Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over the Town of Bar Harbor's decision to present several proposed changes to its municipal charter as separate questions to voters, rather than as a single package. The changes were recommended by a charter commission and included modifications to various areas of the town's governance. A group of voters, led by Michael Good, challenged this approach, arguing that the changes were not "minor modifications" and should have been presented as a single "revision" of the charter.The Superior Court (Hancock County, Anderson, J.) agreed with Good and nullified the changes, ruling that they were not minor modifications and should have been presented as a single revision. The court also found procedural irregularities in how the changes were developed and submitted.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with the lower court's interpretation. The court held that the charter commission acted legally in determining that its recommendations constituted minor modifications and proposing that they be submitted to the voters in nine separate articles. The court also found that none of the claimed procedural irregularities nullified the vote. Therefore, the court vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded the case for the court to enter a judgment for the Town on Good’s complaint. View "Good v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law

Wade T. Hamilton, a pediatric cardiologist, recommended a patient for a cardiac MRI scan but warned her that due to her COVID-19 vaccination, which he claimed included "magnets and heavy metals", it would be unsafe for her to enter an MRI machine. The patient's mother reported Hamilton's statements to the nurse practitioner who had referred the patient to Hamilton, leading to a report being filed against Hamilton with the Board of Licensure in Medicine. The Board, in response, opened a complaint proceeding and demanded that Hamilton undergo a neuropsychological evaluation.Hamilton challenged the Board's order in the Superior Court, arguing that the Board had overstepped its authority and violated his rights to due process and free speech. However, the Superior Court denied his petition and ruled in favor of the Board. Shortly before this decision, Hamilton's medical license in Maine expired and he did not renew it.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court dismissed Hamilton's appeal as nonjusticiable, stating that there had been no final agency action and that the challenged order was moot because Hamilton had allowed his medical license to lapse. The court also noted that Hamilton's challenge to the order directing the evaluation was fully reviewable at the conclusion of the complaint proceedings, making his petition premature. Furthermore, since Hamilton was no longer licensed in Maine, the Board no longer had authority to pursue his evaluation. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court for dismissal of the petition for judicial review as nonjusticiable. View "Hamilton v. Board of Licensure in Medicine" on Justia Law

The case involves Dennis G. Crosen, a former employee of Blouin Motors, Inc., who suffered two work-related injuries in 1984 and 2002, respectively. The 1984 injury occurred while Crosen was working for Rockingham Electric, Inc., and the 2002 injury occurred while he was working for Blouin Motors, Inc. The two injuries combined to render Crosen totally incapacitated. A hearing officer apportioned 40% of the responsibility for Crosen's incapacity to Rockingham and 60% to Blouin. In 2014, Crosen began collecting old-age insurance benefits under the United States Social Security Act. By statute, Blouin's obligation to pay weekly incapacity benefits based on the 2002 injury was to be reduced by half of the amount of Social Security benefits that Crosen receives. No Social Security offset applies to the compensation that Rockingham owes for the 1984 injury.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Workers’ Compensation Board Appellate Division denied Blouin's petition to apply the entire Social Security offset to its compensation payments to Crosen. The ALJ and the Appellate Division interpreted the relevant statute to mean that Blouin could only apply the offset to the portion of the benefits for which it was responsible (60%), not the entire amount.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with the lower courts' interpretation of the statute. The court held that Blouin was entitled to take the full offset provided by the statute, not just the portion corresponding to its share of responsibility for Crosen's incapacity. The court vacated the decision of the Appellate Division and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also noted that Blouin may be entitled to a credit for the portion of the offset that it did not take prior to this case, but left this issue to be resolved on remand. View "Crosen v. Blouin Motors., Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a group of plaintiffs, led by Chris Calnan, who challenged a rule implemented by Maine Emergency Medical Services (Maine EMS) requiring emergency medical service (EMS) workers to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 and influenza. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Maine EMS lacked statutory authority to implement such a rule.The Superior Court (Kennebec County) dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had named the correct defendants, that it had jurisdiction to consider the challenge to the rulemaking, and that the EMS Board acted within its authority in implementing the immunization rule. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as moot.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the EMS Board did not exceed its statutory authority in issuing the immunization rule. The court also concluded that the rule aligns with the purpose of the Maine Emergency Medical Services Act of 1982, which is to ensure optimum patient care and the safe handling and transportation of patients. Lastly, the court determined that the EMS Board followed the applicable rulemaking process for the promulgation of the immunization rule. View "Calnan v. Hurley" on Justia Law

The case centers around the dispute over the requirement for a supermajority vote in the Town of Bar Harbor's amendment to its Land Use Ordinance (LUO) concerning vacation rentals. Erica Brooks and Victoria Smith, both property owners in the town, argued that due to a 2-2 tie vote by the Planning Board on the proposed amendment, a two-thirds majority vote was necessary for the amendment to pass. The amendment, however, was enacted with a 60% majority vote. The Superior Court sided with the Town, asserting that the LUO language did not necessitate a supermajority vote.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision but did so on different grounds. The court agreed with the argument put forth by the Maine Municipal Association in an amicus brief, which asserted that irrespective of the LUO's language, under Maine statutes 21-A M.R.S. § 723(4) (2023) and 30-A M.R.S. § 2501 (2023), only a simple majority vote was required for the amendment to take effect, unless the Town's charter provided otherwise, which it did not. Therefore, the court concluded that the amendment was lawfully enacted with a simple majority vote, rendering the Town's supermajority requirement unenforceable. View "Brooks v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law

