Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the decision of the Appellate Division of the Workers' Compensation Board (WCB) affirming the decision of the WCB ALJ denying Appellant's petition for review of incapacity benefits paid by Hydraulic Hose & Assemblies, LLC, through its insurer, The Hanover Insurance Group, because the statute of had expired, holding that the claim was timely.Appellant filed a petition for review of incapacity, claiming that he was entitled to total incapacity benefits. The ALJ denied the petition, concluding that the six-year statutory limitation period had expired and that Appellant's receipt of Social Security benefits did not toll the statute of limitations. On appeal, Appellant argued that the receipt of his Social Security benefits under the circumstances tolled the statute of limitations. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding (1) offsetting Social Security old-age insurance benefits must be treated as primary payments of workers' compensation; and (2) the "date of the most recent payment" under Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A, 306 is the date of most recent payment of offsetting Social Security old-age insurance benefits. View "Charest v. Hydraulic Hose & Assemblies, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the opinion of the Workers' Compensation Board Appellate Division agreeing with the conclusion of the administrative law judge (ALJ) that Darla Potter, an aquaculture worker, was not a "seaman" within the meaning of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. 30104, holding that the Appellate Division did not err.The Appellate Division affirmed the decree of the ALJ granting Potter's petitions for award of compensation for injuries sustained in the course of her employment with Cooke Aquaculture USA, Inc. At issue on appeal was whether Potter's claims fell within the jurisdiction of federal admiralty law or state workers' compensation law. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Potter was not a seaman within the purview of the Jones Act. View "Potter v. Great Falls Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the Workers' Compensation Board Appellate Division vacating the judgment of the administrative law judge (ALJ) denying Lorraine Somers's petition to have her benefits reinstated, holding that the Appellate Division did not err.The Board entered a decree permitting S.D. Warrant Company and its insurer (collectively, S.D. Warren) to discontinue paying Somers partial incapacity benefits when those payments had reached the 520-week statutory limit. Somers filed a petition to have her benefits reinstated, arguing that S.D. Warren failed to comply with Me. W.C.B. Rule, ch. 2, 5(1) (the former Rule) by not providing her with notice that she could be eligible for an extension of weekly benefits. An ALJ denied the petition. The Appellate Division vacated that decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that S.D. Warren was required to give Somers notice pursuant to the former Rule before terminating her benefits. View "Somers v. S.D. Warren Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court dismissing the three-count complaint filed by John Doe, DO, against the Maine Board of Osteopathic Licensure, holding that Doe failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as to any of his claims.Two of Doe's complaints sought a declaration that pending disciplinary complaints against him must be dismissed because the Board did not provide him the required notice, and the third count claimed that the Board failed to address the complaints in a timely manner. The superior court dismissed the first two counts for failure to state a claim and the third count for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that dismissal of all three counts was proper on the grounds that Doe failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. View "Doe v. Maine Board of Osteopathic Licensure" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the superior court affirming the decision of the Commissioner of the Department of Health and Human Services (Department) accepting the recommendation of an administrative presiding officer that the Department correctly established and maintained a recoupment claim for $116,852 against Appellant, an oral surgeon, holding that remand was required as to one aspect of the Department's decision.Appellant was a MaineCare provider whose practice was based in Auburn. After Appellant retired, the Department issued a notice of violation, alleging that Appellant had been overpaid. After an administrative hearing, the Department reduced its claim to $116,852. The presiding officer upheld the Department's recoupment claim. The Commissioner adopted the presiding officer's recommended decision in full. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part and remanded the case, holding (1) because the Department failed to explain its decision imposing the maximum allowable penalties for Appellant's failure properly to document time spent with patients following his administration of anesthesia, the Court was unable to determine whether the Department properly exercised its discretion; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error. View "Palian v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming the decision of the Town of Casco Zoning Board of Appeals in which the Board denied the request for a shoreline zoning permit filed by Mark and Valerie Tomasino, holding that the Tomasinos lacked standing to seek such a permit.On appeal, the Tomasinos argued that the Board erred in determining that they demonstrated insufficient right, title, or interest in the property to obtain a permit to remove three trees from property owned by Lake Shore Realty Trust, the abutting property owner, over which the Tomasinos claimed a deeded easement. