards in the ETS; the Board considered performance standards during the rulemaking process, including existing regulations, and concluded certain prescriptive standards were necessary to assure “to the extent feasible, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity.” The Board did not abuse its discretion in establishing regulations excluding workers exposed to COVID-19 cases from the workplace and mandating a continuation of pay, benefits, and seniority during such periods of exclusion. View "Western Growers Association v. Occupational Safety & Health Standards Board" on Justia Law

Lozano and Mitchell, former Los Angeles police officers, filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate challenging the city’s decision to terminate their employment. A board of rights found the two guilty on multiple counts of misconduct, based in part on a digital in-car video system (DICVS) recording that captured them willfully abdicating their duty to assist a commanding officer’s response to a robbery in progress and playing a Pokémon mobile phone game while on duty.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of relief, rejecting arguments that the city proceeded in a manner contrary to the law by using the DICVS recording in their disciplinary proceeding and by denying them the protections of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA, Gov. Code 3300). While Department personnel are not subject to discipline for minor infractions or purely private communications unrelated to their police work, commanding officers are not required to ignore egregious misconduct that is unintentionally captured on a DICVS recording. POBRA did not apply because when the sergeant called the officers in to discuss the radio calls, he did not have evidence that the officers had committed a crime or egregious misconduct. View "Lozano v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

North Dakota Workforce Safety & Insurance ("WSI") appealed after a district court affirmed an ALJ’s decision reversing WSI’s imposition of derivative premium liability on Brendel Construction, Inc. for unpaid premiums due from one of its subcontractors, Daniel Alvidrez. WSI determined Daniel Alvidrez and Alfredo Frias were roofing subcontractors of Brendel Construction. WSI investigators noticed Frias and Alvidrez each used the same Texas address, and because of this “cross-over information relating to Frias and Alvidrez, [WSI] established two separate accounts.” After unsuccessfully attempting to collect premium amounts from each, WSI imposed derivative liability on Brendel Construction. Brendel Construction appealed to the district court, and WSI cross appealed. The court affirmed imposition of liability as to the Frias account and dismissed as untimely WSI’s cross appeal concerning the Alvidrez account. In Brendel Construction I, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed as to the Frias account and reversed the dismissal of WSI’s cross appeal. On remand, the district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision determining Brendel Construction was not liable for the Alvidrez account. WSI appealed that last judgment. The Supreme Court determined that even if there was evidence Alvidrez had employees, WSI still had not provided reliable information to support its imposition of premium liability. Judgment was thus affirmed. View "Brendel Construction v. WSI" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court and appeals officer that Employee was incapacitated from earning "full wages" and therefore denying Employer and its insurer's petition for judicial review, holding that there was no error.At issue was whether Employee's inability to earn overtime due to his industrial injury amounted to being incapacitated from earning "full wages" such that he could seek to reopen his claim more than one year after its closing. The appeals officer concluded (1) Employee was incapacitated from earning full wages for the time specified under Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.400(1); (2) that Employee had satisfied the statute's period of incapacitation; and (3) therefore, Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.390(5) permitted Employee to submit an application to reopen his claim more than one year after it had closed. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the term "full wages" as used in section 616C.400(1) may include payments for overtime; and (2) substantial evidence supported the appeals officer's findings in this case. View "City of Henderson v. Wolfgram" on Justia Law