Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Department of Labor and Regulation determining that a copy of a letter to Appellant's insurer seeking a review of his workers' compensation benefits did not constitute a petition for a hearing, holding that the Department and the circuit court did not err.Appellant injured his left and right shoulder at work. Western National Insurance (Insurer), the workers' compensation for Appellant's employers, paid workers' compensation benefits. Five years later, Appellant sent a letter to Insurer seeking a review of his workers' compensation benefits and sent a copy of this letter to the Department requesting that the Department determine that the letter constituted a petition for hearing. The Department concluded that the letter was not a petition for hearing because it lacked the information required by ARSD 47:03:01:02. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that Appellant's letter did not satisfy ARSD 47:03:01:02. View "May v. Spearfish Pellett Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus and, alternatively, a writ of procedendo ordering Respondents to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his appeal of the mayor's appointment of another detective sergeant to the position of lieutenant with the City of Youngstown Police Department, holding that Relator was not entitled to the writs.Relator, a detective sergeant with the Youngstown Police Department, brought this action against Respondents, the Youngstown Civil Service Commission and its president, Vice President, and secretary, challenging the decision of the City's mayor to appoint to the position of lieutenant the examinee who ranked first on the eligibility list. The Supreme Court denied the writs, holding (1) Relator's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to issue a decision determining his appeal was moot; (2) this Court declines to address Relator's constitutional argument; and (3) Relator's procedendo claim failed. View "State ex rel. Cox v. Youngstown Civil Service Commission" on Justia Law

During Castilleja's 15 years as Bexar County Community Supervision and Corrections Department (CSCD) community service officer, he had multiple reprimands and termination warnings. After Castilleja was transferred in 2014, his new manager suspected Castilleja was violating overtime rules. An investigation by Assistant Chief Kelly confirmed Castilleja was routinely taking unapproved overtime and using his work computer to send union-related emails. Castilleja only received counseling and was put on a “performance improvement plan.” Castilleja’s 2015 evaluation rated him “satisfactory” overall but gave him the lowest rating in multiple categories. In 2016, Castilleja was sworn in as president of the Bexar County Probation Officers Association (BCPOA), having served in the union since 2007. Castilleja switched units and other issues came to light, resulting in an audit of Castilleja’s former cases. Brady recommended termination, citing Castilleja’s disregard of “the basic ten[e]ts of case management,” multiple policy violations, plus two instances of conducting union business while at work, and one use of work email to send union-related emails. Meanwhile, the BCPOA issued a no-confidence petition calling for Anderson’s removal. Days later, Anderson heard Castilleja’s appeal. Anderson fired Castilleja.Castilleja and the Union sued Anderson and Brady in their individual and official capacities, claiming that Castilleja was fired in retaliation for union-related speech and association in violation of the First Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims. The evidence established valid reasons for firing Castilleja. View "United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial & Service Workers International Union v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Bless was employed by the Cook County Sheriff’s Office, 1996-2013. In 2004, Bless earned his law degree and began practicing law in addition to working as a police officer. The Sheriff’s Office requires its employees to request and receive authorization before engaging in secondary employment. In 2004-2008, Bless received the required approval. In 2008, Bless was involved in a collision while on duty. He sustained injuries, was placed on disability leave, and received temporary disability benefits. Shortly after the accident, Bless was elected as a Republican McHenry County Commissioner. Soon after his return to work as a police officer, Bless was transferred to a less desirable shift.Meanwhile, the County discovered that Bless was driving his car while on disability leave although he had a driving restriction. The Office of Professional Review found no records of secondary employment requests for Bless for 2009-2010. Bless claimed that he had submitted those requests. OPR brought filed a complaint with the Merit Board, which found that Bless had engaged in unauthorized secondary employment, violated driving restrictions, and lied to OPR investigators; it directed the Sheriff’s Office to fire Bless. After his termination, Bless filed suit, alleging political retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (the Sheriff is a Democrat) and race discrimination under section 1983 and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of both claims on summary judgment. View "Bless v. Cook County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

California Labor Code section 1197.1 (b) authorized the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (the Division) to issue a citation to an employer if the Division “determines that a person has paid or caused to be paid a wage less than the minimum under applicable law.” The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether certain employers, farm labor contractor Jaime Zepeda Labor Contracting, Inc. (Zepeda), and Zepeda’s “client employers,” Anthony Vineyards, Inc. (AVI) and Richard Bagdasarian, Inc. (RBI) (collectively “Employers”), committed minimum wage violations that would support the Division’s issuance of section 1197.1 citations. It was undisputed that the Employers paid all of the employees at issue at least the minimum wage by payday. Nevertheless, the Division contended it properly issued section 1197.1 minimum wage citations because the Employers did not promptly pay the final wages of the employees who were purportedly discharged or deemed by the Division to have quit in accordance with the prompt payment mandates of Labor Code sections 201, 202 and 203. The Division contended that the failure to pay wages on the dates that the employees were discharged or within 72 hours of when they quit subjected the Employers to waiting time penalties under section 203, and constituted independent minimum wage violations that supported the issuance of section 1197.1 citations, even though the Employers paid final wages that were at or above the minimum wage on or before payday, in accordance with the minimum wage law. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Division improperly issued the section 1197.1 minimum wage citations to the Employers. Therefore, the the superior court properly issued a peremptory writ of administrative mandate directing the Division to dismiss the citations with prejudice. View "Jamie Zepeda Labor Contracting v. Dept. of Industrial Relations etc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal rejecting Appellant's challenge to the denial of his motion to disqualify A. Robert Singer as a hearing officer in a peer review proceeding, holding that the record did not establish that Singer should be disqualified for financial bias under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 809.2, subdivision (b).A medical executive committee adopted a recommendation to terminate Appellant's medical staff membership and hospital privileges. Appellant requested a peer review hearing to review the recommendation, and the hospital president exercised authority delegated by the medical staff to select Singer to serve as the hearing officer. Appellant challenged Singer's appointment on grounds of financial bias, but Singer denied the challenge. The peer review panel upheld the revocation of Appellant's staff membership and privileges. The superior court denied Appellant's petition for a writ of administrative mandate, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circumstances surrounding Singer's appointment did not create an intolerable risk of bias that would require disqualification under section 809.2(b). View "Natarajan v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

