Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs (landlords), challenged San Francisco Planning Code 317(e)(4) as conflicting with the Ellis Act of 1985, Government Code section 7060, which protects property owners’ right to exit the residential rental business. The ordinance was enacted in 2013 in response to a growing concern by the Board of Supervisors (and others) about the shortage of affordable local housing and rental properties. Under section 317(e)(4), certain residential property owners (those undertaking no-fault evictions) including “Ellis Act evictions” were subject to a 10-year waiting period after withdrawing a rental unit from the market before qualifying to apply for approval to merge the withdrawn unit into one or more other units. The trial court found that the ordinance impermissibly penalized property owners for exercising their rights under the Ellis Act and was facially void on preemption grounds. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Section 317(e)(4) is preempted by the Ellis Act to the extent it requires a landlord effectuating a no-fault eviction to wait 10 years before applying for a permit to undertake a residential merger on the property. View "San Francisco Apartment Ass'n v. City & Cnty.. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Freddie Mac is a privately-owned, publicly-chartered financial services corporation, 12 U.S.C. 1452, created to provide stability in the secondary residential mortgage market. Piszel began working as the CFO of Freddie Mac in 2006. Piszel with a signing bonus of $5 million in Freddie Mac restricted stock units that would vest over four years, an annual salary of $650,000, and performance-based incentive compensation of $3 million a year in restricted stock. If terminated without cause, Piszel would receive a lump-sum cash payment of double his annual salary and certain restricted stock units would continue to vest. In 2008, facing Freddie Mac's potential collapse, Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act,12 U.S.C. 4511, establishing the FHFA as Freddie Mac's new primary regulator, with authority to disaffirm any contract, after which damages for the breach would be limited to “actual direct compensatory damages.” The Act contained a limit on “golden parachutes.” Piszel alleges that he was terminated without cause and Freddie Mac “refused to provide him with any of the benefits to which he was contractually entitled.” The Claims Court dismissed his allegations of an unconstitutional taking. The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting that Piszel’s breach of contract claim remains intact despite the legislation, particularly in light of Piszel’s assertion that his contract called for “deferred compensation,” rather than a golden parachute. View "Piszel v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2013, Plaintiff, a participant in the Section 8 Federal Housing Choice Voucher Program, listed among her assets a trust that had been established in 2010 to hold Plaintiff's proceeds from a series of tort settlements. The Brookline Housing Authority (BHA) subsequently determined that Plaintiff was “over-income” for continued participation in the Program, as locally administered by the BHA. Plaintiff appealed, requesting that the BHA exclude at least some of these trust disbursements from its income calculation in reasonable accommodation of her disability. The BHA reaffirmed its determination. Thereafter, Plaintiff sued, alleging that the BHA had violated state and federal law by incorrectly calculating her income under the relevant federal regulations and by engaging in disability-based discrimination. The district court ruled in favor of BHA. The First Circuit (1) reversed the district court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim brought under the Housing Act, holding that the BHA misconstrued federal regulations in calculating Plaintiff’s income; (2) vacated the district court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s state and federal discrimination claims and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims as moot; and (3) affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s remaining claims. Remanded. View "DeCambre v. Brookline Housing Auth." on Justia Law

The Texas Optometry Act prohibits commercial retailers of ophthalmic goods from attempting to control the practice of optometry; authorizes the Optometry Board and the Attorney General to sue a violator for a civil penalty; and provides that “[a] person injured as a result of a violation . . . is entitled to the remedies. In 1992, Wal-Mart opened “Vision Centers” in its Texas retail stores, selling ophthalmic goods. Wal-Mart leased office space to optometrists. A typical lease required the optometrist to keep the office open at least 45 hours per week or pay liquidated damages. In 1995, the Board advised Wal-Mart that the requirement violated the Act. Wal-Mart dropped the requirement and changed its lease form, allowing the optometrist to insert hours of operation. In 1998, the Board opined that any commercial lease referencing an optometrist’s hours violated the Act; in 2003, the Board notified Wal-Mart that it violated the Act by informing optometrists that customers were requesting longer hours. Optometrists sued, alleging that during lease negotiations, Wal-Mart indicated what hours they should include in the lease and that they were pressured to work longer hours. They did not claim actual harm. A jury awarded civil penalties and attorney fees. The Fifth Circuit certified the question of whether such civil penalties, when sought by a private person, are exemplary damages limited by the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 41. The Texas Supreme Court responded in the affirmative, noting that “the certified questions assume, perhaps incorrectly, that the Act authorizes recovery of civil penalties by a private person, rather than only by the Board or the Attorney General.” View "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Forte" on Justia Law

Lionel Simeus filed a complaint against RGR Company LLC with the Lincoln Commission on Human Rights for housing discrimination in violation of section 11.06.020(b) of the Lincoln Municipal Code and 42 U.S.C. 3604(b) of the federal Fair Housing Act. The Commission determined that RGR discriminated against Simeus on the basis of race and national origin and, on behalf of Simeus, filed a charge of discrimination against RGR. After a hearing, the Commission found in favor of Simeus. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that RGR’s proffered reasons for its negative treatment of Simeus were a pretext for discrimination or that Simeus was the victim of intentional discrimination. View "RGR Co., LLC v. Lincoln Comm’n on Human Rights" on Justia Law

