Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around the certification of Initiative Petition 23-35, "An Act Giving Transportation Network Drivers the Option to Form a Union and Bargain Collectively" by the Attorney General. The plaintiffs argued that the petition should not have been certified as it does not meet the requirement of containing only related subjects. They contended that the provisions allowing transportation network drivers to organize and collectively bargain with transportation network companies are unrelated to its provisions subjecting the results of any collective bargaining to supervision, review, and approval by the Commonwealth's Secretary of Labor.The case was brought before the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, where the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the petition does not satisfy the related subjects requirement of art. 48, and an order enjoining the Secretary of the Commonwealth from placing the petition on the Statewide election ballot. The plaintiffs argued that the Secretary of Labor's role in the collective bargaining process is not part of the integrated scheme proposed by the petition.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts disagreed with the plaintiffs' argument. The court concluded that the petition seeks to establish a multistep collective bargaining scheme in which the Secretary of Labor's role is an integrated component. Therefore, the subjects of the petition are related for purposes of art. 48. The court affirmed the Attorney General's certification of the petition. The court also noted that the Secretary of Labor's supervisory role is designed to anticipate and address a potential consequence of the collective bargaining process the petition seeks to create, specifically a legal challenge that the collective bargaining process would be preempted by Federal antitrust law. View "Craney v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a workers' compensation claim filed by Christine Coray after she was injured at her workplace, Idaho Regional Hand & Upper Extremity Center. Following her injury, Coray's physician recommended back surgery. However, after an independent medical examination (IME) requested by her employer and its surety, they denied liability for the surgery and ongoing benefits, arguing that Coray had recovered from the workplace injury and that the surgery was necessitated by preexisting conditions. After undergoing surgery outside of the workers' compensation system, her employer requested a second IME by a different physician. Coray refused and sought a declaratory ruling from the Idaho Industrial Commission on whether the employer must use the same physician for multiple examinations of a single injury.The Idaho Industrial Commission ruled that the employer or surety is not required to use the same physician for multiple examinations of a single injury under Idaho Code section 72-433. However, it also held that each request for an IME is subject to a reasonableness standard, and the burden of proof for establishing reasonableness falls on the employer. Coray appealed this interpretation, while the employer cross-appealed the Commission's conclusion that it bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of a second IME.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the Idaho Industrial Commission's decision. It held that the plain language of Idaho Code section 72-433 does not prohibit an employer or surety from using different physicians to perform multiple examinations of a single injury. The court also affirmed the Commission's ruling that the employer bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of its requested IME, including its choice of physician, if raised by the employee. View "Coray v. Idaho Regional Hand & Upper Extremity Center" on Justia Law

The case involves Lusardi Construction Company (Lusardi), a prime contractor, and its subcontractor, Pro Works Contracting Inc. (Pro Works). Pro Works violated certain Labor Code provisions by failing to hire apprentices for a construction project. The Department of Industrial Relations and the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) cited Pro Works for these violations and ordered Lusardi to pay penalties. Lusardi's administrative appeal was unsuccessful, and it subsequently filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus, which the superior court denied. Lusardi argued that the superior court erroneously concluded that it knew of Pro Works's violations and that the joint and several liability provision applied.The Superior Court of San Diego County affirmed the DLSE's decision, concluding that Lusardi had knowledge of Pro Works's violations and was liable for the penalties. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the findings relating to the amount of the penalty assessment. The court rejected Lusardi's claim of due process violations, stating that Lusardi was put on notice of the potential for being held jointly and severally liable for Pro Works’s apprentice hiring violations.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the superior court did not err in interpreting the statute, which provides two inclusive and alternative ways for imposing liability on a prime contractor for penalties resulting from the subcontractor’s violations. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the penalty imposed. The court concluded that Lusardi was not denied due process when it refused to enforce its subpoena or ask for a continuance to secure the witness’s attendance. View "Lusardi Construction Co. v. Dept. of Industrial Rel." on Justia Law

