Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Petitioner Peter Vizzi, M.D. filed an open account against the Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government (LCG) for expenses incurred following his treatment of Quinton Contrell Sam. Sam allegedly committed armed robbery in early 2008. He fled the scene of the crime on foot and forced his way into a private residence. When police arrived on the scene, they arrested Sam. Sam was taken by ambulance to Lafayette General Medical center where he was treated for a gunshot wound. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to interpret the meaning of La. R.S. 15:304 to determine whether Dr. Vizzi was legally entitled to recover the expenses he incurred for treatment of Sam. After review of the record, the Court concluded the lower courts erred by holding that LCG was liable for the expenses: LCG argued that the expenses were not caused by the arrest, but were merely the result of an injury prior to the arrest, and therefore, La. R.S. 15:304 was inapplicable. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the lower courts' holdings.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether court of appeal erred in affirming the trial court's ruling granting summary judgment. That judgment confirmed and quieted title to a tax purchaser on the basis that the former property owner failed to file a separate action or reconventional demand to institute a proceeding to annul the tax sale within six months from the date of service of the petition and citation to quiet title. Upon review, the Court concluded the former property owner's claim that the tax sale was null and void was timely made and the former property owner had sufficiently established that there remain genuine issues of material fact as to whether the sheriff provided notice of the tax delinquencies and the tax sale to the record property owner as required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (failure of which would have rendered the tax sales entirely null and void). Accordingly, the Court found summary judgment to quiet tax titles in favor of the tax purchaser was not warranted in this case.

"This matter has a complicated and convoluted procedural history, which has ultimately resulted in a 'cobweb of litigation.'" This case has its genesis in 1994 when ANR Pipeline Company (ANR) first challenged the ad valorem taxes assessed against its public service pipelines by filing a protest with the Louisiana Tax Commission (LTC). Thereafter, through 2003, ANR filed annual protests with the LTC. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company (TGP) and Southern Natural Gas Company (SNG) also filed protests with the LTC regarding the ad valorem taxes assessed against their public service pipelines from 2000 to 2003.The issues before the Supreme Court concerned whether the reassessment of public service properties issued on remand of this matter in accordance with a court order constituted a local assessment by the local assessors or a central assessment by the Louisiana Tax Commission (LTC) and whether, in this taxpayers’ action, the assessors have a right to challenge a decision of the LTC relative to those reassessment valuations. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the reassessments were central assessments governed by the provisions of La. Const. art. VII, sec. 18 and La. R.S. 47:1851, et seq. Furthermore, the Court found that once joined by the taxpayers as defendants in the taxpayers’ Section 1856 action for judicial review, the assessors are entitled to challenge the LTC’s final determination of the reassessment valuations. Accordingly, the Court found the lower courts erred in sustaining the taxpayers’ exceptions of no right of action and dismissing the assessors’ cross-appeals.

The Workers' Compensation hearing officer terminated Petitioner Gloria Clay's benefits, finding her employer had sufficiently proved the availability of jobs such that Petitioner was capable of earning at least ninety percent of her pre-injury wages. The court of appeal reversed, finding the jobs identified by the vocational rehabilitation counselor were not available to Petitioner. Finding no manifest error in the hearing officer's decision, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the hearing officer's ruling terminating Petitioner's benefits.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a "statement made or action taken" language in La. R.S. 17:439(A) precludes a cause of action against school employees for negligent acts of omission and to ascertain whether an action may be filed pursuant to La. R.S. 17:439(D) directly against a school employee for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle to the extent his or her liability is covered by insurance or self-insurance. Nakisha Credit, mother of Adrianne Breana Howard (Breana), sued on behalf of Breana's half-siblings and herself stemming from a fight Breana had on school grounds. Breana was involved in "an ongoing feud" with Courtney McClain. Breana was dropped off in the rear of Rayville High School after school had been dismissed for the day at Richland Career Center and began to walk home. Plaintiffs contend LeBaron Sledge instigated a fight between Breana and Courtney whereby the two girls began fighting on the sidewalk in the rear of the school. During the altercation, Breana was either pushed by Courtney or fell off the sidewalk, and was struck by an oncoming Richland Parish school bus. Breana died as a result of her injuries. Among other allegations, Plaintiffs' petition alleged Defendants the School District, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, the school board's insurer, the school superintendent and the bus driver were negligent in a variety of ways by failing to supervise the children, failing to timely respond to the fight, and failing to adequately staff the bus area with teachers or school employees. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision to hold that La. R.S. 17:439(A) precludes a cause of action against school employees for certain negligent acts, including acts of commission and acts of omission. The Court otherwise affirmed the court of appeal's ruling that La. R.S. 17:439(D) permits an action directly against a school bus driver for the negligent operation of a school bus to the extent the driver’s liability is covered by insurance or self-insurance.