In this case before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, the Office of the Public Advocate (OPA) contested an order by the Public Utilities Commission (Commission) that extended the waiver of the standard depreciation rate for the Maine Water Company - Millinocket Division (MWC). The OPA raised three claims: (1) the Commission erred in applying Chapter 110 of its rules to waive the depreciation rate set in Chapter 68, which according to the OPA already contained a waiver provision; (2) the Commission abused its discretion and set unjust and unreasonable rates by approving an arbitrarily low depreciation expense; and (3) the Commission relied on information that was not included in the evidentiary record.The court disagreed with all three claims raised by the OPA. Regarding the first claim, the court stated that Chapter 68 did not contain a waiver provision and that the Commission rightly applied the general waiver provision contained in Chapter 110. Concerning the second claim, the court found that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it extended the waiver in anticipation of a gradual return to full depreciation expenses. The court determined that the Commission's decision aligned with the statutory rate-setting goal and prevented rate shock. Lastly, the court determined that the OPA waived its third claim by not raising the issue about the lack of an evidentiary record earlier in the proceedings. As such, the court affirmed the Commission's order. View "Office of the Public Advocte v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves Hans Utsch and Julia H. Merck's appeal against a denial of their petition for judicial review of an email from the mining coordinator of the Department of Environmental Protection. The case originates from Harold MacQuinn, Inc.'s intent to restart quarry operations in Hall Quarry, Mount Desert. Under Maine law, quarry operations must comply with performance standards, and those intending to operate a quarry must file a “notice of intent to comply” (NOITC) with these performance standards. The email that Utsch and Merck challenge is about whether MacQuinn is required to file a NOITC.From 2012 to 2015, the mining coordinator asserted that MacQuinn did not need to file a NOITC, as the quarry operated before 1970 and was thus grandfathered into the performance standards for quarries. In 2017, the Legislature passed an act that added temporal language to the performance standards for quarries, limiting the one-acre threshold to areas excavated since January 1, 1970. MacQuinn modified its excavation plan so that the total area excavated would not exceed one acre, thus not requiring a NOITC according to the mining coordinator.Utsch and Merck, who live near the quarry, filed a petition for review of the mining coordinator’s email, claiming that the Department violated statutory provisions by determining that MacQuinn does not have to file a NOITC before operating the quarry. The Superior Court denied their petition, on the basis that the email was a final agency action and Utsch and Merck had standing to appeal it.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded for dismissal of the petition. The court held that the mining coordinator’s email was not a final agency action, as it did not affect anyone’s “legal rights, duties or privileges” under the Maine Administrative Procedure Act. The court further held that Utsch and Merck's petition was not ripe for consideration as a declaratory judgment action because it fails both prongs required for ripeness, as their allegations were too uncertain and speculative. View "Utsch v. Department of Environmental Protection" on Justia Law

In the case before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, the Office of the Public Advocate (the appellant) contested a decision by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) that approved an amended special rate contract between Bangor Natural Gas Company and Bucksport Generation LLC. The appellant argued that the PUC applied the wrong standard in reviewing the contract, which led to unjust or unreasonable rates and undue or unreasonable preference for Bucksport Generation over other Bangor Gas customers. The appellant also argued that the PUC's order should be vacated because it relied on evidence not included in the record.The court disagreed with the appellant's first argument and found the second argument waived, thereby affirming the PUC's order. The court held that the PUC was within its discretion to apply different standards of review for special rate contracts depending on the type of utility service at issue. Given the competitive nature of the natural gas market in Maine, the court deemed the PUC's standard reasonable.Regarding the rates, the court found that the PUC’s approval of the special rate contract did not result in unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory rates for other Bangor Gas customers. The court noted that incentivizing continued financial contributions from Bucksport Generation to Bangor Gas’s fixed costs was justifiable.Finally, the court ruled that the appellant's argument about the PUC's failure to create an evidentiary record was waived due to the appellant's failure to raise the issue at the PUC level. However, the court acknowledged the appellant's point and advised the PUC to clarify its regulations regarding what materials constitute the evidentiary record in proceedings where an evidentiary hearing is not held. View "Office of the Public Advocate v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court determining that the Aroostook County Commissioners had jurisdiction over an appeal of a municipality's denial of a tax abatement application by Cassidy Holdings, LLC, holding that there was no error.Cassidy, which owned nonresidential property with an equalized municipal valuation of $1 million or greater, requested a partial abatement of its 2021 property taxes. The City of Caribou's Board of Assessors denied the request. The Commissioners declined to hear Cassidy's ensuing appeal on the grounds that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The superior court remanded the case for the Commissioners to proceed on the merits, concluding that the Commissioners erred in determining that they lacked jurisdiction over the abatement appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of 36 Me. Rev. Stat. 844 provides for concurrent jurisdiction before either the Commissioners or the State Board. View "Cassidy Holdings, LLC v. Aroostook County Commissioners" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court reversing the decision of the Town of Eliot's board of appeals vacating the planning board's approval of a large solar array project, holding that the project did not fit the definition of "public utility facility" within the meaning of the Town zoning ordinance.Odiorne Lane Solar, LLC applied to the Planning Board for a approval to build a large solar array project on land located in the Town's rural district. The Planning Board approved the application. The board of appeals, however, vacated the approval. The superior court vacated the board of appeals' decision. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the superior court's judgment, holding that, at the relevant times for this application, the ordinance did not permit the location of the project within the rural district. View "Odiorne Lane Solar, LLC v. Town of Eliot" on Justia Law