Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners filed a petition for judicial review of the Baltimore City Council's approval of a planned unit development (PUD) with a Wal-Mart supercenter. Both Petitioners' residences were approximately 0.4 miles away from the PUD. The Mayor and City Council of the City, the owners of the property, and the developers of the PUD (Respondents) filed motions to dismiss, alleging that Petitioners lacked standing to challenge the PUD. The circuit court granted Respondents' motions and dismissed Petitioners' petition for review. The court of special appeals affirmed, concluding that Petitioners did not qualify for prima facie aggrieved status and that they had failed to show any special aggrievement different from the general public. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the circuit court did not err in its judgment, as Petitioners failed to allege specific facts that they had been specially aggrieved in a manner different than the public generally. View "Ray v. Baltimore" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an LLC, sought an exception from the Charles County Zoning Regulation to build an office building, gun range, and driving track on a parcel of land in a rural community in the County. The property was subject to zoning restrictions prohibiting such activity except as authorized through a special exception. In deciding Petitioner's application, the Board conducted one trip to the property in question. The Board allowed representatives from the LLC as well as two citizens to attend but prohibited any other members of the public from attending and kept no transcript or other record of that which transpired. The Board then granted Petitioner's application. Various individuals filed a petition for judicial review. The circuit court affirmed. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the Board improperly conducted the visit to the property in a manner that was closed to the public. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the site visit constituted a "meeting", which was required to be open to the public; and (2) because the Board violated the open meeting provisions of the Maryland Code, the Charles County Code, and its own Rules of Procedure, the matter should be remanded for a new hearing. View "WSG Holdings, LLC v. Bowie" on Justia Law

In 2002, county voters adopted an amendment to the county charter relating to the resolution by binding arbitration of collective bargaining impasses with the county's law enforcement employees and uniformed firefighters. In 2003, the county council adopted an ordinance implementing that charter provision. In 2011, the county council amended the 2003 ordinance to provide that binding arbitration did not require the council to appropriate funds or enact legislation necessary to implement a final written award in arbitration. An uncodified section of the 2011 council bill also provided that, if any part of the 2011 ordinance were held invalid, the entire county code section enacted by the 2003 ordinance, as amended through the 2011 ordinance, would be deemed repealed by operation of law, with the result that impasses would be addressed by a code section that did not authorize binding arbitration. Petitioners sought a declaratory judgment that the 2011 ordinance violated the 2002 charter amendment. The circuit court held the 2002 charter amendment violated the Maryland Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the 2002 charter amendment bound the county council; and (2) portions of the 2011 ordinance, as well as its uncodified section 3, violated the charter and were invalid. Remanded. View "Atkinson v. Anne Arundel County" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a test technician's certification that a driver refused to complete an alcohol concentration test after initially submitting to it - when coupled with the evidence that the driver had been explained the testing procedure and was in "good health" - was prima facie evidence of refusal under Md. Code Ann. Transp. 16-205.1. The ALJ and Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings found that it was and suspended the driver's commercial driver's license. The circuit court reversed, holding that the Motor Vehicle Administration failed to show evidence that the driver refused the test. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) there was prima facie evidence of refusal, and (2) the ALJ's finding that the driver refused to complete the test was supported by substantial evidence. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. McMillan" on Justia Law

Respondent sustained six injuries while playing for the Washington Redskins on four separate occasions. Consequently, Respondent filed with the Maryland Workers Compensation Commission six separate claims against his employer, the Washington Redskins (Petitioner). The Commission denied five of Respondent's claims on the ground that he was not a "covered employee" because he was working for the Redskins outside of the State when he sustained the injuries underlying the claims. The circuit court affirmed. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a football player employed by the Washington Redskins is a "covered employee," and therefore entitled to avail himself of Maryland's workers' compensation laws, when injured while practicing and playing football outside of Maryland. View "Pro-Football, Inc. v. McCants" on Justia Law

Respondents, a county, city, village, and other government officials, established speed cameras that recorded, among others, Petitioners traveling in their vehicles over the posted speed limit. Respondents issued citations to Petitioners. Petitioners subsequently filed a complaint in the circuit court, asserting claims sounding in tort and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Petitioners asserted that Respondents' contracts with their common speed monitoring contract, ACS State and Local Solutions, violated Md. Code Ann. Transp. 21-809(j), which prohibited the county from remunerating, on a per-citation basis, a contractor who operates a speed monitoring system on the county's behalf. The circuit court granted Respondents' motions for summary judgment on all counts. The intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) section 21-809 does not provide an express or implied private cause of action in tort; and (2) Petitioners lacked the necessary taxpayer standing to pursue their injunctive and declaratory relief claims. View "Baker v. Montgomery Co." on Justia Law

The Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc. (FOP) filed a grievance under its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Montgomery County following the County's unilateral decision to discontinue a long-standing practice of allowing shop stewards to sit in on disciplinary interrogations for training purposes. The County filed a motion to dismiss the grievance, arguing that arbitration of the issue was preempted by the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBR). The arbitrator determined the grievance was not preempted and denied the motion to dismiss. Subsequently, the County filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award in the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the arbitrator's decision and granted summary judgment on behalf of the FOP. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the LEOBR was not implicated by the steward training grievance and, therefore, did not preempt its arbitration under the CBA. View "Montgomery Co. v. FOP Lodge 35" on Justia Law

After a sheriff's deputy pulled Ronald Lipella over for swerving outside the proper travel lane on a county highway, the deputy administered to Lipella three standard field sobriety tests, all of which Lipella failed. An ALJ subsequently suspended Lipella's driver's license was subsequently for driving while intoxicated. The circuit court held that the ALJ's suspension of Lipella's license was unsupported by substantial evidence, concluding that the deputy failed to indicate adequately on the Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) Form DR-15A the reasonable grounds for the underlying traffic stop that led to the license suspension. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, holding (1) the Implied Consent Statute does not require the officer to supply the grounds for the underlying traffic stop, but rather, the officer is required to provide on the DR-15A form the reasonable grounds for the suspect's intoxication; and (2) thus, the ALJ concluded properly that the MVA mounted successfully a prima facie case, which was unrebutted, supporting the suspension of Lipella's license.

At issue in this case was the scope of authority of the Attorney General's Consumer Protection Division to issue administrative subpoenas in aid of its investigation into potential unfair and deceptive trade practices. The Division in this case sought documents it claimed were relevant to its investigation of Washington Home Remodelers (WHR). WHR demurred, asserting that the Division overreached by seeking discovery into matters in which the regulatory authority resided exclusively with either the Commissioner of Financial Regulation of the Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation (DLLR) or the Maryland Home Improvement Commission under their respective enabling statutes. The circuit court ordered the subpoena's enforcement. WHR appealed, insisting that the Division subpoena was not authorized by law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Division's subpoena was authorized by the Consumer Protection Act, and therefore, the Court did not need to delve into conflicting investigatory prerogatives of separate administrative agencies.

Appellant Nancy Forster was terminated from the position of state public defender by the board of trustees of the state office of public defender. Forster subsequently filed a wrongful discharge action against the office of the public defender without first appealing administratively her termination. The circuit court dismissed Forster's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Forster appealed, arguing that the circuit court erroneously granted the State's motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed without reaching the merits of Forster's claim, holding that Forster failed to exhaust the available and primary administrative remedy provided to at-will, executive service State employees under Md. Code Ann. State Pers. & Pens. 11-305, even though she was not given written notice by the board of trustees of the availability of that avenue of appeal, as section 11-305 does not require the appointing authority to provide notice of the available administrative appeal.