Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent was a driver of a motor vehicle that was involved in a crash. The officer that responded to the accident arrested Respondent and requested that he take a blood test to determine alcohol concentration after noticing a "strong odor of alcoholic beverage emitting from the person and breath" of Respondent. An ALJ subsequently suspended Respondent's driver's license for ninety days. The circuit court reversed, concluding that only if the accident was Respondent's fault that an inference could be drawn, in combination with the odor of alcohol, that there were reasonable grounds to conclude Respondent was under the influence of alcohol or intoxicated. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the police officer's certification that a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage was present on Respondent's breath and person constituted reasonable grounds to request an alcohol content test. Remanded. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Sanner" on Justia Law

CareFirst, Inc., a nonstock, nonprofit Maryland corporation, is a holding company with two subsidiaries that provides health insurance for millions of Maryland residents. State law confers broad authority on the Maryland Insurance Commissioner to oversee its operation and adherence to its mission. This case arose from the termination of Leon Kaplan, a former executive of CareFirst. CareFirst declined to pay part of the post-termination compensation set forth in Kaplan's employment contract, reasoning that the compensation was not for "work actually performed," as that standard had been interpreted by the Commissioner. The Commissioner affirmed the decision not to pay the benefits, concluding that the payments would violate Md. Code Ann. Ins. 14-139. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Commissioner's determination was not preempted by ERISA; (2) the Commissioner's construction of the insurance code was legally correct; and (3) there was substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's determination in this case. View "Md. Ins. Comm'r. v. Kaplan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, in two separate lawsuits, sued a medical doctor and medical center for medical negligence, lack of informed consent, and fraud. Prior to the trial date, Defendants successfully moved to bifurcate the trials. The administrative judge of the circuit court vacated the trial judge's orders bifurcating the trials and reassigned the cases to another judge for trial. Defendants filed a petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition to reverse the administrative judge's orders. The Court of Appeals vacated the administrative judge's orders and reinstated the orders of the trial judge, holding that, under the circumstances, the administrative judge did not have the authority to review and vacate the trial judge's decision to bifurcate the trials and to unilaterally reassign the cases. View "St. Joseph Med. Ctr. v. Circuit Court (Turnbull)" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the validity of two Prince George's County ordinances regulating the packaging, sale or other distribution of cigars on several alternative grounds. One of Petitioners' arguments was that the General Assembly had legislated in the area so extensively that an intent to occupy the entire field must be implied. The circuit court granted Respondents' motions for summary judgment, rejecting each of Petitioners' contentions. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for the entry of a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, holding that state law occupies the field of regulating the packaging and sale of tobacco products, including cigars, and thus impliedly preempts the two ordinances enacted by the county council of Prince George's County. View "Altadis U.S.A., Inc. v. Prince George's County" on Justia Law

The Maryland Economic Development Corporation (MEDCO) is a public corporation established by the legislature to aid in promoting the economic development of the State. This litigation arose from MEDCO's involvement in the development of a technology development center. MEDCO sought a loan with Bank to finance the center. MEDCO executed a leasehold deed of trust with Bank requiring MEDCO to pay all recording costs and fees in connection with filing the loan documents. MEDCO subsequently presented the deed of trust for recording in Montgomery County, claiming an exemption from the recordation tax based on Md. Code Ann. Econ. Dev. 10-129(a), which granted MEDCO a tax exemption "from any requirement to pay taxes or assessments on its properties or activities." The county transfer office denied the exemption and required MEDCO to pay recordation tax. The county department of finance denied MEDCO's recordation tax refund claim. The tax court denied MEDCO's petition for appeal. The circuit court reversed, and the court of special appeals reversed the circuit court. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, based on the plain language of section 10-129(a), the legislature intended to exempt MEDCO from paying the recordation tax at issue in this case. View "Md. Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

Complainants were disabled residents of a condominium. Complainants filed a complaint against the condominium's board of directors (the Condo) and their property management company, alleging that the Condo had discriminated against them by refusing to grant a reasonable accommodation for their disabilities. Specifically, Complainants alleged that the Condo refused to provide keys to the side and back doors to their building. The Office of Administrative Hearings ruled that Complainants had not proven that giving them the keys to the side and back doors was necessary and reasonable. The Appeal Board of the Commission on Human Relations (Board) disagreed and determined that the Condo (1) was required to prove that giving Complainants keys was an unreasonable financial burden, and (2) failed to establish that giving Complainants keys presented an undue burden. The circuit court reversed. The court of special appeals vacated the circuit court's decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Condo was required to prove that providing keys to Complainants was unreasonable in light of the costs attendant in doing so; and (2) the Board properly performed the requisite balancing test when it concluded the Condo unreasonably denied Complainants' requests to be given the disputed keys. View " Cameron Grove Condo. Bd. of Dirs. v. Comm'n on Human Relations" on Justia Law