The Supreme Court granted consolidated writ applications to address the majority opinion of the court of appeal which held the medical malpractice cap enunciated in La.R.S. 40:1299.42(B) was unconstitutional "to the extent it includes nurse practitioners within its ambit.” The Court reiterated its holding in "Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hospital of Dillard University," (508 U.S. 909 (1993)), which found the cap constitutional. Finding the cap to be applicable to all qualified healthcare providers under the Medical Malpractice Act, including nurse practitioners, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal in this respect. Additionally, the Court addressed two other assignments of error asserted by the Louisiana Patients' Compensation Fund and affirmed those portions of the court of appeal judgment. The effect of the Court's holding was to reinstate the trial court judgment in full.

This case came before the Supreme Court on recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana, which recommended Justice of the Peace Herbert Williams (Parish of Plaquemines) be publicly censured and ordered to reimburse costs incurred in the Commission's investigation and prosecution of this case for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. In his capacity as an ex officio notary public, JP Williams notarized a document "purporting to transfer" ownership of a parcel of land to his son and daughter-in-law. The donation was not recorded right away. Upon discovering the "purported donation" in 2009, the purported Donor filed a complaint in Louisiana federal district court to clear title to the property at issue. In light of an article that appeared in the local newspaper concerning the complaint, the Commission opened an investigation, and alleged JP Williams engaged in judicial misconduct by notarizing the donation of land to his relatives, which was beyond his limited ex officio notarial powers, and without witnessing the Donor's signature. After a thorough review of the facts and law in this matter, the Supreme Court agreed with the Commission's disciplinary recommendation.

Plaintiffs Dr. Kaleem and Nadeem Arshad initially requested a jury trial in their petition for damages. Shortly before trial, they filed a motion to strike the jury. In response, Defendant City of Kenner enacted a resolution waiving the prohibition against jury trials in this specific case and filed a request for a jury trial. The District Court granted the City's request, finding La. Rev. Stat. 13:5105(D) permitted a political subdivision to waive the prohibition against jury trials on a case-by-case basis. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the City's resolution was a prohibited special law because it waived the prohibition against jury trials only in this single case. The Supreme Court granted writs to address the correctness vel non of the appellate court's decision. The Court concluded that the plain language of La. Rev. Stat. 13:5105(D) did not permit a political subdivision to waive the prohibition against jury trials in a single case. The Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment.

McLane Southern, Inc. is a Mississippi wholesaler of tobacco products that sells smokeless tobacco to retail establishments in Louisiana. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the company was liable for excise taxes pursuant to the state Tobacco Tax Law. Finding that the law imposes an excise tax on smokeless tobacco products be paid by the dealer who first sells, uses, consumes, handles or distributes the product in Louisiana, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Village of Moreauville breached its duty to keep its sidewalk in reasonably safe condition. Specifically, the issue was reduced to whether a one-and-one-quarter to one-and-one-half inch deviation created an unreasonable risk of harm. Plaintiff Arlene Chambers tripped on the ledge created by that deviation and fell, fracturing her arm. The trial court ruled in Plaintiff's favor, finding the Village one hundred percent at fault. After a review of the record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court found the Village's failure to repair the deviation did not amount to a breach of its duty to keep its sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition. The Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and rendered judgment in favor of Defendant.