Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over the constitutionality of "release time" provisions in a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the City of Phoenix and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local 2384. These provisions allow certain employees to be released from their regular duties, while still being paid by the City, to perform union activities. The plaintiffs, who are non-union employees, argued that these provisions violate their free-speech, free-association, and right-to-work rights, as well as the Gift Clause of the Arizona Constitution.The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted summary judgment in favor of the City and the Union, finding that the release time provisions did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights because the City, not the employees, paid for the release time. The court also found that the provisions did not violate the Gift Clause, as they served a public purpose and were supported by adequate consideration. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that the provisions did not violate the plaintiffs' rights and were supported by adequate consideration.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the release time provisions do not violate the free-speech, free-association, or right-to-work rights of the plaintiffs because the City pays for the release time. However, the Court found that the provisions violate the Gift Clause of the Arizona Constitution. The Court determined that the release time provisions do not provide adequate consideration to the City, as the benefits to the City are negligible compared to the substantial costs. Consequently, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion, reversed the Superior Court's decision, and remanded the case for the entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the Gift Clause claim. View "GILMORE v. GALLEGO" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Judge Kerry L. Burman, the Glendive City Judge, and Mayor Deb Dion of Glendive, Montana. Judge Burman petitioned for a writ of mandamus to reinstate Mary York to her position as Clerk of Glendive City Court after Mayor Dion terminated York's employment. The termination occurred following a disagreement over the justification for York's attendance at a training conference. York was terminated without notice and escorted out of the court, leaving unfinished work and causing operational disruptions.The District Court initially ordered York's interim reinstatement pending further review. Judge Burman argued that Mayor Dion's actions violated state statute, the court's holding in Carlson v. City of Bozeman, and the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Respondents contended that Mayor Dion had the statutory authority to terminate York, who was still in her probationary period, and that the court's operations were not significantly impaired.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court determined that the matter was more appropriately characterized as an application for a writ of prohibition rather than mandamus. The court found that Mayor Dion's actions disrupted the court's operations and violated § 3-1-111, MCA, which grants courts the authority to control their ministerial officers. The court held that the executive's authority to hire or fire employees must be exercised in a manner that does not impair the court's ability to conduct its business.The Supreme Court of Montana granted the petition for a writ of prohibition, arresting Mayor Dion's action of terminating York's employment. The court emphasized the need for coordination between branches of government to avoid such disruptions. View "Burman v. City of Glendive" on Justia Law

A group of non-convicted individuals detained in Alameda County’s Santa Rita Jail filed a lawsuit against Aramark Correctional Services, LLC, Alameda County, and Sheriff Gregory J. Ahern. The plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to minimum wage and overtime pay under California’s Labor Code for work performed without pay for Aramark while detained. The defendants moved to dismiss these claims, arguing that the plaintiffs' compensation was governed by the California Penal Code, which allows counties to pay prisoners at rates below minimum wage.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the minimum wage and overtime claims, holding that the California Penal Code did not preclude non-convicted detainees working for a private company from the protections of the Labor Code. The district court allowed the plaintiffs' claims to proceed, leading the defendants to file an interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and certified a question to the California Supreme Court regarding whether non-convicted detainees working for a private company in county jails have a claim for minimum wages and overtime under the California Labor Code. The California Supreme Court responded that such detainees do not have a claim for minimum wages and overtime under Section 1194 of the California Labor Code. The court clarified that section 4019.3 of the California Penal Code applies broadly to all county inmates, including pretrial detainees, and does not depend on the identity of the employer.Based on the California Supreme Court's response, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order denying the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' minimum wage and overtime claims. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims failed under the current law and reversed the district court's decision. View "RUELAS V. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA" on Justia Law

