Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs owned property near but not on Sebago Lake. Defendants owned shorefront property on the lake. Through their deeds, Plaintiffs acquired an easement consisting of a right-of-way over lot 40A, a strip of land situated between Defendants' lots. In 2007, the lot was conveyed to Defendants. Before the conveyance, Plaintiffs obtained a permit for the construction of a dock extending from the lot to the lake. In 2010, the Town's code enforcement officer rescinded the permit and ordered the dock to be removed. The Town's zoning board upheld the enforcement officer's decision. Plaintiffs filed suit, challenging the zoning board's decision and Defendants' fee simple title to the lot and seeking a declaratory judgment that they were entitled to maintain a dock on the lot. Ultimately, the superior court found Defendants held fee simple title to the lot and that the easement held by Plaintiffs did not grant them a right to maintain the dock. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the deed in Defendants' chains of title unambiguously excepted the lot from a prior conveyance and that deeds in Plaintiffs' chains of title were ambiguous as to whether the dock was allowed. Remanded. View "Sleeper v. Loring" on Justia Law

The district court ordered Defendant to pay a civil penalty and attorney fees and to remove three unregistered, uninspected vehicles from his property after finding that he maintained an automobile graveyard on his property in violation of Me. Rev. Stat. 30-A, 3753. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not misconstrue the applicable law in determining that the vehicles on Defendant's property did not meet the definition of "antique auto"; (2) did not clearly err in finding that one of the vehicles on Defendant's property was not a tractor used solely for logging purposes; (3) did not err by accepting Defendant's interrogatory answers into evidence and finding that his truck was an "altered vehicle"; and (4) did not abuse its discretion in declining to award additional attorney fees to the Town of China. View "Town of China v. Althenn" on Justia Law

Berwick Iron & Metal Recycling, Inc. operated a metal and automobile recycling business under an existing conditional use permit. In 2010, Berwick Iron applied for a conditional use permit to install and operate a metal shredder. On remand, the Berwick Planning Board voted to approve the conditional use permit. The superior court vacated the Board's judgment, concluding that the Board erred in applying the ordinance governing air emissions. Both parties appealed. On cross-appeal, the abutters argued, among other things, that the superior court erred in concluding that the Board did not violate the abutters' due process rights by communicating ex parte with representatives from Berwick Iron. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment and remanded for entry of a judgment affirming the Board's decision, holding that, despite the Board's ex parte communications with Berwick Iron, the Board did not violate the abutters' due process rights or err in applying its ordinance. View "Duffy v. Town of Berwick" on Justia Law

The Superintendent of Insurance ordered Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Company (GTL) to pay a civil penalty of $150,000 after finding that GTL violated Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 24-A, 1420-M(1), 1902, and 2412(1-A)(B), and that GTL was accountable, pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 24-A, 1445(1)(D) for violations committed by Cinergy Health, Inc., a company that acted as GTL's producer. The business and consumer docket affirmed the decision of the Superintendent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) GTL was accountable pursuant to section 1445(1)(D) for Cinergy's misconduct occurring before the date on which GTL formally appointed Cinergy as its producer; (2) the Superintendent did not err in concluding that GTL provided coverage to Maine residents and was liable under section 2412(1-A)(B); (3) the Superintendent's did not issue an untimely decision pursuant to the plain language of Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 24-A, 235(2); (4) the Superintendent did not abuse her discretion by holding GTL liable under section 1420-M(1); and (5) the Superintendent did not abuse her discretion by penalizing GTL for violating section 1902. View "Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Superintendent of Ins." on Justia Law

A.H. was born in 2010 with extreme medical needs. A.H. required hospitalization three times when she was in the care of her parents. Eventually, the Department of Health and Human Services placed the child in a foster home. After being placed in a foster home, A.H. began receiving adequate nutrition and became healthier. Because A.H.'s parents demonstrated that they had limited intellectual capacity and failed to progress in rehabilitation, the Department petitioned for the termination of each parent's parental rights. After a hearing, the district court terminated both parents' parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding (1) the parents were not able to protect A.H. from jeopardy; (2) the parents were unable to take responsibility for A.H. within a time reasonably calculated to meet her needs; and (3) the termination of parental rights and adoption by the foster parents was in A.H.'s best interest. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

