Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The district court held that NSC, a small nonprofit corporation registered in Virginia, is ineligible for attorney's fees under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 5524(a)(4)(E)(i). In keeping with Kay v. Ehrler, Baker & Hostetler LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, and the decisions of its sister circuits, the court held that a corporation with a legal identity distinct from the attorney who represents it in litigation is eligible to recover attorney’s fees under FOIA. Because NSC is such a corporation, it is not barred by the pro se litigant exception. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "National Security Counselors v. CIA" on Justia Law

Blume Construction, Inc. appealed a district court judgment affirming a Job Service North Dakota decision, finding Blume did not file a valid appeal and the agency's determination assigning Blume a final penalty tax rate. Blume received a notice of determination from Job Service informing Blume that it would be assigned a penalty tax rate for unemployment insurance. The notice stated the agency conducted an audit and concluded there was a transfer of ownership and payroll between Blume and another company that was knowingly done to obtain a lower tax rate for unemployment insurance. The notice informed Blume it would be assigned the highest tax rate assignable for the next three years. The notice advised Blume the determination would become final unless a written appeal was made to Job Service within fifteen days. Job Service received an electronic appeal request for Blume signed by Craig Fidler. Fidler was identified as a licensed attorney from Colorado. Fidler was not licensed to practice law in North Dakota. In approximately May 2014, Fidler notified the referee he was unable to secure a sponsoring attorney licensed in North Dakota. During that same time period, the referee was informed a North Dakota attorney would be representing Blume. Blume argued the referee erred in finding Blume's attorney engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and the appealed request the attorney filed was void. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Blume Construction, Inc. v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Several Albuquerque residents sued Mayor Richard Berry in his official capacity as Mayor of Albuquerque in state court over the City’s redistricting plan enacted after the 2010 census. This case arose out of an award of attorneys’ fees imposed as a sanction on attorneys who brought a voting-rights lawsuit on the residents' behalf against the Mayor. After dismissing the case, the district court found the attorneys unreasonably multiplied proceedings in what it called a meritless case and sanctioned them under 28 U.S.C. 1927. They argued the award was an abuse of discretion. The Mayor cross-appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion by declining to award fees under several other provisions the Mayor raised as grounds for sanctions. The Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that most of the attorneys’ arguments lacked merit. However, the Court vacated the award of fees and remanded for the trial court to consider whether a different trigger for the imposition of sanctions was appropriate. View "Baca v. Berry" on Justia Law

Jan Goldsmith was the San Diego City Attorney. League of California Cities was an association of 473 California cities and their public officials, which, among other purposes, advocates to protect and restore local control for cities to provide for the public health, safety, and welfare of their residents. Real Party in Interest, San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG), submitted a request under the Public Records Act to the City of San Diego (the City) seeking "[a]ny and all e-mails sent to or from [Jan Goldsmith's personal e-mail account] . . . that pertain in any way to the official business of the City of San Diego." Among other records, the City asserted an exemption to the disclosure of e-mails between a purported legal assistant for the League and attorney members of the League on the grounds they were not public records because they did not concern city business, or were otherwise privileged. SDOG filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City and Goldsmith to compel disclosure of the e-mails. In a minute order, the trial court directed the City to provide SDOG with a privilege log identifying the documents not produced, along with the legal objection for not producing the documents. After considering the parties' briefing, the trial court declined to perform an in camera review of certain challenged e-mails. The court found the City failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the e-mails were privileged or exempt under the Act, and ordered the City to produce the e-mails by a certain date. The League filed the instant petition for a peremptory writ of mandate or prohibition in the first instance, or an alternative writ or order to show cause seeking to vacate that part of the court's order requiring disclosure of the e-mails. The Court of Appeal concluded the term "a party," as used in the Act, was not limited to an actual party to the action. Accordingly, the nonparty here had standing to file the instant petition challenging the trial court's order. The Court further concluded the trial court erred by not conducting an in camera review of the documents as requested by the party asserting the documents were exempt from disclosure. Accordingly, we grant the petition and remand the matter for further proceedings. View "League of Cal. Cities v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Individuals requested documents under the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, 6250) from Newark Unified School District. The District inadvertently included 100 documents that, the District contends, are subject to attorney-client or attorney work product privileges. Within hours of the release, the District sent e-mails asking for return of the documents. The recipients cited section 6254.5, contending that inadvertent release had waived the privileges. Under that statute, the disclosure of a document to the public waives any claim by an agency that the document is exempt from release. The District filed suit, seeking return or destruction of the documents. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order preventing dissemination, but ultimately agreed that section 6254.5 effected a waiver of confidentiality. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the legislative history demonstrates the intent to prevent public agencies from disclosing documents to some members of the public while asserting confidentiality as to others. Waiver as a result of an inadvertent release, while not necessarily inconsistent with that intent, was not within its contemplation. To harmonize section 6254.5 with Evidence Code 912, which has been construed not to effect a waiver of the privileges from an inadvertent disclosure, the court construed section 6254.5 not to apply to inadvertent release. View "Newark Unifed Sch. Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Law Firm of Marc Grossman represented a student of defendant Victor Elementary School in a civil action arising from an assault that took place at the school. Plaintiff, in the name of the law firm, filed a petition for writ of mandate in the trial court under the Public Records Act seeking documentation reflecting the amount of money spent defending the litigation. That petition was denied, so relief was sought from the Court of Appeal, which granted the petition. Upon issuance of the remittitur, plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Costs seeking, among other costs, attorneys’ fees for the petition. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to tax costs, denying attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff appealed the denial of attorneys’ fees. On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in denying fees on the ground plaintiff represented itself in the trial court. Agreeing with plaintiff, the Court of Appeal reversed. View "Law Offices of Marc Grossman v. Victor Elementary School Dist." on Justia Law

