Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

On May 15, 2012, Karl Lewies won the primary election for the position of Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney. Because he had no opponent in the November general election, he knew he would be elected as the prosecuting attorney. He was scheduled to be sworn into office on January 14, 2013. On November 23, 2012, he filed two petitions for review against the county commissioners of Fremont County. One petition for review was on behalf of Flying “A” Ranch, Inc., and the other petition was on behalf of E. C. Gwaltney, III. The petitions sought to overturn the designation by the county commissioners of certain roads as being public roads rather than private roads. On January 7, 2013, the county commissioners, represented by Blake Hall, the deputy prosecutor hired by the prosecutor that Lewies had defeated in the primary, filed motions in both cases seeking to have Lewies disqualified from representing the petitioners in those cases. On the same day, Lewies filed motions in both cases to withdraw as counsel for the petitioners. In his supporting affidavit, Lewies stated that he would be sworn in as prosecuting attorney on January 14, 2013, at which time he would have a conflict of interest in continuing to represent the petitioners. In each of the cases, Lewies had named two of the commissioners in both their official and individual capacities. The commissioners filed motions in both cases to dismiss the actions against them. The court made preliminary rulings that Lewies could not represent any parties in the two cases; that the county would be awarded attorney fees against him personally for having to file the motion to disqualify; that an action against the two commissioners in their individual capacities could not be joined with a petition for judicial review; and that attorney fees would not be awarded against Lewies for having named them in their individual capacities. At another hearing, the issue of attorney fees against Lewies was discussed. After the parties argued that issue, the court entered a final decision in both cases awarding the county attorney fees against Lewies personally pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1). Lewies timely appealed. Because there was no legal basis for the award, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Flying "A" Ranch v. Bd. of Cty. Comm. of Fremont" on Justia Law

Appellant-attorney was criminally prosecuted along with Judge Doe on violations of the campaign finance law. The criminal proceeding was eventually terminated, and the records were sealed. The State Commission on Judicial Conduct subsequently began an investigation into possible judicial misconduct by Judge Doe in the underlying criminal proceeding. Supreme Court granted the Commission’s motion to release the sealed records from the underlying criminal proceeding for use in the investigation. Appellant filed an application to vacate the release order, which Supreme Court denied. Appellant appealed. Meanwhile, the Commission censured Judge Doe for misconduct arising from her judicial election campaign. The Appellate Division dismissed Appellant’s appeal as moot and ordered that the records be resealed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the order dismissing the appeal as moot and upheld the Commission’s authority to request and receive Appellant’s sealed records, holding that the Commission is authorized to request and receive records sealed under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 160.50 for its use in investigations. View "State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct v. Rubenstein" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in his underlying criminal case because his lawyers induced him to reject a plea bargain for a much lower sentence "by misrepresenting the potential maximum sentencing exposure petitioner was facing at trial." The superior court appointed a lawyer from the Prisoners’ Rights Office of the Defender General to represent petitioner in that court. The appointed public defender accepted representation and proceeded to represent petitioner throughout the trial court proceeding. The State moved to dismiss the petition under 13 V.S.A. 7134 because it was "a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner." The public defender answered that the case did not fit within the statute because the theory on which this petition was based had not been raised in earlier PCR petitions because it was not available at the time of the earlier petitions. The superior court granted summary judgment for the State. Shortly thereafter, the public defender filed a notice of appeal on petitioner’s behalf. In a letter to petitioner, the public defender said she initially thought there were no grounds for appeal, but then said "I changed my opinion and filed a notice of appeal for you." She added, however, that since filing the notice of appeal she discovered the Defender General’s office had a conflict of interest so the case had been assigned to conflict counsel. The first assigned conflict counsel withdrew because her firm had done a merits review for the Defender General on petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in connection with a prior PCR action. Counsel concluded that the firm’s prior negative merits review created a conflict of interest. The case was then assigned to attorney Michael Rose. Attorney Rose filed a motion for leave to withdraw, citing Vermont Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 and case law. Because it became clear during the argument on that motion that the Defender General had not gone through the procedure it typically goes through before seeking leave to withdraw on the basis cited by Attorney Rose, the Supreme Court invited the Defender General to present its position on the motion. Upon further review, the Supreme Court granted Attorney Rose’s motion for leave to withdraw, and it did not appoint new publicly funded counsel. View "In re Bruyette." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order denying his motion for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412. The court concluded that the underlying agency action lacked a reasonable basis in law because the Social Security ALJ disregarded competent lay witness evidence on plaintiff's symptoms without comment. The court concluded that, because the ALJ disregarded competent lay witness evidence without comment, the position of the United States in the underlying action was not substantially justified. Because the government's underlying position was not substantially justified, the court awarded fees, even if the government's litigation position may have been justified. Therefore, plaintiff was entitled to an award of attorney's fees. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Tobeler v. Colvin" on Justia Law

