Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Fox Lake patrol officer Zander was charged with misconduct arising from multiple job-related incidents. The chief recommended termination. Zander's union, FOP, assigned Attorney Carlson, an FOP employee. Zander had no input into the choice of an attorney, had no retainer agreement with Carlson, and was not charged for Carlson’s services. Under the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/1-1-1), police officers who face removal or discharge are entitled to a hearing before the local board of fire and police commissioners unless a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) provides for arbitration. The CBA between Fox Lake and FOP gave officers the option of pursuing either avenue. On Carlson’s advice, Zander chose arbitration. The arbitrator upheld the termination. Zander sued, alleging legal malpractice and that FOP has no right to employ attorneys to furnish legal services under its direction to FOP members, and cannot control what attorneys assigned to help FOP members may do and “should be vicariously liable.”The circuit court dismissed, citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s "Atkinson" holding, which immunizes union members and officers against personal liability for actions taken while acting as a union representative in the context of the collective bargaining process. The court noted the parallels between federal labor law and the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. But for the collective bargaining agreement. FOP would have owed Zander no duty. Zander’s claim against the union fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Illinois Labor Relations Board. View "Zander v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Sparta instituted a policy for evaluating the performance of full-time police officers. Day-shift officers must accumulate at least 82 points, while the standard for night-shift officers is 65 points. Points are awarded for traffic citations, drug task force duties, investigations that take more than one shift, shooting range training; training outside the department, court time, and extra duty shifts. Awards for Officer of the Month and of the Year will be based on the most points earned over the Officer’s monthly minimum standard. Failure to reach the minimum monthly points will result in discipline that is corrective and progressive in nature. The Union alleged the policy establishes an unlawful ticket quota in violation of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-1-12). The circuit court granted Sparta summary judgment.The appellate court reversed, holding that the statute prohibits consideration of the number of citations issued when evaluating a police officer’s performance based on points of contact. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Section 11-1-12 first provides a general statement prohibiting citation quotas, defined as “requir[ing] a police officer to issue a specific number of citations within a designated period of time.” The second paragraph, applicable here, does not prohibit evaluating police officers with points-of-contact system and defines a “point of contact” as “any quantifiable contact made in the furtherance of the police officer’s duties,” with the sole exception being “the issuance of citations or the number of citations issued.” View "Policemen's Benevolent Labor Committee v. City of Sparta" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court reversing the decision of the Public Employees Grievance Board (PEGB) determining that Petitioners, employees of the Lincoln County Board of Education, did not qualify as Executive Secretaries under W. Va. 18A-4-8(i)(45), holding that the circuit court did not err.Petitioners filed grievances with the PEGB seeking reclassification from Secretary III to Executive Secretary. The PEGB found that Petitioners did not meet section 18A-4-8(i)(45)'s definition of Executive Secretary but that they were entitled to reclassification because they met the Board's definition of Executive Secretary. The circuit court affirmed the PEGB's determination that Petitioners did not qualify as Executive Secretaries under the Code but reversed the decision granting Petitioners' requested classification, concluding that the Board's definition of Executive Secretary contravened state law because it conflicted with section 18A-4-8(i)(45). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board's definition of the Executive Secretary title was unquestionably contrary to the law. View "Owens v. Lincoln County Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed: (1) an order granting a request for publication, recalling the mandate, and withdrawing a memorandum disposition and replacing it with an opinion; and (2) an opinion affirming in part the district court's judgment denying NUHS relief from a decision of the Council, and dismissing the appeal in part as moot.In this case, after NUHS's appeal of the Council's probation decision was denied, NUHS filed a complaint in federal court raising common law due process claims and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The district court denied relief and NUHS appealed.The panel expressed no opinion on the validity of common law due process claims challenging decisions relating to accreditation. The panel held that, because the Council's accreditation standards contemplate situations in which a program can remain accredited even if it is not fully in compliance with all accreditation standards, the Council did not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it simultaneously reaffirmed NUHS's accreditation and imposed probation. Furthermore, the Council's decision to impose probation was not arbitrary and capricious and did not violate the Council's obligation to apply review procedures consistent with due process under 20 U.S.C. 1099b. Finally, because NUHS has no further reporting obligations with respect to NBCE exams administered before the change in Illinois law, its appeal from the denial of injunctive relief prohibiting the Council from enforcing Policy 56 is moot. View "National University of Health Sciences v. Council on Chiropractic Education, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Griz One Firefighting, LLC's petition for judicial review of a default order and determination by the Department of Labor and Industry Wage and Hour Division (DLI) and awarding Matthew Sean West $11,241 in back wages, penalties, costs, and attorney fees, holding that the district court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not clearly err when it concluded that DLI notified Griz One of West's wage claim; (2) Griz One was not entitled to relief on its due process and jurisdictional arguments; (3) the district court was correct in concluding that Mont. R. Evid. 605 does not apply to a DLI compliance specialist; and (4) the district court's award of attorney fees and costs to West was reasonable and based on competent evidence. The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the district court for a determination of West's costs and fees on appeal. View "Griz One Firefighting v. State Department of Labor & Industry" on Justia Law