The case involves Business and Professions Code section 7451, enacted through Proposition 22, which classifies app-based drivers for companies like Uber, Lyft, and DoorDash as independent contractors rather than employees, provided certain conditions are met. This classification exempts these drivers from California workers’ compensation laws, which typically apply to employees. Plaintiffs, including several individuals and unions, argue that section 7451 conflicts with article XIV, section 4 of the California Constitution, which grants the Legislature plenary power to create and enforce a complete system of workers’ compensation.The Alameda County Superior Court found Proposition 22 unconstitutional, reasoning that it improperly limited the Legislature’s power to govern workers’ compensation, a power deemed "unlimited" by the state Constitution. The court held that the people must amend the Constitution through an initiative constitutional amendment, not an initiative statute, to impose such limitations. Consequently, the court invalidated Proposition 22 in its entirety.The California Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that article XIV, section 4 does not preclude the electorate from using its initiative power to legislate on workers’ compensation matters. The court reasoned that the Legislature’s power under article XIV, section 4 is not exclusive and that Proposition 22 does not conflict with this constitutional provision. The court did, however, affirm the invalidation of certain severable provisions of Proposition 22 not at issue in this appeal.The California Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s judgment, agreeing that section 7451 does not conflict with article XIV, section 4. The court held that the Legislature’s plenary power under article XIV, section 4 is not exclusive and does not preclude the electorate from enacting legislation through the initiative process. The court did not address whether other provisions of Proposition 22 improperly constrain the Legislature’s authority, as those issues were not presented in this case. View "Castellanos v. State of California" on Justia Law

Enright Seeding, Inc. is involved in a dispute with the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL-CIO, regarding the nature of their collective bargaining agreement. Enright Seeding, a construction industry subcontractor, signed a bargaining agreement with the union in 2007, which included language suggesting it was a § 9(a) agreement under the National Labor Relations Act, indicating majority employee support for the union. The company later claimed that its obligations ended when it repudiated the contract in 2016. The union, however, argued that the agreement was a § 9(a) agreement and that the company violated the Act by not providing requested information.An administrative law judge determined that the agreement was a § 9(a) agreement and that Enright Seeding violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by failing to provide the requested information. The judge also concluded that even if the agreement was under § 8(f), the company did not clearly repudiate it. A three-member panel of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) affirmed this decision, focusing on the § 9(a) status and not addressing the repudiation issue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the NLRB's decision was not supported by substantial evidence, as there was no actual evidence of majority employee support for the union in 2007, only boilerplate contract language. The court emphasized that all evidence must be considered to determine the status of the relationship, and mere contract language is insufficient. The court also rejected the argument that Enright Seeding was barred from disputing the agreement's status due to the six-month limitation period in § 10(b) of the Act.The Eighth Circuit vacated the NLRB's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, without expressing a view on whether Enright Seeding had effectively repudiated the agreement or whether the union was entitled to the requested information under a § 8(f) agreement. View "NLRB v. Enright Seeding, Inc." on Justia Law

Brian Ambroise, a Senior Correctional Police Officer at the Edna Mahan Correctional Facility for Women, faced disciplinary charges from the Department of Corrections (DOC) in December 2020. The charges included conduct unbecoming a public employee and undue familiarity with inmates, stemming from allegations that Ambroise had a sexual relationship with an inmate, J.O., and performed favors for her, such as bringing in contraband and passing messages. Ambroise admitted to kissing J.O. and failing to report it, as well as passing a message between inmates.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) modified the DOC’s penalty from removal to a twenty-day suspension, sustaining only the charge of failing to report the kiss and dismissing the others. The DOC appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which affirmed the ALJ’s finding on the failure to report but reversed the dismissal of the undue familiarity charge. The Commission imposed a six-month suspension, considering Ambroise’s previously unblemished record and the seriousness of his conduct.The New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the case and found the Commission’s decision to be arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The Court held that the Commission failed to adequately consider the DOC’s expertise in maintaining prison security and the seriousness of Ambroise’s offenses. The Court emphasized that Ambroise’s failure to report the kiss and his undue familiarity with inmates compromised prison security and discipline. Consequently, the Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and reinstated the DOC’s recommended sanction of removal, remanding the case to the Commission to redetermine the penalty in accordance with the Court’s decision. View "In the Matter of Brian Ambroise" on Justia Law