The case involves the Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association (LACERA) and the County of Los Angeles. LACERA, a public employee retirement system, sued the County over the authority to set employment classifications and salaries for its employees. LACERA argued that under the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937 (CERL) and the California Constitution, it had the authority to create employment classifications and set salaries for its employees. The County disagreed, asserting that it had the authority to set employment classifications and salaries for all county employees, including those of LACERA.Previously, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County sided with the County, following a 2003 decision, Westly v. Board of Administration, which held that the broad authority granted to retirement boards was not broad enough to give them the power to establish employment classifications and set salaries for their employees.However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven disagreed with the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the Westly decision was inconsistent with the language, purpose, and intent of Proposition 162, a 1992 voter initiative that gave governing boards of public employee retirement systems “plenary authority and fiduciary responsibility for investment of moneys and administration of the system.” The court concluded that this plenary authority included the power to create employment classifications and set salaries for employees of the retirement system. The court also found that section 31522.1 of the CERL imposed a ministerial duty on a county board of supervisors to include in the county’s employment classifications and salary ordinance the classifications and salaries adopted by the board of a county public employee retirement system for employees of that system. The court reversed the judgment of the lower court. View "L.A. County Employees Retirement Assn. v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Deborah A. Perlick, who was employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) as a Research Health Science Specialist. During her tenure, she discovered approximately $78,000 missing from a study's funding and reported this to VA officials. Subsequently, she was terminated from her position. Perlick filed a complaint under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), and the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board) granted her request for corrective action, awarding her back pay through March 31, 2020. However, Perlick also sought consequential and compensatory damages, including future lost earnings, which the Board denied.The Board found that Perlick had established her claim of protected whistleblowing disclosures. However, it denied her request for consequential damages, stating that such damages are limited to out-of-pocket costs and do not include non-pecuniary damages. The Board also denied Perlick's request for future lost earnings, arguing that she had no guarantees of future employment beyond the completion date of her final project with the VA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the Board's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that future lost earnings are recoverable as compensatory damages under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012. The court found that the Board erred by improperly raising the burden for Perlick to establish these damages, requiring her to "guarantee" future employment to recover future lost earnings. The court instructed the Board to determine under the preponderance of the evidence standard whether Perlick met her burden to prove entitlement to pecuniary compensatory damages in the form of future lost earnings. View "PERLICK v. DVA " on Justia Law

The case revolves around Deborah Strickland, an employee of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), who was suspended for 15 days without pay following a series of incidents involving her supervisor. Strickland appealed her suspension to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), claiming disability discrimination. The MSPB refused to consider the entire disciplinary decision after determining one part of the decision was correct. Strickland then appealed to the district court, which affirmed the MSPB's decision.The district court upheld the MSPB's decision and dismissed Strickland's Rehabilitation Act claims. Strickland then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Court of Appeals found that the MSPB erred in refusing to review the VA's entire disciplinary decision and that both the MSPB and the VA erred by failing to analyze the non-exhaustive factors articulated in Douglas v. Veterans Admin. The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's and the MSPB's orders, reversed the district court in part, and remanded to the district court with instructions to remand to the MSPB for additional proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Strickland v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Breeze Aviation Group, Inc. (Breeze), an airline company, and its dispute with the National Mediation Board (NMB) and the Air Line Pilots Association International (ALPA). Breeze challenged the administration of a union-representation election by the NMB, which resulted in the NMB’s certification of ALPA as the representative of pilots employed by Breeze. Breeze argued that the NMB improperly excluded trainee pilots from voting in the union election and improperly refused to extend the cut-off date for voter eligibility to allow more pilot trainees to complete their training and become eligible to vote.