Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT) appealed a New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) order finding that DOT committed an unfair labor practice when it implemented a new commercial driver’s license (CDL) medical card requirement for certain current DOT employees. In early April 2019, DOT unilaterally revised the minimum qualifications necessary for certain positions so that they now require an employee to have a CDL medical card. DOT notified the Union that the new minimum qualifications apply to new hires and to current employees only upon being promoted (even temporarily), demoted, or transferred to a position that now required a CDL medical card. Thus, a current employee occupying a position that now required a CDL medical card need not obtain a card to remain in his or her current position. The employee had to obtain a CDL medical card only if he or she wqw promoted, demoted, or transferred to a different position requiring a CDL medical card. The Union filed an unfair labor practice complaint against DOT asserting that, by adopting the medical card requirement for current employees, DOT failed to negotiate a mandatory subject of bargaining and improperly implemented a unilateral change in the terms and conditions of employment for affected employees. The Union did not challenge the new CDL requirement for new hires. DOT opposed the complaint, arguing that requiring certain current DOT employees to obtain CDL medical cards in connection with a position change was a matter of managerial prerogative and a prohibited subject of bargaining. Following a hearing, the PELRB ruled in favor of the Union. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court Affirmed the PELRB's order. View "Appeal of New Hampshire Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Nicholas Roberts appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants James Winder, Rosie Rivera (solely in her official capacity as Salt Lake County Sheriff), and the Unified Police Department of Greater Salt Lake (“UPD”) (collectively, “Defendants”) on Roberts’ 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) claims. All of his claims arose from his removal as Range Master-Firearms Instructor (“Range Master”). On March 1, 2017, at Winder’s request, Undersheriff Scott Carver and Chief Deputy Shane Hudson met with Roberts and informed him that the Range Master position was being eliminated. Hudson told Roberts he would be reassigned to patrol duties and his pay would be reduced. On March 9, Roberts, through counsel, sent a letter to Winder objecting to his removal, reassignment, and pay reduction. Winder treated Roberts’ letter as a grievance and rejected the grievance, explaining that the Range Master was subject to transfer under Merit Commission Policy 3140, Range Master was a specialist position, and Roberts’ merit rank was “sergeant.” The UPD Board later ratified Winder’s decision to remove Roberts as Range Master and reassign him to patrol duties as a sergeant. Winder later assigned Todd Griffiths, a merit rank Lieutenant four years younger than Roberts, to oversee the shooting range. Roberts did not appeal his grievance, and instead filed this complaint in the district court. In June 2017, after Roberts initiated this lawsuit, the UPD conducted two investigations of Roberts’ management of the Range. Both investigations described failures in Roberts’ performance as Range Master. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Defendants on Roberts’ declaratory judgment and due process claims, finding that Roberts did not have a property interest in his position as Range Master, and thus his reassignment did not violate due process. Alternatively, the district court held that Roberts waived his due process claims by failing to appeal Winder’s decision to the Merit Commission. After review, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "Roberts v. Winder, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant John Tompkins worked as a physician at the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for thirty years. From 2012 through 2016, he served as Chief of Surgery. In 2017, he was terminated from his position as a physician based on administrative deficiencies during his tenure as Chief of Surgery. After exhausting the VA’s administrative remedies, Tompkins filed suit claiming entitlement to: (1) review under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”); and (2) relief under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Tompkins appealed a district court order dismissing his complaint without prejudice based on his failure to identify an applicable waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity. After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found no error in the district court's dismissal of Tompkins' complaint for lack of jurisdiction, and affirmed. View "Tompkins v. DOVA, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner Estate of Peter Dodier, appealed a New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) order denying the estate’s claim for workers’ compensation and death benefits following Peter Dodier’s death. The CAB denied the estate’s claim based on its determination that Dodier’s anxiety and depression were not a compensable injury. It therefore did not reach the issue of death benefits. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that Dodier’s anxiety and depression were compensable, it reversed the CAB’s decision and remanded for its consideration of whether the estate was entitled to death benefits. View "Appeal of Estate of Peter Dodier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus compelling the Ohio Industrial Commission to vacate its orders rejecting a proposed settlement between Employee and Employer, holding that the court of appeals correctly denied the writ.Employee suffered a work-related injury, and his workers' compensation claim was allowed. Employee applied for an award of additional compensation due to Employer's alleged violation of specific safety requirements (VSSRs). Employer and Employee subsequently submitted a proposed settlement for approval by the Commission. A staff hearing officer rejected the settlement as neither fair nor equitable and then granted Employee's request for a VSSR award. Employer sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Commission to vacate its orders and approve the settlement, but the court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employer's three propositions of law are rejected. View "State ex rel. Zarbana Industries, Inc. v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Jenaro Carrasco worked as a parole agent for real party in interest Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (department) for five years. He was promoted to the position of special agent and was subject to a 12-month probationary period. The department served Carrasco with a notice of rejection before the end of the probationary period and stated six reasons for the rejection. Carrasco challenged his rejection before defendant-respondent the State Personnel Board (the board) and, when the board upheld his rejection, he petitioned the superior court for a writ of administrative mandamus. At the conclusion of the administrative and superior court proceedings, only two of the reasons given for Carrasco’s rejection were found to have been supported by substantial evidence. However, both the board and the superior court concluded Government Code section 19175 did not mandate reinstatement if less than all the reasons given for the rejection were upheld. In addition, the board and the superior court concluded the department had not acted in bad faith when it rejected Carrasco. Therefore, the superior court denied Carrasco’s petition. After review, the Court of Appeal concurred with the board and superior court, and affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Carrasco v. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals granting a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order granting temporary total disability (TTD) compensation to Bridget Moss and then granted a limited writ, holding that the Commissioner must reconsider this case under the proper standard, as articulated in this opinion.Moss's employer, Ryan Alternative Staffing, Inc. (Ryan) sought a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to vacate its order and deny TTD compensation because Moss had refused an offer of alternative employment within her medical restrictions. The Tenth District granted the writ. At issue on appeal was whether the Commission may award TTD compensation if an employee refuses an offer of alternative employment in good faith based on family circumstances. The Supreme Court vacated the Tenth district's judgment and granted a limited writ, holding that the Commission's orders exhibited confusion about the correct standard under which the employer's good faith standard was to be determined. View "State ex rel. Ryan Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Moss" on Justia Law

The child at issue in this case, Grayson, was born on February 14, 2013 to a mother with a significant history of drug abuse; Grayson allegedly had drugs in his system at birth. Shortly thereafter, in March 2013, Grayson was adjudicated a “child in need of care,” placed in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”), and entrusted to the physical care of foster parent Samantha Gafford. While in Gafford's, Grayson suffered severe personal injuries, which included brain damage, blindness, and seizures; it was also alleged that the child had bite marks on his thigh and abdomen. Gafford did not disclose these injuries until Grayson was taken to the hospital in May 2013. This suit was filed to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by an infant while in the custody of DCFS and in the physical care of foster parents. After all other claims were dismissed except allegations that DCFS was vicariously liable for the actions of the foster mother, based not only on an employer-employee relationship, but also based on DCFS’s non-delegable duty as the legal custodian of the child, as set forth in Miller v. Martin, 838 So.2d 761 (2003), DCFS filed a peremptory exception pleading the objection of no cause of action, claiming La. R.S. 42:1441.1 barred the application of La. C.C. art. 2320 to DCFS. The district court denied the peremptory exception, and the appellate court denied the ensuing writ application filed by DCFS. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kunath v. Gafford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded in part the judgment of the trial court upholding the decision of the Retirement Systems's Administrative Review Board affirming the decision of the Kentucky Retirement Systems applying the Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.598, the pension-spiking statute, to assess actuarial costs to the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office (JCSO), holding that the Retirement Systems erred in part.The Kentucky Retirement Systems assessed the costs because it found a JCSO employee took unpaid leave for two months, causing a temporary decrease in gross compensation in that year, but then returned to his earlier pay. The circuit court agreement with the Retirement Systems, finding that section 61.598 as applied was not arbitrary. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Retirement Systems improperly applied section 61.598 to the pay spikes to the extent the changes in compensation were caused by an isolated transition in JCSO's new accounting method but properly assessed the increased actuarial costs to the extent it was caused by regular overtime work; and (2) different aspects of the circuit court's decision were erroneous. View "Kentucky Retirement Systems v. Jefferson County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board reversing the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) granting permanent partial disability benefits (PPD) to Richard Russell but finding that certain medical expenses were submitted untimely and were therefore non-compensable, holding that there was no error.Russell sustained a work-related injury to his right arm and sought workers' compensation benefits. The ALJ found that Russell did not timely submit his medical bills, so they were not compensable, but otherwise granted PPD benefits. The Board reversed, concluding that the medical bills were not submitted untimely. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Russell timely submitted his medical expenses. View "Wonderfoil, Inc. v. Russell" on Justia Law