Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Eagle Rental was a licensed used car dealer. Daniel Bickford and his wife were the company's vice president and treasurer. In 2003, Eagle Rental began purchasing Cadillac Escalades and trading them in to dealers for newer models. The Bickfords were unable to sell their Escalade inventory for several years and drove the Escalades on personal business. The tax assessor assessed use taxes on four of those Escalades. The business and consumer docket affirmed the assessment. Eagle Rental appealed, arguing it did not owe use tax because the Bickfords operated the Escalades with dealer plates for their personal use in accordance with Maine's dealer plate statute. Read together, the dealer plate and taxation statutes provide that dealers and their immediate families may use dealer plates on vehicles in a dealer's inventory for their personal use without being subject to use tax until the vehicles to which the plates are attached are withdrawn from inventory. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Eagle Rental did not meet its burden of proving that the Escalades were not withdrawn from inventory, and accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded they were subject to use tax. View "Eagle Rental, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor" on Justia Law

Employee suffered an injury to his left hand while working for Employer. Later, Employee's left index finger had to be amputated. Employee subsequently filed a petition for specific loss benefits. The parties agreed Employee was entitled to specific loss benefits because of the amputation for a period of thirty-eight weeks. At issue was whether Employer was entitled to an offset for the incapacity benefits it paid before the amputation. The Workers' Compensation Board granted the petition for specific loss benefits and determined that Employer was allowed to offset the incapacity benefits paid before the amputation. The Supreme Court vacated the Board's decision, holding that Employer was not entitled to offset the incapacity benefits paid during the months after Employee's initial injury but before the amputation of his finger. View "Scott v. Fraser Papers, Inc. " on Justia Law

In 2007, Petitioner pleaded guilty to ten counts of burglary. Because of a pending federal sentence, Petitioner was classified as a medium security inmate by the Department of Corrections (DOC). In 2011, Petitioner filed a grievance with the DOC contending that he should have been receiving two days of good time per month pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A, 1253(10)(B), which gives the chief administrative officer of a prison the discretion to deduct up to two days per month from an inmate's sentence for satisfactory performance in "community work, education or rehabilitation programs." The DOC denied relief. The superior court denied Petitioner's petitions seeking post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the DOC properly construed section 1253(10)(B); and (2) the DOC's policy implementing section 1253(10)(B) was validly adopted in accordance with the Maine Administrative Procedure Act. View "Roderick v. State" on Justia Law

Decedent, an employee of the Salvation Army, died at his home, part of which served as his office. Decedent's spouse filed a petition for death benefits with the Workers' Compensation Board (Board), which issued an award in favor of the Estate. The Salvation Army filed notices of appeal with the Supreme Court and with the Workers' Compensation Board Appellate Division. At issue before the Court was whether the appeal was properly before the Appellate Division or the Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the Salvation Army's petition, holding (1) for all workers' compensation cases without final decision before September 1, 2012, the initial review must go to the Appellate Division; and (2) because the Board declined review on or after September 1, 2012, the appeal from the hearing officer's final decision was not properly before the Supreme Court. View "Estate of Sullwold v. Salvation Army" on Justia Law

The Scarborough Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) granted a setback variance to property owners in the Higgins Beach neighborhood of Scarborough. The property abutted land owned by Summerwind Cottage, LLC. Peter and Libby Cassat owned the land directly across the street. The superior court affirmed the decision of the ZBA. Summerwind Cottage and the Cassats appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in relying on the Official Shoreland Zoning Map to conclude that the property was in the buildable Shoreland Overlay District and in concluding that the property met the requirements for a variance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Summerwind's arguments failed to establish that the ZBA erred in relying on the Official Shoreland Zoning Map in determining that the property was in the buildable Shoreland Overlay District; and (2) there was substantial evidence in the record to support the ZBA's decision to grant the ordinance. View "Summerwind Cottage, LLC v. Town of Scarborough" on Justia Law