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, even assuming that the Tomasinos demonstrated that they had some interest in the particular portion of property at issue in this case, they failed to demonstrate that they had the kind of interest that would allow them to cut the trees if they were granted a permit to do so. View "Tomasino v. Town of Casco" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court affirming a decision of the Town of York Board of Appeals purporting to grant Daniel and Susan Raposa's appeal from a decision of the Town's Code Enforcement Officer (CEO), holding that because the Board's written findings of fact directly nullified its decision to grant the appeal, the matter must be remanded for further proceedings.The Raposas contacted the Town's CEO to express their concern that Joshua Gammon's use of his property was not consistent with his predecessor's lawful nonconforming use. The CEO determined that Gammon's operation of his business on his property was not a change in use from his predecessor's use of the property. On appeal, the Board granted the Raposas' appeal as to the change-of-use issue. In the Board's written decision, however, the Board stated, "The use of the lot by Mr. Gammon's landscaping business does not constitute a change of use but is an intensification of the same use." The superior court affirmed, concluding that the Board's written decision was the operative decision for judicial review. The Supreme Judicial Court held that because the Board's written decision contained factual findings directly contradicting its initial decision, the matter must be remanded for further proceedings. View "Raposa v. Town of York" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the business and consumer docket vacating a decision by the Town of Lamoine Board of Appeals that reversed the Town Planning Board's denial of Hard MacQuinn, Inc.'s application for a permit under the Town's site plan review ordinance and affirming and reinstating the Planning Board's decision, holding that the lower court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the Me. R. Civ. P. 80B complaint filed by Friends of Lamoine and Jeffrey Dow as Trustee for the Tweedie Trust was timely; (2) the Board of Appeals properly conducted appellate review of the site plan permit decision rather than de novo review; (3) the Planning Board’s findings in denying the permit were supported by substantial evidence; and (4) MacQuinn's argument that the Planning Board should have waived a criterion of the ordinance as duplicative or inapplicable did not require discussion. View "Friends of Lamoine v. Town of Lamoine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court determining that the Town of Frye Island may not withdraw from Maine School Administrative District 6 (MSAD 6) in the absence of legislation expressly authorizing the Town to invoke the statutory withdrawal process set forth in Me. Rev. Stat. 20-A, 1466, holding that the superior court did not err.The residents of Frye Island voted unanimously to withdraw from MSAD 6. The Legislature responded by enacting L.D. 500, which stated that the Town could not withdraw from MSAD 6 unless withdrawal was first authorized. Frye Island later amended its charter and again sought to withdraw from MSAD 6. MSAD 6 sought a declaratory judgment that Frye Island's effort to withdraw from MSAD 6 was unlawful. The court granted summary judgment for MSAD 6. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the amendment to the Town's charter did not expressly or implicitly repeal L.D. 500 by operation of law; (2) L.D. 500 does not violate the Maine Constitution's special legislation clause; and (3) the court did not err in dismissing Frye Island's claims arising under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the United States and Maine Constitutions. View "MSAD 6 Board of Directors v. Town of Frye Island" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed as moot this appeal from the decision of the superior court dismissing Appellant's petition against the Maine Department of Corrections for failure to serve the Department pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 5, 11003(1), holding that events in the superior court had overtaken this appeal, rendering it moot.After Appellant filed this action, the trial court, treating the action as a petition for review of agency action, issued Appellant an order requiring him to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for failure to serve the Department. The court ultimately dismissed the petition for insufficient service of process. After Appellant's appeal was docketed, Appellant filed a motion asserting that the Department had acknowledged receipt of process. The court then negated its dismissal of Appellant's action. Therefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "Paquette v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law