Since 2001, Callaghan has worked part-time at the South Portland Library. Edwards works for the Parks and Recreation Department about four hours per week. Both are subject to a personnel policy, which, following 2010-2011 amendments, provides that city employees may not seek or accept nomination or election to any South Portland elective office; use the influence of their employment for or against any candidate for city elective office; circulate petitions or campaign literature for any city elective office; solicit or receive subscriptions, contributions or political service from any person for or against any candidate for any city elective office; or use city property to assist or advocate for or against any candidate. Callaghan has served on the School Board since 2007. When Callaghan sought reelection in 2011, the City Clerk stated that the personnel policy amendments prevented placement of her name on the ballot. Edwards had served on the Board for 18 years. In 2010, Edwards expressed interest in filling a vacancy on the Board. After the City Clerk questioned whether Edwards could be appointed given his city employment, Edwards did not pursue the appointment. Edwards and Callaghan filed a complaint, 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that the policy was an unconstitutional restraint on political speech. The trial court entered partial summary judgment for the employees and an injunction barring enforcement of a prohibition on any city employee seeking election to or serving on the School Board or, on their own time, from circulating petitions or campaign literature and soliciting or receiving contributions or political service for or against candidates in School Board elections. The Maine Supreme Court affirmed as to the employees, but vacated the judgment to the extent that it invalidates the policy as to employees who were not parties. View "Callaghan v. City of South Portland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a general construction company. In 2010, the Maine Department of Labor Bureau of Unemployment Compensation conducted a random audit of Plaintiff's business to verify that twenty-four individuals that worked for Plaintiff were independent contractors. The Bureau determined the individuals were employees of Plaintiff and thus assessed Plaintiff unpaid unemployment tax liability for each of these individuals. The Unemployment Insurance Commission affirmed the Bureau's determination as to twenty-two of the individuals - salespeople, a bookkeeper, and skilled workers employed as subcontractors. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the Commission's decision as to the bookkeeper and the salespeople; but (2) vacated the Commission's judgment with regard to eighteen of the subcontractors, holding that Plaintiff met its burden of demonstrating that the subcontractors met all three criteria listed in 26 Me. Rev. Stat. 1043(11)(E)(1) to (3). Remanded. View "Sinclair Builders, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The City Council authorized the City Manager to sell a parcel of oceanfront property known as "the Boat School." Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the sale agreement was invalid due to the City's failure to advertise in accordance with its charter, and moved for a temporary restraining order to prevent the sale of the property. Defendants counterclaimed against Plaintiffs for slander of title and tortious interference with a contract. Plaintiffs filed a special motion to dismiss the counterclaims of Defendants pursuant to Maine's anti-SLAPP statute because Defendants' counterclaims were based on Plaintiffs' petitioning activity. The district court (1) declined to address the merits of Plaintiffs' special motion to dismiss because it was filed after the sixty-day period provided by the statute; (2) granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' complaint; (3) granted in part and denied in part summary judgment for Plaintiffs on Defendants' counterclaims. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Plaintiffs' special motion to dismiss, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider the merits of Plaintiffs' untimely special motion. View "Bradbury v. City of Eastport" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the administratrix of a Massachusetts estate appointed by a Massachusetts court. Part of the estate was a parcel of real property located in Maine that was later sold. The estate and the IRS agreed to value the back parcel at $950,000. Plaintiff later filed an amended Maine estate tax return, but insufficient funds remained in the estate to pay the Maine assessment. Plaintiff received a notice of assessment for Maine estate tax informing her that, as the estate's personal representative, she was personally liable for the money owed by the estate. Upon Plaintiff's request for reconsideration, the Assessor upheld an adjusted assessment of $98,180. The superior court vacated the Assessor's decision, concluding that the Assessor lacked jurisdiction to impose personal liability for unpaid estate taxes on a personal representative appointed by an out-of-state court to administer a foreign estate. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment and remanded for entry of judgment against Plaintiff, holding that Maine tax law provides the Assessor with the authority to hold a personal representative appointed by an out-of-state court personally liable for unpaid Maine estate taxes resulting from the sale of real property located in Maine. View "Metcalf v. State Tax Assessor" on Justia Law

Paul Dyer held licenses as an insurance producer and consultant. Because of Dyer's alleged misconduct, the Bureau of Insurance filed a petition for enforcement against Dyer alleging that Dyer violated the Maine Insurance Code and seeking the revocation of his licenses and requesting civil penalties and restitution. After a hearing, the Superintendent of Insurance concluded that Dyer violated the identified provisions of the Insurance Code, revoked Dyer's licenses, and ordered him to pay civil penalties and restitution. Dyer appealed the judgment entered in the business and consumer docket affirming the Superintendent's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Superintendent did not err in interpreting the Insurance Code or in making factual findings and did not abuse his discretion by imposing penalties permitted in the statute. View "Dyer v. Superintendent of Ins." on Justia Law