Cleveland Stegall was employed at an FCA vehicle assembly plant through a staffing agency, Brightwing. In late 2015, FCA announced plans to eliminate Stegall’s shift by summer 2016. In April 2016, Stegall raised concerns about asbestos in the workplace to his FCA supervisors, who promised air quality tests but did not provide results. Stegall continued to request the results and threatened to file complaints with OSHA and Michigan OSHA. He was terminated on June 17, 2016, and subsequently filed a discrimination complaint with Michigan OSHA, alleging retaliation for his asbestos concerns.The Oakland Circuit Court granted summary disposition for both defendants, ruling that Stegall’s public-policy claim was preempted by the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) and that internal complaints could not support a public-policy claim. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the public-policy claim was preempted and could not be based on internal reporting. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that internal reporting could support a public-policy claim and remanded for further consideration of whether the claim was preempted by other laws.On remand, the Court of Appeals concluded that Stegall’s public-policy claim was preempted by OSHA and MiOSHA, as these statutes provided exclusive remedies for retaliation. The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the remedies under OSHA and MiOSHA were inadequate and thus not exclusive. Therefore, Stegall’s public-policy claim was not preempted. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine if there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding Stegall’s claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy. View "Stegall V Resource Technology Corporation" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including several states and corporations, challenged a Department of Labor rule that allowed ERISA fiduciaries to consider environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors when making investment decisions if those factors equally serve the financial interests of the plan. This rule was issued following an executive order by President Biden, which counteracted a previous Trump-era rule that prohibited considering non-pecuniary factors in investment decisions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas upheld the Department of Labor's rule, relying on the Chevron deference doctrine, which allows courts to defer to a federal agency's interpretation of ambiguous statutory language. The district court concluded that the rule was not "manifestly contrary to the statute" after affording the Department the deference due under Chevron.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. During the appeal, the Supreme Court decided Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which overruled Chevron, thus eliminating the deference previously given to agency interpretations. Given this significant change in the legal landscape, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the new Supreme Court decision. The appellate court emphasized the importance of allowing the district court to reassess the merits without the Chevron framework, ensuring that the lower court's independent judgment is applied to the statutory interpretation of ERISA. View "State of Utah v. Su" on Justia Law

Eight New Hampshire employers sought a writ of mandamus to compel the New Hampshire Department of Labor (DOL) to hold department-level hearings. These employers had their applications for reimbursement from the Special Fund for Second Injuries denied. The employers argued that they were entitled to a hearing under RSA 281-A:43, I(a). The DOL had denied their requests for such hearings, stating that the disputes were more appropriately heard by the Compensation Appeals Board (CAB).The employers initially appealed to the CAB and requested department-level hearings from the DOL. The DOL denied these requests, leading the employers to file a petition for original jurisdiction with the New Hampshire Supreme Court. The proceedings before the CAB were stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision.The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed whether the DOL is statutorily required to grant a request for a department-level hearing when an employer’s request for reimbursement from the Fund is denied. The court held that RSA 281-A:43, I(a) grants employers the right to a department-level hearing before an authorized representative of the commissioner when they have been denied reimbursement from the Fund. The court found that the statute's language supports the employers' right to such a hearing and that this interpretation aligns with the statutory scheme's purpose of encouraging employers to hire or retain employees with permanent impairments. Consequently, the court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus, compelling the DOL to hold the requested hearings. View "Petition of City of Manchester" on Justia Law

The case involves Lion Elastomers, a synthetic rubber manufacturer, and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Lion Elastomers had been found guilty of unfair labor practices by the NLRB for threatening, disciplining, and discharging an employee, Joseph Colone, for engaging in protected activities. The NLRB applied the Atlantic Steel standard to assess whether Colone's behavior lost its protected status. However, before the appeal of the Board’s decision had been briefed, the NLRB issued a new interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in a case called General Motors, which overruled Atlantic Steel. The NLRB then sought a remand to apply this new interpretation to the Lion Elastomers case.The case was remanded to the NLRB by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. However, instead of applying the new interpretation from General Motors as expected, the NLRB used the remand proceeding to overrule General Motors and return to the Atlantic Steel standard. Lion Elastomers argued that the NLRB exceeded the scope of the remand and violated its due-process rights during the remand proceeding.The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Lion Elastomers. The court found that the NLRB had exceeded the scope of the remand by not applying the General Motors standard as expected. The court also found that the NLRB had violated Lion Elastomers's due-process rights by not giving the company an opportunity to be heard before deciding to overturn General Motors. The court vacated the NLRB's decision and remanded the case back to the NLRB, instructing it to apply the General Motors standard to this case. View "Lion Elastomers v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law