A regulation promulgated by San Francisco’s Rent Board provides that notwithstanding any changes to the terms of a tenancy under section 827, a tenant may not be evicted for violating an obligation that was not included in the tenant’s original rental agreement unless the change is authorized by San Francisco’s rent control ordinance, is required by law, or is accepted by the tenant in writing. (Rule 12.20.) The issues this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on: (1) whether section 827 preempted Rule 12.20; (2) whether the Rent Board exceeded its powers when it adopted Rule 12.20; and (3) whether it exceeded its powers when it adopted Rule 6.15C, which limited the rent a master tenant may charge to a subtenant but provided that a violation of that limitation was not a basis for eviction. Plaintiff Margaret Foster lived for more than 40 years in an apartment in a multi-unit building now owned by defendant and cross-complainant John Britton and managed by defendant and cross-complainant W.J. Britton & Co., Inc. (collectively, “Britton”). After buying the building in 2011, Britton served the tenants, including plaintiff, with “House Rules.” The document setting forth the new “House Rules” stated that the rules superseded all previous house rules, that they went into effect 30 days from receipt, and that “Tenant accepts the House Rules by remaining in possession after they come into effect and paying rent each month. If Tenant does not accept the House Rules, Tenant may opt to give 30 days’ written notice to Landlord to terminate his or her tenancy and move out.” Plaintiff responded that the longstanding terms of her tenancy (that the House Rules effectively prohibited) included garbage service, two parking spaces, an assigned area in the back yard, specific storage spaces, and the use of her service porch for laundry and storage. She informed Britton she did not agree to any unilateral changes to her rental agreement. In the ensuing dispute, Britton took the position that section 827, subdivision (a) preempted Rule 12.20. The Court of Appeal concluded that section 827 did not preempt Rule 12.20 and that the Rent Board did not exceed its powers in adopting the challenged regulations. View "Foster v. Britton" on Justia Law

The New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) terminated the Section 8 benefits of Petitioners. Petitioners commenced separate N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceedings against NYCHA seeking to annul NYCHA’s determinations as arbitrary and capricious and to reinstate their benefits. NYCHA move to dismiss the proceedings as time barred, arguing that Petitioners did not commence these proceedings within four months of their receipt of their respective “T-3 letters.” Supreme Court denied NYCHA’s motions and granted Petitioners’ petitions, concluding that the statute of limitations did not begin to run because NYCHA failed to show that it mailed all three notices - a warning letter, T-1 letter and T-3 letter - required under a federal consent judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) pursuant to the consent judgment, the statute begins to run upon the tenant’s receipt of the T-3 letter, regardless of whether NYCHA has proven that it mailed other notices required by the consent judgment to be sent before the T-3 letter; and (2) the Appellate Division found in each case that NYCHA established proper mailing of the T-3 letters, and Petitioners did not commence these proceedings within four months of their receipt of the T-3 letters. View "Banos v. Rhea" on Justia Law

While living at Mayor Wright Homes, a federally-subsidized Public housing project owned and operated by Hawai’i Public Housing Authority (HPHA), Fetu Kolio misappropriated approximately $1,400 in Mayor Wright Homes Tenant Association funds. HPHA evicted Kolio, asserting that Kolio’s theft of the funds violated a term in his lease that stated that a tenant shall not engage in any “criminal activity” that “threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment” of the housing premises. The circuit court and intermediate court of appeals affirmed the Eviction Board’s order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) HPHA failed to carry its burden of showing that Kolio’s theft threatened the health, safety, or peaceful enjoyment of the premises; and (2) Kolio’s theft did not meet the definition of criminal activity given in Hawai’i Administrative Rules 17-2020. View "Kolio v. Hawaii Pub. Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Appellant had leased the same apartment at a San Juan, Puerto Rico housing cooperative (Cooperative) for several years. While living at the cooperative, Appellant received benefits under the Section 8 federal housing assistance program, which enabled her to pay her rent. When the Housing Finance Authority concluded that Appellant’s apartment unit was “over-housed” for Section 8 purposes, the Cooperative informed Appellant that she would have to pay market-rate rent without the Section 8 assistance. Appellant subsequently submitted a request to the Cooperative for reasonable accommodation on account of her disability, stating that she could not move to a different unit without compromising her health. The Cooperative denied Appellant’s request. After filing an administrative complaint without success, Appellant filed suit in federal court, alleging that the Cooperative had violated the Fair Housing Act by failing to provide the requested accommodation, by engaging in a pattern of discriminatory actions against her, and by retaliating against her because she had recently prevailed in a separate HUD proceeding against the Cooperative. The district court (1) found in the defendants’ favor regarding the reasonable accommodation and disparate treatment claims; and (2) concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the retaliation claim. The First Circuit (1) affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the reasonable accommodation and disparate treatment claims; and (2) reversed the district court’s decision to dismiss Appellant’s retaliation claim, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to decide this claim. View "Batista v. Cooperativa de Vivienda" on Justia Law

Canal/Claiborne, Limited owned property located at 1661 Canal Street in New Orleans. In January 1995, Canal/Claiborne entered into a lease with Stonehedge Development, L.L.C. Stonehedge entered into a sublease in June 1995 with the State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Services. The Department occupied the premises, remitting monthly rent payments of about $53,000.00 to Stonehedge, which in turn remitted monthly payments of about $36,000.00 to Canal/Claiborne until Hurricane Katrina struck the city in 2005. Following Katrina, the Department failed to remove its partially damaged movable property from the premises of the plaintiff’s building. During this time, the Department also failed to remit rental payments to Stonehedge. Canal/Claiborne sought remuneration for lost rental income. The issue presented in this case was whether Canal/Claiborne's quasi-contractual claim of unjust enrichment, based on the lost rental income, fell within the scope of that waiver of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court concluded that the unjust enrichment claim did not fall within the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity in contract or tort. Furthermore, the Court also found Canal/Claiborne's suit asserting a claim of unjust enrichment had not been otherwise permitted by the legislature in a “measure authorizing … immunity from suit and liability.”View "Canal/Claiborne Ltd. v. Stonehedge Development, LLC" on Justia Law