Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Dr. Deborah A. Perlick, who was employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) as a Research Health Science Specialist. During her tenure, she discovered approximately $78,000 missing from a study's funding and reported this to VA officials. Subsequently, she was terminated from her position. Perlick filed a complaint under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), and the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board) granted her request for corrective action, awarding her back pay through March 31, 2020. However, Perlick also sought consequential and compensatory damages, including future lost earnings, which the Board denied.The Board found that Perlick had established her claim of protected whistleblowing disclosures. However, it denied her request for consequential damages, stating that such damages are limited to out-of-pocket costs and do not include non-pecuniary damages. The Board also denied Perlick's request for future lost earnings, arguing that she had no guarantees of future employment beyond the completion date of her final project with the VA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the Board's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that future lost earnings are recoverable as compensatory damages under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012. The court found that the Board erred by improperly raising the burden for Perlick to establish these damages, requiring her to "guarantee" future employment to recover future lost earnings. The court instructed the Board to determine under the preponderance of the evidence standard whether Perlick met her burden to prove entitlement to pecuniary compensatory damages in the form of future lost earnings. View "PERLICK v. DVA " on Justia Law

The case revolves around Deborah Strickland, an employee of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), who was suspended for 15 days without pay following a series of incidents involving her supervisor. Strickland appealed her suspension to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), claiming disability discrimination. The MSPB refused to consider the entire disciplinary decision after determining one part of the decision was correct. Strickland then appealed to the district court, which affirmed the MSPB's decision.The district court upheld the MSPB's decision and dismissed Strickland's Rehabilitation Act claims. Strickland then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Court of Appeals found that the MSPB erred in refusing to review the VA's entire disciplinary decision and that both the MSPB and the VA erred by failing to analyze the non-exhaustive factors articulated in Douglas v. Veterans Admin. The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's and the MSPB's orders, reversed the district court in part, and remanded to the district court with instructions to remand to the MSPB for additional proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Strickland v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Breeze Aviation Group, Inc. (Breeze), an airline company, and its dispute with the National Mediation Board (NMB) and the Air Line Pilots Association International (ALPA). Breeze challenged the administration of a union-representation election by the NMB, which resulted in the NMB’s certification of ALPA as the representative of pilots employed by Breeze. Breeze argued that the NMB improperly excluded trainee pilots from voting in the union election and improperly refused to extend the cut-off date for voter eligibility to allow more pilot trainees to complete their training and become eligible to vote.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The district court dismissed Breeze's complaint for lack of jurisdiction, stating that federal courts have jurisdiction to review NMB certification of union representation only where the complaining party shows that the certification decision was a gross violation of the Railway Labor Act (RLA) or that it violated the constitutional rights of an employer, employee, or Union. The district court determined that Breeze’s complaint did not make the required showing.Breeze appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The court found that the NMB had fulfilled its statutory duty to investigate and acted within the broad bounds of its statutory discretion when it designated who could participate in the election, set the rules that governed that election, and held the election itself. The court concluded that Breeze's arguments did not point to any specific requirement in the RLA that the NMB violated, and were more in terms of policy and broad generalities as to what the RLA should provide. View "Breeze Aviation Group v. National Mediation Board" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Pureza “Didit” Martinez, who was terminated from her position at the Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center at the age of 72. She filed a lawsuit alleging age discrimination against the Health Sciences Center, the Texas Tech University System, and the Texas Tech University System’s Board of Regents. The Texas Tech University System and the Board of Regents argued that they were not Martinez's employer and thus retained sovereign immunity.Previously, the trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction filed by the Texas Tech University System and the Board of Regents, and the court of appeals affirmed this decision. The defendants argued that Martinez failed to plead allegations that could make them liable for age discrimination under the Labor Code, essentially denying being Martinez’s employer.