Defendant Wedbush Securities, Inc. (Wedbush) was a securities broker-dealer firm that provided financial planning and investment products through its financial advisors. It classified its California financial advisors as exempt under the administrative exemption to California wage-and-hour law; the administrative exemption only applied if an employee earned a monthly “salary” equivalent to at least twice the state minimum wage. Wedbush pays its financial advisors on a commission-only basis. It uses a computer program to track the trades they make in a given month and then calculates the compensation owed based on what commission tier the employee met that month. The higher the employee’s total monthly gross product sales, the higher the percentage used to calculate the employee’s monthly commission payment. The central issue in this case is whether the Wedbush compensation model meets that administrative exemption requirement. The Court of Appeal determined the compensation plan based solely on commissions, with recoverable advances on future commissions, did not qualify as a “salary” for purposes of this exemption. Since the trial court found the employees in question were exempt and entered judgment for the employer, the Court reversed and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "Semprini v. Wedbush Securities, Inc." on Justia Law

Dr. Hessami was the Chief of Pharmacy at a West Virginia VA Medical Center when the first curative therapies for Hepatitis C Virus infection (HCV) entered the market. The Center struggled to provide patients with access to the enormously expensive but life-saving new therapies. The Regional Veteran Integrated Service Network funded and provided treatment guidelines for administration of HCV therapies. Hessami was familiar with HCV treatment guidelines, monitored all purchases of HCV medications, and provided information to the VISN. Hessami repeatedly raised concerns about the prescribing practices of one physician, asserting that treatment decisions were unnecessarily exposing patients to increased risk of adverse drug reactions and side effects, and overspending the Center’s HCV funds. Hessami claims that her comments were met with hostile, derogatory statements. A pharmacy employee accused Hessami of misconduct. Hessami was suspended and later demoted. The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed her claim that she had been accused of wrongdoing and punished in reprisal for her protected disclosures regarding the agency’s spending.The Federal Circuit vacated. When determining whether an appellant has non-frivolously alleged that she disclosed information that she reasonably believed evidenced misconduct under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8), the Board’s inquiry should be limited to evaluating whether the appellant has alleged sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. The Board erroneously relied on the testimony of agency witnesses in dismissing Hessami’s appeal. View "Hessami v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

Ge Vue was an asset-protection worker at the Walmart in Eagle River, Alaska in 2016. On February 3, he was shot in the back and face with a pellet gun when he and another asset-protection worker tried to stop three juveniles from taking a cart full of merchandise they had not paid for. No pellets penetrated his back, but one pellet penetrated the skin near his right eye and came to rest in his right orbit, or eye socket, near his optic nerve. He underwent surgery for the injury, and received treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder. His employer contended that he was not disabled by the psychological injury and, after an ophthalmologist retained by the employer questioned specific pain-related medical care, the employer controverted that treatment. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board granted the worker’s claim for medical care, found the employer had not unfairly or frivolously controverted benefits, and denied the worker’s request for disability during periods of time when his eye doctors said he had the physical capacity to perform asset-protection work. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision. Vue appealed,, making arguments related to disability and the standard for finding an unfair or frivolous controversion. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s decision, and remanded with instructions to remand to the Board for calculation of benefits and penalty owed to the worker. View "Vue v. Walmart Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the decision of the reviewing board of the Department of Industrial Accidents determining that the Department lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim of Mark Mendes, holding that the Commonwealth had jurisdiction over Mendes's claim.Mendes, a Massachusetts resident, entered into an employment contract, performed much of the work, and was injured outside of the Commonwealth. The Department's reviewing board denied and dismissed Mendes's claim for workers' compensation, determining that Massachusetts lacked jurisdiction over the claim because it was neither the place of hire nor the place of injury. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the board's decision, holding that there were sufficient significant contacts between Massachusetts and Mendes's employment such that the employment relationship was located in Massachusetts. View "Mark Mendes's Case" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of a writ of mandate to compel the Civil Service Commission to complete a deputy sheriff's administrative appeal. The court held that a deputy sheriff who has obtained and continues to receive service-connected disability retirement benefits is no longer an employee of the county, and thus his appeal to the Civil Service Commission of his discharge by the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, filed before his disability retirement, is no longer viable. The court held that the Commission has no authority to order reinstatement or any other relief to a retired person whose future status as an employee is not at issue. View "Deiro v. L.A. County Civil Service Commission" on Justia Law