Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the decision of the Appellate Division of the Workers' Compensation Board (WCB) affirming the decision of the WCB ALJ denying Appellant's petition for review of incapacity benefits paid by Hydraulic Hose & Assemblies, LLC, through its insurer, The Hanover Insurance Group, because the statute of had expired, holding that the claim was timely.Appellant filed a petition for review of incapacity, claiming that he was entitled to total incapacity benefits. The ALJ denied the petition, concluding that the six-year statutory limitation period had expired and that Appellant's receipt of Social Security benefits did not toll the statute of limitations. On appeal, Appellant argued that the receipt of his Social Security benefits under the circumstances tolled the statute of limitations. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding (1) offsetting Social Security old-age insurance benefits must be treated as primary payments of workers' compensation; and (2) the "date of the most recent payment" under Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A, 306 is the date of most recent payment of offsetting Social Security old-age insurance benefits. View "Charest v. Hydraulic Hose & Assemblies, LLC" on Justia Law

Simko began working for U.S. Steel in 2005. In 2012, Simko successfully bid on a new position. During training, Simko requested a new two-way radio to accommodate his hearing impairment. U.S. Steel did not provide the new radio or any other accommodation. Although Simko completed the training, he alleges that his trainer refused to “sign off” that he was able to perform the position’s duties because of his disability. Simko resumed working at his former position.In May 2013, Simko signed an EEOC charge under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101, asserting discrimination and denial of reasonable accommodation In December 2013, U.S. Steel discharged Simko after an incident. In May 2014, Simko was reinstated but was discharged again in August 2014, based on a safety violation. About three months later, the EEOC received Simko's handwritten claim that he was discharged in retaliation for his EEOC filing. In December 2015, the EEOC communicated to Simko’s counsel that it had notified U.S. Steel that an amended charge was pending. In January 2016, Simko’s counsel filed an amended EEOC charge. In February 2019, the EEOC issued a determination of reasonable cause. A right-to-sue letter issued in April 2019.In June 2019, Simko filed suit, asserting only retaliation, without alleging disability discrimination or failure to accommodate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Simko failed to file a timely EEOC charge asserting retaliation. His amended charge claiming retaliation was filed 521 days after his termination. Simko was not entitled to equitable tolling; he was not misled by the EEOC or prevented from filing the amended charge and offered no reason why he could not file a timely claim. View "Simko v. United States Steel Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint, alleging various causes of action arising from his termination as a police officer with the Reno-Sparks Indian Colony, a federally recognized Indian Tribe.The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that, to the extent that plaintiff's claims alleged that the Tribe's decision to fire him was retaliatory, those claims are barred by the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act. The panel applied the two-part Gaubert-Berkovitz test and concluded that the discretionary function test bars plaintiff's two retaliation-based wrongful termination claims. In regard to plaintiff's third cause of action alleging that his termination was wrongful, the panel concluded that the first element of the Gaubert-Berkovitz test was not met and the discretionary function exception did not apply. Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that plaintiff's third cause of action was barred. Finally, the panel concluded that the district court erred in determining that the discretionary exception function barred the two additional claims plaintiff sought to raise in the Third Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Miller v. United States" on Justia Law

The Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act, 30 U.S.C. 801, requires the Secretary of the Department of Labor, through the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), to negotiate mine-specific ventilation plans with companies that operate the mines. In 2006-2018, Knight Hawk Coal operated its Prairie Eagle Mine pursuant to an MSHA-approved ventilation plan that permitted perimeter mining with 40-foot perimeter cuts. In 2018, MSHA conducted a ventilation survey at Prairie Eagle and concluded that the approved plan did not adequately ventilate the perimeter cuts. MSHA relied primarily on the results of chemical smoke tests, which involved survey team members observing smoke movement from a 44-foot distance. Months later, MSHA revoked the Prairie Eagle ventilation plan. After receiving a technical citation from MSHA for operating without an approved plan, Knight Hawk sought review by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission.The Commission’s ALJ found the revocation arbitrary and capricious, in part because the chemical smoke test results were unreliable and inconsistent and the Secretary ignored disagreements among MSHA ventilation survey team members regarding the results. The ALJ reinstated the previously-approved ventilation plan. The Commission affirmed, concluding that the Secretary failed to explain adequately why the existing ventilation plan was deficient. The D.C. Circuit denied the Secretary’s petition for review, finding that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding. View "Secretary of Labor v. Knight Hawk Coal, LLC" on Justia Law