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The district court dismissed Breeze's complaint for lack of jurisdiction, stating that federal courts have jurisdiction to review NMB certification of union representation only where the complaining party shows that the certification decision was a gross violation of the Railway Labor Act (RLA) or that it violated the constitutional rights of an employer, employee, or Union. The district court determined that Breeze’s complaint did not make the required showing.Breeze appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The court found that the NMB had fulfilled its statutory duty to investigate and acted within the broad bounds of its statutory discretion when it designated who could participate in the election, set the rules that governed that election, and held the election itself. The court concluded that Breeze's arguments did not point to any specific requirement in the RLA that the NMB violated, and were more in terms of policy and broad generalities as to what the RLA should provide. View "Breeze Aviation Group v. National Mediation Board" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Pureza “Didit” Martinez, who was terminated from her position at the Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center at the age of 72. She filed a lawsuit alleging age discrimination against the Health Sciences Center, the Texas Tech University System, and the Texas Tech University System’s Board of Regents. The Texas Tech University System and the Board of Regents argued that they were not Martinez's employer and thus retained sovereign immunity.Previously, the trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction filed by the Texas Tech University System and the Board of Regents, and the court of appeals affirmed this decision. The defendants argued that Martinez failed to plead allegations that could make them liable for age discrimination under the Labor Code, essentially denying being Martinez’s employer.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court found that Martinez's petition did not allege facts demonstrating that the Texas Tech University System or the Board of Regents employed Martinez directly or that either one controlled access to and interfered with her employment. Therefore, the court concluded that Martinez failed to allege a waiver of sovereign immunity, and the plea to the jurisdiction of the Texas Tech University System and the Board of Regents should have been granted. However, the court remanded the case to the trial court to give Martinez an opportunity to replead, as her petition did not foreclose a valid claim against those defendants. View "Texas Tech University System v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The case involves Amazon.com Services LLC and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB alleged that Amazon committed an unfair labor practice by discharging an employee for engaging in protected concerted activity. While the charge was pending before the Board, the Board sought temporary injunctive relief, including the employee’s reinstatement. The district court found "reasonable cause" to believe Amazon committed an unfair labor practice in terminating the employee. However, it concluded that ordering Amazon to cease and desist from committing certain violations of the Act was "just and proper," but that ordering Amazon to reinstate the employee was not.The district court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The appellate court found that the district court did not adequately explain why the cease-and-desist order was just and proper, particularly in light of its conclusion that the employee’s reinstatement was not. Therefore, the injunction was vacated in part. The court noted that the district court's lack of explanation for granting the cease-and-desist order, coupled with its explicit, undisputed findings in rejecting the request to order the employee's reinstatement, cast serious doubt on the propriety of the cease-and-desist order. View "Poor v. Amazon.com Services LLC" on Justia Law

An employee of the Department of Public Health (DPH), Juanita Estrada, filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, alleging that the DPH retaliated against her for a whistleblower disclosure. Estrada's job duties included reviewing the qualifications of individuals appointed as municipal directors of health. She approved an appointment without verifying the individual's credentials, which were later found to be false. After notifying her supervisor, the individual was removed from the position. Estrada then repeated the error with another appointment and received a letter of reprimand. She subsequently received another reprimand, multiple unsatisfactory performance appraisals, and was demoted. Estrada filed grievances challenging these actions but did not raise a whistleblower retaliation claim. All grievances were denied. She then filed a whistleblower retaliation claim with the commission.The trial court concluded that the commission lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Estrada’s whistleblower complaint, that Estrada had not made a protected whistleblower disclosure, and that she had failed to establish a causal connection between any alleged whistleblower disclosure and the alleged retaliation. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on the merits in favor of the department. The commission appealed to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.The Supreme Court held that the commission had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Estrada’s whistleblower retaliation claim. The court also held that an employee is entitled to whistleblower protection under the statute for reporting his or her own error. However, the court concluded that Estrada had failed to prove that the department’s adverse personnel actions were caused by Estrada’s reporting of her errors rather than the errors themselves. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed. View "Dept. of Public Health v. Estrada" on Justia Law