Rodriguez, a Supervisory Consumer Affairs Specialist with the VA Patient Advocate’s Office, engaged in a confrontation with a patient, yelling at the patient and using profanity. VA Police officers had to escort him back to his office. Rodriguez returned to the reception area, where he again confronted the patient. During an investigation, Rodriguez was temporarily relieved of his supervisory responsibilities. Rodriguez contacted one of his subordinates and asked her to modify her witness statement. The investigator made findings of patient abuse, violation of the VA Code of Conduct, failure to follow the officer’s instruction, attempted coercion, and lack of candor in Rodriguez’s accounts of the incident, and concluded that the appropriate penalty was removal. Rodriguez had a previous disciplinary incident. After Rodriguez was given an opportunity to reply, the Director issued a removal decision.The Merit Systems Protection Board administrative judge, citing 38 U.S.C. 714, found the charges supported by substantial evidence. The Federal Circuit reversed the removal order. the administrative judge misinterpreted section 714 when he ruled that “substantial evidence” is the proper standard for determining whether an employee has engaged in misconduct that justifies discipline; preponderance of the evidence is the minimal appropriate burden of proof in administrative proceedings. Although section 714 provides that the Board may not mitigate penalties, the Board has the authority to review penalties for substantial evidence. View "Rodriguez v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

In 2007, Connor began working as the Chief of Police Services for the Fayetteville, North Carolina VA Medical Center. After it was discovered that Connor had stored ammunition in a manner inconsistent with VA policy, the VA investigated allegations of mismanagement at Fayetteville, including the failure to inventory ammunition, misuse of government vehicles, lack of training, unfair hiring and promotion practices, employee misconduct, and lack of leadership. In 2019, Fayetteville's Executive Director sustained 27 specifications against Connor and the penalty of removal under 38 U.S.C. 714. The Merit Systems Protection Board determined that the VA had failed to prove 26 specifications by substantial evidence, upholding specification 25, regarding the improper storage of ammunition. The Board held that the “Douglas factors” remained applicable and upheld the VA’s charge and the penalty of removal.The Federal Circuit affirmed. Section 714 of the 2017 Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act created an expedited procedure allowing the VA Secretary to remove, demote, or suspend VA employees for misconduct or substandard performance; it limits review of disciplinary actions by administrative judges and the Board. A disciplinary decision must be upheld if “supported by substantial evidence.” The administrative judge and the Board “shall not mitigate the penalty prescribed by the Secretary.” Section 714 does not alter the penalty review with respect to the Douglas factors. The court rejected Connor’s argument that the Board did not adequately consider those factors. View "Connor v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals granting a limited writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to identify the reasons for its denial of Employer's request for reconsideration of its order directing Employer to continue paying for Employee's drugs prescribed in connection with Employee's work injuries, holding that the Commission must reconsider Employee's motion in light of Ohio Adm.Code 4123-6-21.3.After Employer, which was self-insured for workers' compensation purposes, informed Employee that it would no longer reimburse Employee for his prescriptions in connection with his work-related injuries, Employee filed a motion asking the Commission to order Employer to continue paying for his drugs. The Commission granted the motion and denied Employer's request for reconsideration. Employer then sought a writ of mandamus directing the Commission to vacate its order and deny continued reimbursement for the prescriptions. The court of appeals granted a limited writ. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' judgment and denied in part and granted in part the writ of mandamus, holding that the Commission should have considered Ohio Adm.Code 4123-6-21.3 in its determination of Employee's motion. View "State ex rel. T.S. Trim Industries, Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law

L.B. lived within the Northern Cheyenne Reservation. L.B. and her mother went to a bar and had alcoholic drinks. After they returned home, L.B.’s mother went for a drive. L.B. called the police and reported that her mother was driving while intoxicated. Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Officer Bullcoming determined that L.B.’s mother was safe and then went to L.B.’s residence, where her children were asleep in the other room. L.B. admitted to consuming alcoholic drinks. Bullcoming threatened to arrest L.B. for child endangerment because she was intoxicated while in the presence of her children. L.B. pleaded with Bullcoming not to arrest her because she would lose her job as a school bus driver. Bullcoming took L.B. outside for a breathalyzer test. L.B. believed that her choices were to go to jail or have sex with Bullcoming. L.B. and Bullcoming had unprotected sexual intercourse. L.B. became pregnant as a result of the encounter and gave birth.L.B. brought a Federal Tort Claims Act suit, seeking to hold the government liable for Bullcoming’s misconduct. The government asserted that Bullcoming was not acting within the scope of his employment when he sexually assaulted L.B so his actions fell outside the scope of the FTCA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity. The Ninth Circuit certified the question to the Montana Supreme Court: whether, under Montana law, OBullcoming’s sexual assault of L.B. was within the scope of his employment as a law enforcement officer. View "L. B. v. United States" on Justia Law