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court found that Martinez's petition did not allege facts demonstrating that the Texas Tech University System or the Board of Regents employed Martinez directly or that either one controlled access to and interfered with her employment. Therefore, the court concluded that Martinez failed to allege a waiver of sovereign immunity, and the plea to the jurisdiction of the Texas Tech University System and the Board of Regents should have been granted. However, the court remanded the case to the trial court to give Martinez an opportunity to replead, as her petition did not foreclose a valid claim against those defendants. View "Texas Tech University System v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The case involves Amazon.com Services LLC and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB alleged that Amazon committed an unfair labor practice by discharging an employee for engaging in protected concerted activity. While the charge was pending before the Board, the Board sought temporary injunctive relief, including the employee’s reinstatement. The district court found "reasonable cause" to believe Amazon committed an unfair labor practice in terminating the employee. However, it concluded that ordering Amazon to cease and desist from committing certain violations of the Act was "just and proper," but that ordering Amazon to reinstate the employee was not.The district court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The appellate court found that the district court did not adequately explain why the cease-and-desist order was just and proper, particularly in light of its conclusion that the employee’s reinstatement was not. Therefore, the injunction was vacated in part. The court noted that the district court's lack of explanation for granting the cease-and-desist order, coupled with its explicit, undisputed findings in rejecting the request to order the employee's reinstatement, cast serious doubt on the propriety of the cease-and-desist order. View "Poor v. Amazon.com Services LLC" on Justia Law

An employee of the Department of Public Health (DPH), Juanita Estrada, filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, alleging that the DPH retaliated against her for a whistleblower disclosure. Estrada's job duties included reviewing the qualifications of individuals appointed as municipal directors of health. She approved an appointment without verifying the individual's credentials, which were later found to be false. After notifying her supervisor, the individual was removed from the position. Estrada then repeated the error with another appointment and received a letter of reprimand. She subsequently received another reprimand, multiple unsatisfactory performance appraisals, and was demoted. Estrada filed grievances challenging these actions but did not raise a whistleblower retaliation claim. All grievances were denied. She then filed a whistleblower retaliation claim with the commission.The trial court concluded that the commission lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Estrada’s whistleblower complaint, that Estrada had not made a protected whistleblower disclosure, and that she had failed to establish a causal connection between any alleged whistleblower disclosure and the alleged retaliation. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on the merits in favor of the department. The commission appealed to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.The Supreme Court held that the commission had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Estrada’s whistleblower retaliation claim. The court also held that an employee is entitled to whistleblower protection under the statute for reporting his or her own error. However, the court concluded that Estrada had failed to prove that the department’s adverse personnel actions were caused by Estrada’s reporting of her errors rather than the errors themselves. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed. View "Dept. of Public Health v. Estrada" on Justia Law

Augustina Dean, a former elementary school teacher, filed a workers' compensation claim with the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (DLIR) in Hawaii, asserting she had suffered a work-related injury. The Director of the DLIR, however, found that Dean did not suffer a work-related injury. Dean appealed this decision to the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeal Board (LIRAB). The LIRAB reversed the Director's decision and ordered a new hearing. Following the new hearing, the Director awarded Dean $2,424.24 for "1% permanent partial disability of the whole person," and "medical care, services and supplies as the nature of the injury may require." Dean appealed this decision to the LIRAB, but the LIRAB refused to hear the case, arguing that Dean had missed the appeal deadline by one day.