Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A sitting circuit court judge was the subject of an impeachment petition submitted to the Kentucky House of Representatives by a former legislator who was not a party to any of the cases he cited. The petition alleged that the judge abused her discretion in six cases; five of these cases were still pending in the judicial system at the time. The petition did not include an affidavit, as required by Kentucky statute. The House referred the matter to its Impeachment Committee, which held a hearing and ultimately issued articles of impeachment against the judge. The Kentucky Senate scheduled a trial on these articles.The judge sought a temporary injunction in Franklin Circuit Court to stop the impeachment proceedings. The Franklin Circuit Court denied the injunction. She then sought emergency relief and review from the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which also denied relief. The judge subsequently filed emergency motions and a petition for a supervisory writ with the Supreme Court of Kentucky, seeking a declaration that the impeachment articles and proceedings violated the separation of powers and her due process rights, and requesting that they be declared void from the outset.The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted the petition for a supervisory writ. The Court held that the impeachment petition was invalid because it was not verified by affidavit, as required by statute. The Court further held that the allegations concerned discretionary judicial acts subject to correction through the appellate process or Judicial Conduct Commission proceedings, not impeachment, and that the Legislature’s actions violated the separation of powers. The Court also found that the impeachment process denied the judge due process, and that further proceedings would cause her irreparable harm. The Court enjoined the General Assembly from continuing the impeachment proceedings and ordered dismissal of the pending articles. View "GOODMAN V. NEMES" on Justia Law

Several individuals facing involuntary civil commitment under Washington’s Involuntary Treatment Act were entitled to appointed counsel. The King County Department of Public Defense (DPD) was responsible for providing this representation. During the spring and summer of 2024, DPD’s attorneys assigned to these cases reached their annual caseload limits, which are set by state standards. Despite having sufficient funding, DPD was unable to recruit additional attorneys and therefore notified the court when it could not assign counsel to new cases without exceeding the limits. When the court ordered DPD to provide counsel, DPD complied. The King County Executive was also ordered by the trial court to provide counsel, although in King County, only DPD has that authority.The King County Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing and subsequently issued orders requiring both DPD and the King County Executive to provide counsel to respondents. The court’s amended orders clarified that the decision of which attorney to appoint, and how to allocate caseloads, rested with DPD and the Executive, not with the court. Both DPD and the King County Executive sought review in the Washington Supreme Court. The Executive argued it should not be included in the orders due to the county’s charter, which provides DPD with exclusive authority and independence. DPD argued the orders effectively required it to violate mandatory caseload limits.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the caseload limits for public defenders in the Standards for Indigent Defense are mandatory and that courts lack authority to order attorneys or agencies to violate these limits. However, the court found that the trial court did not actually order DPD to violate the caseload limits, as it left the method of compliance to DPD. The court reversed the orders as they applied to the King County Executive but affirmed the orders requiring DPD to provide counsel. View "In re Det. of M.E." on Justia Law

NonDoc Media and William W. Savage III submitted open records requests to the University of Oklahoma seeking two reports prepared by the law firm Jones Day. The reports resulted from investigations into allegations of misreporting alumni donor data and possible sexual misconduct involving high-ranking University officials. Jones Day was retained under an attorney-client relationship, and the reports included confidential interviews and legal analysis. Portions of the reports were provided to law enforcement under joint-interest agreements and excerpts of the sexual misconduct report were shared with the parties involved pursuant to Title IX protocols.The District Court of Cleveland County conducted an in camera review of both reports. It granted summary judgment in favor of the University, finding the documents protected by attorney-client privilege. The court also found that the reports were exempt under the Open Records Act’s personnel record exemption, and that the sexual misconduct report was further protected by work-product and informer privileges. The court did not find that the University had waived any of these protections, and rejected NonDoc’s arguments to the contrary. NonDoc appealed, and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma retained the case.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the summary judgment de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege protects the reports from disclosure, and clarified that the privilege does not expire when the underlying investigation or action concludes. The court also found that the University did not waive the privilege by sharing the reports with law enforcement under joint-interest agreements or by limited disclosure required by law. Summary judgment for the University was affirmed. View "NONDOC MEDIA v. STATE Ex Rel. BOARD OF REGENTS of the UNIV. of OKLAHOMA" on Justia Law