In this grievance proceeding, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals vacating the judgment of the circuit court affirming in part and reversing in part the decision of the ALJ and remanding with instructions to dismiss the proceeding, holding that the complaint did not present a grievable issue.Keith Merryman, a police officer employed by the University of Baltimore and the president of the Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 146 (the Union), initiated a grievance proceeding complaining about holiday leave. The ALJ ruled in favor of the Union. The circuit court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court of special appeals held that the ALJ lacked jurisdiction over the complaint because the dispute was not a grievable issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under the memorandum of understanding in this case, which incorporated the grievance procedures set forth in Md. Code Ann., Educ. 13-201 to 13-206, the complaint did not constitute a grievable issue. View "Merryman v. University of Baltimore" on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Supreme Court accepted this petition for original jurisdiction filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 11 by the New Hampshire Division of State Police (“the Division”) to determine whether the Superior Court erred when, in the course of litigation between Douglas Trottier, formerly a police officer in the Town of Northfield, and the Northfield Police Department (“Northfield PD”), it ordered the Division (a nonparty) to produce a file related to the Division’s pre-employment background investigation of Trottier. The Division argued the trial court erred because it ordered a nonparty to produce discovery without a proper “jurisdictional basis,” such as a subpoena. It also argued the court erred when it concluded that RSA 516:36, II (2007) did not bar discovery of the pre-employment background investigation file. Although the parties never served the Division with a subpoena, the Supreme Court found that the trial court ultimately afforded the Division ample notice and the opportunity to object to disclosure of the file, and, therefore, there was no prejudicial error. Because the Supreme Court also held that RSA 516:36, II did not apply to the pre-employment background investigation file, and, therefore, the file is not shielded from discovery, it affirmed the trial court. View "Petition of New Hampshire Division of State Police" on Justia Law

This case involved a challenge to former RCW 43.43.120(23)(a) (2001), which excluded certain overtime from the calculation of the monthly pension benefit granted under the Washington State Patrol Retirement System (WSPRS). Four Washington State troopers (Troopers) hired before the statute became effective claimed this exclusion of voluntary overtime from the calculation of their monthly pensions was an unconstitutional impairment of their contract with the State in violation of article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution and article I, section 23 of the Washington State Constitution. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled: (1) the statute of limitations was three years and accrued at retirement; (2) there remained issues of material fact regarding whether the change was offset by comparable benefits; and (3) the change was reasonable and necessary to serve a legitimate public purpose. After review of that ruling, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings on the statute of limitations and on comparable benefits. However, the Court vacated its legitimate public purpose ruling as premature given that the issue of comparable benefits remained for trial. The matter was remanded for additional proceedings. View "Hester v. Washington" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissing Appellant's workers' compensation claim upon finding that Appellant failed to provide reasonable notice of her injury to her employer, holding that the ALJ applied the incorrect provision of Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.185(1).Appellant filed a workers' compensation claim alleging that she sustained cumulative trauma injuries to her neck, back, and hands while working as a nurse. Applying the notice provisions of section 342.185(1), the ALJ found that Appellant's delay of almost two years from the original manifestation date was untimely. The Board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the ALJ erred in applying section 342.185(1) to Plaintiff's claim because, as of July 14, 2018, the notice provisions of section 342.185(1) do not apply to cumulative trauma injuries; and (2) under section 341.285(3), which specifically addresses a claimant's notice requirements for cumulative trauma injuries, Appellant's claim was timely. View "Anderson v. Mountain Comprehensive Health Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board upholding the order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) denying Plaintiff a thirty percent enhancement of benefits from his employer, Defendant, as a result of workplace safety violations, holding that the safety-violation benefit enhancement did not apply.Plaintiff sustained a serious work-related injury while employed by Defendant, a temporary staffing company. At issue before the ALJ was whether Plaintiff was entitled to the thirty percent enhancement under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.165(1) for Defendant's alleged workplace violations. The ALJ denied enhanced benefits. The Board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not liable for section 342.165's enhancement of benefits because extending liability for the safety violations at the facility where Defendant sustained his injuries to Defendant pursuant to the "intentional failure" standard in section 342.165(1) was contrary to the current statute and caselaw. View "Maysey v. Express Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this case to the Workers' Compensation Board, holding that Mark Ivey's pre-employment lower back disc herniation and two surgeries required an impairment rating to be carved out of his permanent partial disability rating for which his employer, ViWin Tech, would be responsible.An ALJ assigned a whole-person impairment of twenty-eight percent and rejected a carve-out for a pre-existing injury. The Board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on a plain reading of the relevant statutes and the AMA Guides, the ALJ erred in concluding that a carve-out was unwarranted. View "Viwin Tech Windows & Doors, Inc. v. Ivey" on Justia Law