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) sided with the LIRAB, affirming its decision to dismiss Dean's appeal as untimely. The ICA relied on the precedent set in Kissell v. Lab. & Indus. Rels. Appeals Bd., which declared that the time for filing a written notice of appeal is mandatory. Dean, still self-represented, appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii vacated the ICA's summary disposition order. The court held that the LIRAB, the agency rejecting an appeal as untimely based on the Department’s “sent” date, must have direct evidence that the decision was sent on that date. In this case, the LIRAB did not have sufficient evidence. The court concluded that the Department did not offer adequate evidence that it mailed its decision on the date it claimed. Therefore, Dean may appeal to the LIRAB. The court remanded the case to the LIRAB to address the merits of Dean's appeal. View "Dean v. State" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a former coal miner, Richard McLain, who developed a serious lung condition after working underground for nearly two decades. McLain filed a claim under the Black Lung Benefits Act, alleging that his years of mine work had left him totally disabled from a pulmonary perspective. His former employer, Old Ben Coal Company, had been liquidated through bankruptcy, so Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the surety guaranteeing Old Ben’s debts under the Act, contested liability on the coal company’s behalf.The case was initially heard by an administrative law judge (ALJ), who determined that McLain was disabled within the meaning of the Black Lung Benefits Act. The ALJ's decision was based on a thorough review of the medical record and a set of medical findings regarding how to distinguish between lung disorders arising from coal dust and those arising from tobacco smoke. Old Ben appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Benefits Review Board, arguing that the ALJ erroneously treated the 2001 preamble as if it were binding law and made factual findings unsupported by the medical record. The Review Board affirmed the benefits decision in full.The case was then brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court affirmed the decision of the Benefits Review Board, emphasizing the broad discretion ALJs enjoy when evaluating competing medical theories, the weight ALJs may properly attribute to the perspective of the Department of Labor on such issues, and the significant deference owed to ALJs’ medical findings and scientific judgments on appeal. The court found no error in the ALJ's application of a regulatory preamble or in the factual findings that were challenged by Old Ben. View "Safeco Insurance/Liberty Mutual Surety v. OWCP" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal by the Department of Corrections (DOC) against a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff P. Mark Potanas under the State Employee Whistleblower Act. Potanas, a former superintendent of Southern State Correctional Facility (SSCF), claimed that the DOC fired him in retaliation for his whistleblowing activities. These activities included notifying the state about potential savings on a building renovation project and advocating for more mental health staff at SSCF. The DOC argued that Potanas did not engage in any "protected activity" under the Act, and thus, the trial court should have granted its request for judgment as a matter of law.The trial court denied the DOC's motion, finding that Potanas's report of potential waste and his complaints about mental health staffing were sufficient to meet the definition of "protected activity" under the Act. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Potanas, leading to the DOC's appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling, agreeing with the DOC that Potanas did not engage in protected activity under the Whistleblower Act. The court held that the Act does not encompass reports about the possibility of future waste and that reporting on a known problem or disagreeing about how to resolve a known problem is not protected activity. The court remanded the case to the trial court to vacate the jury’s verdict and enter judgment for the DOC. View "Potanas v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The case involves the Federal Education Association Stateside Region (FEA-SR), a teachers' union, and the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). The parties were negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) when they reached an impasse. The Federal Service Impasses Panel (FSIP) was called in to resolve the remaining issues. The FSIP issued an order resolving the impasse, but FEA-SR refused to sign the agreement, arguing that the FSIP lacked jurisdiction to resolve certain issues. FEA-SR filed an arbitral grievance claiming that the Department of Defense's submission of the agreement for agency head review without FEA-SR's signature violated the contractual ground rules and constituted bad faith bargaining.The arbitrator found in favor of FEA-SR, concluding that the Department of Defense had committed unfair labor practices by cutting negotiations short and submitting an unexecuted agreement for agency head review. The FLRA, however, set aside the arbitrator's award, finding that the arbitrator could not review whether the FSIP had jurisdiction over the disputed issues and that the agreement was "executed" when the FSIP issued its order.FEA-SR petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of the FLRA's decisions. The court held that it had jurisdiction to review the petition because the FLRA's decisions involved an unfair labor practice. However, on the merits, the court rejected FEA-SR's claims and denied the petition for review. The court agreed with the FLRA that the arbitrator lacked authority to review the FSIP order and that the agreement was executed when the FSIP issued its order. View "Federal Education Association Stateside Region v. FLRA" on Justia Law