To facilitate the transition to a competitive market for the supply of electricity, the Legislature provided that consumers would receive certain credits over the period of a year to mitigate a large projected increase in Baltimore Gas & Electric Company's (BGE) rates for the supply of electricity. The overall scheme involving credits, charges, and bond financing was known as the rate stabilization plan. Following passage of the rate stabilization law, BGE took the position that the legislation had the effect of deferring part of its franchise tax liability during the period that credits were applied to customers' bills. The Department of Assessments rejected BGE's position. BGE filed a refund claim, which was rejected. The tax court upheld the Department's denial. The circuit court concluded that the deferral credit affected BGE's distribution revenues for purposes of computing its franchise tax liability, that the tax court decision would subject BGE to double taxation, and that BGE was entitled to the claimed refund. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, in establishing the rate stabilization plan, the legislature neither intentionally nor inadvertently provided for the credits and charges to affect BGE's franchise tax liability. Remanded. View "Dep't of Assessments v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner was a waterman with a commercial license to harvest clams. As Petitioner was clamming in 2011, a Department of Natural Resources (DNR) police sargeant cited Petitioner for using a hydraulic claim dredge (HCD) in a submerged aquatic vegetation (SAV) protection zone in violation of Md. Code Nat. Res. 4-1006.1(e)(3). The district court later convicted Petitioner of violating section 4-1006.1 and imposed a criminal fine and costs. The circuit court, sitting as an appellate court, affirmed. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, contending that he could not be prosecuted for using the HCD in the SAV zone because DNR failed to fulfill its obligation under section 4-1006.1(e)(3) to "publish, by public notice, delineations of SAV protection zones and revisions to SAV protection zones." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a violation of section 4-1006.1 is not a strict liability crime, and a prosecution for using an HCD in an SAV zone can only be maintained if the State establishes that DNR complied with section 4-1006.1(e)(3); and (2) in the instant case, the State failed to prove that DNR complied with section 4-1006.1(e)(3), and therefore, Petitioner's conviction could not stand. View "Lowery v. State" on Justia Law

Decedent worked as a firefighter for Baltimore City. After Decedent died, his widow, Petitioner, began receiving survivorship benefits from Decedent's pension. Petitioner later filed a dependent's claim for death benefits under the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act. The dispute at the hearing concerned what provision of the Act was applicable to Petitioner's claim. The City argued that Md. Code Lab. & Empl. 9-610, which reduces compensation death benefits by the amount of pension benefits, should apply. Petitioner argued that Md. Code Lab. & Empl. 9-503(e), which allows firefighters' dependents to collect both pension and workers' compensation up to the amount of what had been the firefighter's weekly salary, should apply. Petitioner's claim was pending when section 9-503(e) was amended to include dependents in its scope of coverage. The Workers' Compensation Commission determined that section 9-503(e) governed the claim and awarded Petitioner benefits. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the City, ruling that Petitioner had no preexisting right to dual benefits prior to the statute's amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the amendments involved a substantive change in the law that precluded it from applying retroactively to pending cases. View "Johnson v. Baltimore" on Justia Law

Respondent was injured while performing his job as a school police officer in Baltimore City. After the City terminated his employment, Respondent applied for line-of-duty disability retirement. A hearing examiner denied Respondent's application, concluding that Respondent did not satisfy the eligibility requirements of Baltimore, Md., Code 22, 9(j), which requires a claimant to prove he sustained at least a fifty percent total impairment as the direct result of a line-of-duty accident. The hearing examiner concluded that Respondent did not satisfy the statutory requirements because the impairment to Respondent's back was not independent of all other causes, reasoning that Respondent's degenerative disc disease contributed to the disability of his back. The circuit court reversed, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Respondent's preexisting condition did not preclude him from qualifying for line-of-duty disability retirement because he proved that fifty percent of his total level of disability was the direct result of the injury he sustained while performing in the line of duty. View "Employees' Ret. Sys. of City of Baltimore v. Dorsey" on Justia Law