Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Superintendent of Insurance found that a Bankers Life and Casualty Company agent engaged in deceptive insurance sales practices in multiple transactions with an elderly woman. Bankers Life and its agents functioned as insurance producers at the relevant time. The Superintendent ordered Bankers Life to pay restitution and a civil penalty of $100,000. The business and consumer docket affirmed the Superintendent's decision. Bankers Life appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Superintendent did not err in her statutory interpretation or factual findings and did not abuse her discretion by imposing restitution and a penalty on Bankers Life based on the evidence presented in the administrative record. View "Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Superintendent of Ins." on Justia Law

When Restaurant was denied a requested liquor license by the Town of Bingham, Restaurant appealed to the Department of Public Safety. After a hearing, a Department hearing officer also denied the license. On appeal, Restaurant asserted various independent claims alleging constitutional and statutory violations by the Department and Town. The appellate court found in favor of Defendants on Restaurant's independent claims but, on the merits, remanded the matter to the Department after concluding that an appeal of a municipality's denial of a liquor license could only be decided by the Commissioner of Public Safety and not a hearing officer. On remand, the Commissioner of the Department denied the license application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the deficiencies in the Department's notice to Restaurant of the hearing on Restaurant's requested liquor license constituted harmless error in the circumstances presented by this case; (2) The Department had sufficient grounds on which to deny Restaurant's liquor license; and (3) the court did not err in entering a judgment against Restaurant on its 42 U.S.C.S. 1983 claims. View "Antler's Inn & Rest., LLC v. Dep't of Pub. Safety" on Justia Law

The Board of Licensure in Medicine revoked Petitioner's medical license. The superior court dismissed Petitioner's complaint seeking judicial review, concluding (1) it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the Board's decision because the district court had exclusive jurisdiction to review nonconsensual license-revocation orders pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 10, 8003(5); and (2) Petitioner's 42 U.S.C.S. 1983 claim should be dismissed because the Board members had authority to revoke her license and were immune from suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court properly dismissed Petitioner's petition for review of the Board order revoking her license because the district court had exclusive jurisdiction in such matters; and (2) because the Board acted within its authority in revoking Petitioner's license and, on appeal, Petitioner did not otherwise assert a denial of her constitutional rights, Petitioner's section 1983 claim was properly dismissed. View "Michalowski v. Bd. of Licensure in Med." on Justia Law

Brockway-Smith Company and MMTA Workers' Compensation Trust appealed from a decision of a Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer awarding incapacity benefits to Richard Graves for a 2003 work-related injury to his left shoulder. Brockway-Smith contended that Graves's claim for the 2003 injury was barred for failure to file it within the six-year limitations period in 39-A Me. Rev. Stat. The Supreme Court was asked to decide whether that six-year period was tolled until the employer filed a first report of injury with the Workers' Compensation Board, even though at the time of the injury the employer was not required to file a first report pursuant to 39-A Me. Rev. Stat, 303. The Supreme Court affirmed the hearing officer's decision, holding that the limitations period did not begin to run until the first report was filed. View "Graves v. Brockway-Smith Co." on Justia Law

Sears, Roebuck & Company appealed a judgment which concluded as a matter of law that the Supreme Court's holding in "Linnehan Leasing v. State Tax Assessor," (898 A.2d 408) applied retroactively. Sears argued that Maine recognizes the practice of retroactively applying certain legal holdings of a decision in a case to the parties in that case but only prospectively in all other instances. Sears urged the Supreme Court to adopt the three-part test enumerated in "Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson" (404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971)) when deciding whether to apply the holding of a decision retroactively to other cases. Sears further argued that "Linnehan Leasing" should not apply retroactively because the three Chevron factors weigh in favor of applying the holding with selective prospectivity. Finally, Sears argued that the Court should have reaffirmed its holding in "Myrick v. James" (444 A.2d 987, 1001-02 (Me. 1982)). Without addressing the issue of retroactivity, the Court applied the plain meaning of the statute at issue and affirmed. View "Sears, Roebuck & Company v. State Tax Assessor" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the question presented to the Supreme Court based on the facts of this case was: "[w]hen a physician is alleged to have acted as an apparent agent of a hospital, does the Maine Health Security Act require that the alleged negligent acts or omissions of that physician be evaluated by the mandatory prelitigation screening and mediation panel before a claim may be brought in court against the hospital based on that physician’s conduct? The Court answered that question in the affirmative: "[b]ecause Maine law requires that a prelitigation screening panel evaluate a physician's alleged professional negligence before consideration at trial, and because that did not occur in the instant case," the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Levesque v. Central Maine Medical Center" on Justia Law

William Buckley appealed a decision of a Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer on remand from the Supreme Court. Buckley contended that, when determining whether his permanent impairment level was above the threshold for receiving partial incapacity benefits for the duration of his incapacity, the hearing officer misinterpreted the Court's mandate by failing to combine or "stack" the percentages of permanent impairment attributable to all of his work injuries. Furthermore, Buckley asserted that the hearing officer's finding that he suffered 0% permanent impairment from a 2001 injury is inconsistent with a finding in the prior decree that he suffered 7% permanent impairment for that injury. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed the hearing officer's decision.

Dale Henderson Logging, Inc. (DHL), and Oak Leaf Realty, Inc. (OLR). DHL owned property in Washington County, and OLR owned several thousand acres in Hancock County. The DHL and OLR properties have a four-rod-wide rail corridor running over them that was once owned by the Maine Central Railroad Company which was later conveyed to the State of Maine, which the Department of Transportation (DOT) claimed to own in fee simple absolute by virtue of deeds given to Maine Central's predecessor in title from 1897 to 1898. DHL and OLR contended that Maine Central held only a railroad easement that it abandoned prior to its purported conveyance to the State, and therefore DOT owned nothing. Alternatively, OLR contended that if DOT held an interest in the corridor, two deeds in DOT's chain of title contained covenants allowing OLR to compel DOT to build and maintain a fence along a portion of the corridor in Hancock County. DHL and OLR appealed the grant of summary judgments entered in favor of DOT by the Superior Court on their complaints seeking a declaration on who owned what. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court correctly found that DOT held an easement that had not been abandoned in the Washington County portion of the corridor, and owned the fee simple in the Hancock County portion of the corridor. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the covenants requiring Maine Central to build and maintain a fence along the corridor were not enforceable against DOT in equity.

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the notice provision of the Paper Streets Act requires that the person asserting the claim to own a paper street notify all record lot owners in the subdivision that includes the street, or only those lot owners that the person asserting ownership of the paper street seeks to exclude from the paper street property. Barbara Carson appealed a superior court judgment in favor of her neighbors who brought suit to determine if they had rights to use a portion of a paper street that bisected Carson's property in order to access another paper street that provides access to the Atlantic Ocean. Because the Court concluded that notice to all subdivision lot owners is required, the Court affirmed that portion of the trial court's judgment addressing the notice issue.

Maine Public Employees Retirement System (the System) appealed a superior court judgment reversing a decision of the System’s Board of Trustees that denied Petitioner Ellen Goodrich basic life insurance coverage under the group life insurance plan administered by the System. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment in part and remanded the case for entry of a judgment: (1) vacating the decision of the Board; and (2) remanding to the Board with instructions to provide Goodrich with prospective basic life insurance coverage after she paid back premiums accrued to date.