The Town of Madawaska foreclosed on Jeffrey and Jeanne Stoops' property after the Stoops failed to pay municipal taxes. The Town then conveyed the property to Richard and Betty Nelson by municipal quitclaim deed. The Stoopses subsequently filed a complaint against Richard Nelson seeking to quiet title to the property and asking the court to declare the respective rights of the parties to the property. The superior court granted the Nelsons' motion for summary judgment. The Stoopses appealed, arguing (1) the Town failed to give the Stoopses proper notice of the pending foreclosure in violation of their due process rights, and (2) the Town failed to adhere strictly to the requirements of the statutorily outlined steps a municipality must take to foreclose on a municipal tax lien. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Town complied with the requirements of the statutory scheme and gave the Stoopses sufficient notice, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the Nelsons. View "Stoops v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The Department of Environmental Protection approved an application of Saddleback Ridge Wind, LLC for a permit to construct the Saddleback Ridge Wind Project, a wind energy development. The Board of Environmental Protection affirmed. Friends of Maine's Mountains, Friends of Saddleback Mountain, and several individuals appealed, arguing, among other things, that the Board abused its discretion when determining which nighttime sound level limit to apply to the applications. The Supreme Court vacated the Board's order related to nighttime sound requirements and remanded, holding that the Board failed to meet its statutory obligation to protect the health and welfare of the Project's neighbors and thus abused its discretion in approving Saddleback's permit applications. View "Friends of Maine's Mountains. v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Michael Nadeau, an employee with the Bureau of Insurance, married a manager of a Bureau-regulated entity. The Bureau subsequently discharged Nadeau on the basis that his continued employment at the Bureau while married to a manager of a Bureau-regulated entity violated Me. Rev. Stat. 24, 209(1). Nadeau initiated the grievance process manadated by the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). After an arbitration hearing, the arbitrator concluded that the Bureau violated the CBA by discharging Nadeau without just cause and ordered his reinstatement. The Bureau petitioned the superior court seeking to vacate the arbitration award, contending that the award of reinstatement required the Bureau to violate section 209(1), which prohibits the Bureau from employing persons "connected with the management" of Bureau-regulated entities. The superior court reported the case to the Supreme Court. The Court declined to answer the reported question regarding the interpretation of section 209 after finding that the arbitration award did not violate public policy, the arbitrator did not exceed his powers, and the award was not subject to further judicial scrutiny on that basis. Remanded for entry of a judgment confirming the arbitration award. View "Dep't of Prof'l & Fin. Regulation v. State Employees Ass'n" on Justia Law

In 2010, Hebron Academy requested a tax abatement from the Town for the 2009 tax year. Because the Academy did not file the abatement request before the statutory deadline, the Town denied the request. The Board of Assessment Review denied the request on the same ground. The Academy subsequently filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that its properties were exempt from taxation and that the Town must reimburse it for real estate taxes it paid on its exempt properties for the prior three years. The superior court declared that the Academy was entitled to the exemption for most of its property but that res judicata precluded the court from relieving it of its obligation to pay the 2009 taxes at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Hebron Academy, as a literary and scientific institution, was entitled to a tax exemption for its real estate "owned and occupied or used solely for [its] own purpose"; and (2) the trial court correctly concluded that res judicata precluded the declaratory judgment from applying to the 2009 tax year because an administrative adjudication had been rendered on the merits of the case. View "Hebron Academy, Inc. v. Town of Hebron" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Public Utilities Commission approved a merger between FairPoint Communications-NNE (FairPoint) and Verizon Maine (Verizon). The merger order committed FairPoint to expanding DSL availability in Maine to certain percentages within certain periods of time. The merger order incorporated an amended stipulation presented by FairPoint and other parties. Approximately twenty months later, FairPoint filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Commission agreed to reduce FairPoint's ultimate broadband buildout obligations from ninety percent addressability to eighty-seven percent. Fairpoint subsequently notified the Commission that it had expanded broadband buildout to the level of eighty-three percent. The Commission disagreed, concluding that FairPoint had used the wrong measure of addressability and therefore overstated its results. At issue on appeal was how "addressability" would be measured when calculating FairPoint's broadband buildout commitments in Maine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the merger order was an order of the Commission and not a consent decree, and therefore, the Commission did not err by failing to interpret the merger order in a manner consistent with the intent and understanding of the parties to the stipulation; and (2) the Commission did not err in its definition of "addressability." View "N. New England Tel. Operations LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law