"This is a case of egregious attorney misconduct." Because of the cumulative effect of the attorney's misconduct, the Court of Appeal felt compelled to reverse the judgment she obtained on behalf of her client, Caltrans. "While Judge Di Cesare showed the patience of Job – usually a virtue in a judge – that patience here had the effect of favoring one side over the other. He allowed [the attorney] to emphasize irrelevant and inflammatory points concerning the plaintiff's character so often that he effectively gave CalTrans an unfair advantage." View "Martinez v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, targets “independent debt collectors,” but excludes in-house collectors, including “any officer or employee of . . . any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties.” In Ohio, consumer debts that remain uncollected by a state entity are “certified” to the Attorney General (OAG), which enlists “special counsel” as independent contractors for collections. Actions taken by special counsel are dictated by an agreement, which requires special counsel to comply with FDCPA standards. All collections must be endorsed to the OAG before special counsel is entitled to a fee. Special counsel were orally directed to use OAG letterhead for all collections (including consumer debts, although contrary to Ohio’s code). Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violation of the FDCPA by use of OAG letterhead. The district court entered summary judgment, holding that special counsel are not “debt collectors” under the FDCPA, and that, even if they were, use of OAG letterhead was not a “false, deceptive or misleading” communication. The Sixth Circuit vacated. A jury could reasonably find that the use of the OAG letterhead by the “special counsel,” in the manner and under the circumstances present here, resulted in letters that were actually confusing to the least sophisticated consumer. View "Gillie v. Law Office of Eric A. Jones, LLC" on Justia Law

This matter comes before the court on the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana that Judge Sheva M. Sims of the Shreveport City Court, Caddo Parish, be suspended without pay for 90 days and ordered to reimburse the Commission's costs. The charge arose from an incident that occurred between Judge Sims and an assistant city prosecutor, Katherine Gilmer, on April 24, 2012, wherein Judge Sims stated that Ms. Gilmer was “held in contempt” of court and then ordered the dismissal of fifteen criminal cases on the docket that day. After reviewing the record and applicable law, the Supreme Court found that the charge against Judge Sims was supported by clear and convincing evidence. However, the Court rejected the recommended discipline and instead ordered Judge Sims be suspended without pay for a period of 30 days. Furthermore, the Court ordered Judge Sims to reimburse the Commission’s costs incurred relative to its investigation and prosecution of this case. View "In re: Judge Sheva M. Sims, Shreveport City Court, Caddo Parish" on Justia Law

After the FAA suspended petitioner's license as an airplane mechanic, the NTSB vacated the suspension and found that the FAA's position had been unreasonable and not substantially justified. Petitioner filed suit seeking recovery of legal fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1). The NTSB denied fee-shifting under the Act because it concluded that petitioner had not "incurred" the fees associated with his legal defense in the license suspension proceedings. The court held that the NTSB's conclusion was arbitrary and capricious where the NTSB should have considered that under the Alabama law of quantum meruit, petitioner was obligated to pay his attorneys for the value of their services. Therefore, petitioner "incurred" fees and may obtain EAJA fee-shifting. The court granted the petition, vacated the decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Roberts v. NTSB" on Justia Law