This case involves the payment of attorney's fees and expenses to attorneys, Appellant Tara Dawn Shurling and co-counsel, who were court-appointed to represent an indigent charged with multiple criminal offenses. Shurling was appointed to represent an indigent defendant in a criminal prosecution for murder, assault with intent to kill, criminal conspiracy, possession of a weapon during a violent crime, and possession of marijuana. Shurling sought approval for her fees and expenses to exceed the statutory caps provided by the South Carolina Indigent Defense Act. The trial court determined that the initial funding order precluded an award for the fees and expenses sought by appointed counsel, which total $46,388.66. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Hackshaw" on Justia Law

Richard L. Hagar, judge of the district court for the North Central Judicial District, filed exceptions to the Judicial Conduct Commission's recommended findings that he violated provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct by failing to diligently and promptly decide judicial matters assigned to him. He also objected to the Commission's recommended sanctions. The Supreme Court adopted the Commission's findings of fact and ordered that Judge Hagar be suspended from his position as district judge for one month without pay commencing April 1, 2014. Moreover, the Court assessed $3,710.49 for the costs and attorney fees necessary for the prosecution of these proceedings. View "Judicial Conduct Commission v. Hagar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the first African-American circuit court judge elected in Phillips County, Arkansas, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the commission and officials during the disciplinary proceedings against him. The district court denied plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order and stayed proceedings in accordance with the Younger abstention doctrine. The state disciplinary proceedings ended with a decision by the Arkansas Supreme Court. The district court then granted the commission and officials' Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, finding no justifiable federal controversy. The court concluded that Defendant Stewart, Executive Director of the commission, was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity as to plaintiff's claims for damages on the first cause of action; plaintiff had no justiciable claim for damages against any defendant in the second cause of action where plaintiff's allegations amounted to nothing more than a state law defamation claim and the district court did not abuse its discretion; and plaintiff's requests for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Simes, II v. Arkansas Judicial D. & D. Comm, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of this qui tam action and disqualifying plaintiff, its individual members - including a former general counsel to defendant - and its outside counsel from bringing a subsequent qui tam action on the basis that the suit was brought in violation of the general counsel's ethical obligations under the New York Rules of Professional Conduct. The court concluded that the attorney, through his conduct in this qui tam action, did violate N.Y. Rule 1.9(c) which prohibited lawyers from using confidential information of a former client protected by Rule 1.6 to the disadvantage of the former client. The court held that the district court did not err by dismissing the complaint as to all defendants, and disqualifying plaintiff, its individual relators, and its outside counsel on the basis that such measures were necessary to avoid prejudicing defendants in any subsequent litigation on these facts. View "Fair Labor Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc." on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Municipal Court Judge Robert Fowlkes following a verbal altercation he had with a probation officer outside the courtroom. The Commission and Judge Fowlkes filed a joint motion asking the Court to approve agreed-upon sanctions of a public reprimand and costs of $200. The Supreme Court agreed that Judge Fowlkes should be publicly reprimanded and assessed $200 for the costs of proceedings, and the Court found he also should be fined $1,000. View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Fowlkes" on Justia Law

Hinds County Youth Court Judge William Skinner, II took action in a case in which he was recused and abused the contempt power. Judge Skinner and the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance submitted a Joint Motion for Approval of Recommendations, recommending that Judge Skinner be publicly reprimanded, fined $1,000, and assessed $100 in costs. The Supreme Court found that the more appropriate sanction was a thirty-day suspension without pay, a public reprimand, a $1,000 fine, and $100 in costs. Furthermore, the Court modified "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Gibson," (883 So. 2d 1155 (Miss. 2004)) and its progeny to the extent that they mandated the Court examine moral turpitude as a factor in determining sanctions. Instead, the Court and the Commission should examine the extent to which the conduct was willful and exploited the judge's position to satisfy his or her personal desires. View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Skinner, II" on Justia Law