Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Chuck Starbird submitted an application for a building permit for the construction of a home on a lot abutting a public easement portion of a road in the Town of Minot. The Town denied the application. The Board of Appeals ultimately granted Starbird's appeal, concluding that the parcel had a private right-of-way because the the term "right-of-way," as used in section 4-501.8 of the Town's Land Use Code, included a public easement. The superior court affirmed but remanded to the Board for further factual findings on whether Starbird's application met all of the factors listed in section 4-501.8(A)-(G). The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court but vacated the portion of the court's judgment remanding the matter, holding (1) the unique circumstances of the matter caused the interlocutory appeal to fall within the judicial economy exception to the final judgment rule; and (2) the Board did not err by granting Starbird's appeal of the denial of his application.

The Town of Westport Island issued a building permit to George Richardson to build a single-family residence on his property. Abutting landowner Deirdre Dunlop filed a notice of appeal, and the Westport Island board of appeals (Board) affirmed the issuance of the permit. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of the building permit, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the Board's finding that Richardon's property met minimum lot-size requirement for construction of a residential dwelling; and (2) the Board correctly determined that Richardson's road lot could be included in his property's acreage calculation.

Anthem Health Plans of Maine appealed from a judgment entered in the Business and Consumer Docket affirming a decision by the Superintendent of Insurance (1) determining that Anthem's proposed rate increase for its individual health insurance products was excessive and unfairly discriminatory, and (2) indicating that an average rate increase with a lower profit margin for those products would be approved. Anthem appealed, contending that the Superintendent's decision violated Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 24-A, 2736 (the statute) and the state and federal Constitutions because the approved rate increase eliminated Anthem's opportunity to earn a reasonable profit on its line of individual health insurance products. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Superintendent properly balanced the competing interests within the statutory framework of the statute in arriving at its approved rate increase; and (2) because the approved rate provided a built-in risk and profit margin, Anthem's argument that the Superintendent improperly cross-subsidized between Anthem's regulated and unregulated product lines, and the corollary argument that the approved rate resulted in an unconstitutional confiscatory taking, necessarily failed as a matter of law.

Mrs. T. was the mother of C.T., a fifteen-year-old boy with severe disabilities. At issue in this case was C.T.'s eligibility for the Department of Health and Human Services' home and community-based waiver program. C.T. was approved for the waiver program but was not receiving services under the waiver when the Department instituted a new regulation that closed the program to children but grandfathered children who were already receiving services. Mrs. T. subsequently filed a grievance with the Department seeking to have C.T. declared waiver-eligible. The Commissioner of the Department accepted the recommendation of an administrative hearing officer that denied the grievance. The superior court affirmed. Mrs. T. appealed, contending that the Department was equitably estopped from denying services because she reasonably relied to her detriment on misinformation she received that C.T. was eligible. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Mrs. T. did not meet her burden to prove that her reliance on the misinformation given to her by the Department caused any detriment to C.T., the hearing officer did not err in finding that the Department was not equitably estopped from declaring C.T. ineligible for a waiver.

The Town of Millinocket appealed and Mary Walsh cross-appealed from a judgment of the superior court following a jury trial finding that Walsh, the former town recreation director, had engaged in activities protected by the state whistleblowers' protection act and that those protected activities were a substantial motivating cause for the Town's decision to eliminate her position. At issue on appeal was whether discriminatory animus expressed by one member of the town council could be found to be a cause or motivating factor for an adverse employment action or whether the lack of evidence of discriminatory animus by any other member of the town council insulated the Town from liability in Walsh's discrimination action. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding (1) an improper motive or discriminatory animus of one member of a multi-member council may create an actionable claim against the governmental entity if a plaintiff proves, and the jury finds, that the improper motive or discriminatory animus was a motivating factor or a substantial cause for an adverse employment action taken against a plaintiff who has engaged in a protected activity; and (2) evidence in the record supported the jury's verdict in this case.

Appellant, a former corrections officer, was dismissed after an administrative hearing on November 4, 2009. On November 18, the commissioners issued their written decision which containted their findings and rationale. On December 18, the appellant filed a compliant asserting a due process claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and a wrongful termination claim pursuant to 30-A M.R.S. 501(3)(A). At issue was what constitutes ânotice of any actionâ to trigger M.R. Civ. P. 80B(b)âs 30-day time limit for filing an administrative appeal. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower courtâs dismissal of appellantâs due process and wrongful termination claims as untimely, holding that Rule 80B(b)âs time limit for seeking review of a decision to dismiss an employee does not commence until the employee receives a written decision of the county commissioners or personnel board. The Court also held that because appellant did not have an opportunity to address his suspension before he was terminated, direct review pursuant to Rule 80B(b) would not provide an adequate remedy for appellantâs Section 1983 claim; therefore, denial of appellantâs right to due process of law was independent of his administrative appeal.

Victor Bravo Aviation is a Connecticut company founded and established by E. Brian Cleary and his wife Vicki in 2002. In 2004, Victor Bravo contracted to purchase an aircraft from Columbia Aircraft Sales in Connecticut. The aircraft was constructed in France. It was flown to the USA with scheduled stops in Maine and Connecticut in 2005. Victor Bravo took possession of the aircraft in Connecticut as its owner. The aircraft was flown its first twelve months in Maine and other surrounding states. The aircraft made thirty-seven flights to Maine. It was stationary in Maine for 156 days with approximately 121 overnight lay-overs. Victor Bravo never had the aircraft registered in Maine. Victor Bravo was assessed with Maine use taxes on the aircraft in February 2007. Victor Bravo appealed this assessment to the Superior Court which was upheld. On appeal, the Supreme Court made the distinction between the facts of this case with those in the "Blue Yonder" case which was decided April 26, 2011. It was determined that the aircraft owned by Victor Bravo was used in a manner that went beyond having a âtemporary, transient presenceâ in Maine. The Court held that under these circumstances, the aircraft should be properly considered to have âcome to restâ in Maine, and therefore subject to the Maine use tax. The Court affirmed the Superior Court and Assessorâs decisions.