The case centers on a dispute involving the Iowa Auditor of State’s authority to subpoena records from the City of Davenport, including documents claimed to be protected by the attorney–client privilege, in connection with a reaudit of city settlement payments. The city provided some documents but refused to produce others, asserting privilege. The Auditor sought enforcement of the subpoena, while the city moved to modify it. The controversy escalated due to public interest in the timing and propriety of the city’s settlements and the Auditor’s investigation into their legality.The Iowa District Court for Scott County ruled in favor of the Auditor, holding that Iowa law gave the Auditor broad access to city records, including attorney–client privileged materials, except for attorney work product, and ordered an in camera review of the contested documents. The city appealed, arguing the Auditor did not have authority to access attorney–client communications. During the appeal, the Auditor and the Iowa Attorney General disagreed fundamentally about the scope of the Auditor’s subpoena power and whether to defend the district court’s ruling. The Attorney General declined to make arguments supporting the Auditor’s position, citing broader state interests and a perceived conflict of interest.The Supreme Court of Iowa determined that, due to this conflict of interest, the Auditor may be represented by his own general counsel, rather than the Attorney General. The court reasoned that the Attorney General’s duties are materially limited by her responsibilities to other state agencies, constituting a conflict under Iowa’s professional conduct rules. The court further held that the Auditor does not need executive council approval to be represented by in-house counsel, as statutory provisions requiring such approval apply only to hiring outside counsel at state expense. The Attorney General was permitted to participate as amicus curiae. View "City of Davenport v. Office of the Auditor of the State of Iowa" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization sought to provide free legal advice to low-income New Yorkers facing debt-collection lawsuits by training nonlawyer “Justice Advocates” to help individuals complete a state-issued check-the-box answer form. The organization and a prospective Justice Advocate argued that many defendants in such cases default due to lack of understanding, leading to severe consequences. However, New York law prohibits nonlawyers from providing individualized legal advice, and all parties agreed that the proposed activities would violate the state’s unauthorized practice of law (UPL) statutes.The plaintiffs filed a pre-enforcement challenge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that applying the UPL statutes to their activities would violate their First Amendment rights. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing and were likely to succeed on the merits, holding that the UPL statutes, as applied, were a content-based regulation of speech that could not survive strict scrutiny. The court granted a preliminary injunction, barring the Attorney General from enforcing the UPL statutes against the plaintiffs and participants in their program.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that the UPL statutes, as applied, regulate speech. However, the Second Circuit held that the regulation is content neutral, not content based, and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. Because the district court applied the wrong standard, the Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. The court did not reach a final decision on whether the statutes, as applied, ultimately violate the First Amendment, leaving that determination for the district court on remand. View "Upsolve, Inc. v. James" on Justia Law

Maurice Devalle, a former North Carolina State Highway Patrol sergeant, was terminated in April 2017 after an internal investigation revealed he had falsified his home address to meet residency requirements, submitted false time sheets, and was untruthful about his work activities. Shortly after his termination, Devalle accepted a position as a deputy sheriff and school resource officer in Columbus County and applied for justice officer certification from the North Carolina Sheriffs’ Education and Training Standards Commission. Over the following year and a half, Devalle received strong character endorsements from his new supervisors and colleagues, who testified to his rehabilitation and positive impact in his new role.After reviewing Devalle’s application, the Commission’s Probable Cause Committee determined he lacked good moral character based on his prior misconduct and did not conduct a new investigation into his recent conduct. Devalle challenged the denial in a contested case before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who found his supporting witnesses credible but noted Devalle’s own testimony was evasive and lacked candor. The Commission ultimately denied certification, citing Devalle’s lack of truthfulness during the hearing. Devalle sought judicial review in Superior Court, Columbus County, which reversed the Commission’s decision, finding insufficient evidence to support the denial and ordering retroactive certification.The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding the Commission’s decision was arbitrary and capricious compared to its handling of a prior, similar case. On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina applied the whole record test and found substantial evidence supported the Commission’s conclusion that Devalle lacked the requisite candor and truthfulness. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstating the Commission’s indefinite denial of certification. View "Devalle v. Sheriffs’ Education & Training Standards Commission" on Justia Law

Upper Missouri Waterkeeper and seven Broadwater County residents challenged the approval of a subdivision by 71 Ranch, LP, arguing it did not meet the "exempt well" exception for a water rights permit. They sought attorney fees under the Montana Water Use Act, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), and the Private Attorney General Doctrine. The District Court denied their request for fees under all three claims.The First Judicial District Court found that the subdivision's environmental assessment was inadequate and that the County abused its discretion in approving the subdivision. The court ruled in favor of Upper Missouri on most claims but denied their request for attorney fees. The plaintiffs appealed the denial of fees.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the District Court that the Water Use Act did not authorize fees. However, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of fees under the UDJA, finding that the District Court abused its discretion. The Supreme Court held that the equities supported an award of attorney fees and that the declaratory relief sought by Upper Missouri was necessary to change the status quo. The case was remanded to the District Court to determine a reasonable amount of fees and their apportionment. The Supreme Court did not address the private attorney general claim. View "Upper Missouri v. Department of Natural Resources and Conservation" on Justia Law

A Russian citizen, Diana Avdeeva, married a U.S. citizen and applied for lawful permanent-resident status, which was granted on a conditional basis. She and her husband later filed a petition to remove the conditional status, but USCIS did not act on it within the required timeframe. After their divorce, Avdeeva requested the petition be converted to a waiver petition. She then applied for naturalization, but USCIS denied her petition, terminated her permanent-resident status, and placed her in removal proceedings. Avdeeva sued USCIS for failing to adjudicate her naturalization application within the statutory period.The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts remanded the case to USCIS based on a settlement agreement, which required USCIS to terminate removal proceedings, approve her petition, and conduct a new naturalization interview. Avdeeva was naturalized, and she dismissed her other lawsuit. She then sought attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), but the district court denied her motion, suggesting she was not a "prevailing party" and that awarding fees would be unjust due to the settlement terms.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Avdeeva was not a "prevailing party" under EAJA because the change in her legal status was not "court-ordered" but rather a result of the settlement agreement. The court noted that the district court's remand order did not resolve the merits of the case or retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement, thus lacking the necessary judicial imprimatur. Consequently, Avdeeva was not entitled to attorney's fees. View "Avdeeva v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Peyman Roshan, a lawyer and real estate broker, had his law license suspended by the California Supreme Court in 2021 for misconduct. Following this, the California Department of Real Estate (DRE) initiated a reciprocal disciplinary proceeding against his real estate license. Roshan filed a federal lawsuit against the DRE, alleging constitutional violations and seeking to enjoin the DRE's disciplinary action.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Roshan's lawsuit, citing the Younger abstention doctrine, which prevents federal courts from interfering with certain ongoing state proceedings. The district court held that the DRE's disciplinary proceeding was quasi-criminal in nature and that Roshan could raise his federal claims during the judicial review of the DRE action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court correctly applied the Younger abstention doctrine. The court noted that the state proceedings were ongoing, involved important state interests, and allowed Roshan to raise his federal claims. The court also determined that the DRE proceeding was quasi-criminal because it was initiated by a state agency following an investigation, involved formal charges, and aimed to determine whether Roshan should be sanctioned by suspending or revoking his real estate license.The Ninth Circuit concluded that all the requirements for Younger abstention were met and that Roshan had not demonstrated any bad faith, harassment, or extraordinary circumstances that would make abstention inappropriate. Therefore, the district court's decision to abstain from hearing the case was proper, and the dismissal of Roshan's lawsuit was affirmed. View "ROSHAN V. MCCAULEY" on Justia Law

Judge Carlos Moore, a municipal court judge for the cities of Clarksdale and Grenada, faced allegations of misconduct related to his social media posts and public comments. The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance (the Commission) claimed that Moore's actions violated the Mississippi Constitution, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Commission and Moore. The Commission's allegations stemmed from Moore's social media activity in 2021 and 2022, where he posted content that could be perceived as advertising his law practice and making racially charged comments.The Commission had previously warned Moore in 2019 about posting information on social media regarding cases he heard in court. In 2020, Moore and the Commission entered into an MOU, where Moore agreed to limit his social media posts to court-related information and not use his judicial title for personal or political purposes. Despite this agreement, Moore continued to post under the name "Judge Carlos Moore" and made public comments that the Commission deemed inappropriate.The Commission filed a Formal Complaint against Moore in July 2022, alleging violations of the Mississippi Constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct. Moore did not respond to the complaint or participate in the Commission's proceedings. The Commission recommended Moore's removal from office, a six-year suspension, and a $5,000 fine.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found that Moore's actions constituted willful misconduct and were prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Court held that Moore's comments on social media and television violated the judicial-conduct canons and the MOU. The Court ordered Moore's removal from the bench, a $3,000 fine, and assessed all costs. The Court emphasized that Moore's actions undermined public confidence in the judiciary and warranted a harsh sanction. View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Moore" on Justia Law