Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In December 2008, State Employee was notified that her employment was terminated. Employee submitted a timely written appeal of her termination to the secretary of her agency. In August 2009, when Employee received no response to her repeated requests for a decision, Employee sought to have the matter appealed to the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). The Secretary forwarded the appeal to the Office of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ dismissed the appeal pursuant to several provisions of the State Personnel Management System. The circuit court and court of special appeals affirmed. At issue before the Court of Appeals was how the provisions of the State Personnel Management System are to be implemented when, as here, a terminated employee notes a timely appeal to the head of the principal unit and the head of the principal unit fails within fifteen days thereafter to issue a written decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a state employee in this circumstance must assume at the end of the fifteen-day period that the appeal has been denied and take any further appeal within ten days thereafter.

Johnette Cosby requested an administrative hearing to challenge a determination by the Department of Social Services that she was responsible for "indicated child neglect." Prior to the hearing, Cosby's son was adjudicated to be a Child in Need of Assistance based on the same allegations of neglect presented in the administrative action. As a result, the administrative law judge granted the Department's motion to dismiss Cosby's administrative appeal based on collateral estoppel. Cosby filed a petition for judicial review, arguing that amendments to Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 5-706.1 precluded application of the common law defense of collateral estoppel. The circuit court reinstated Cosby's administrative appeal, but the court of special appeals reversed that determination. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that section 5-706.1 was not amended so as to preclude the common law defense of collateral estoppel when the elements are otherwise satisfied, and therefore, the dismissal of the administrative appeal was proper.

In 1991, the predecessor in title to the disputed property at issue in this case to Petitioner, HNS Development, and Baltimore County failed to resolve conclusively whether certain development restrictions would be placed on parcels including and adjacent to a historic building. HNS purchased the two parcels in 2004 with knowledge of a cautionary note on the 1991 development plan. After having its proposed amended development plan rejected by three county agencies, the circuit court, and the court of special appeals, HNS asked the Court of Appeals to conclude that its amended development plan met the applicable development regulations of the Baltimore County Code and ignore the conceded Baltimore County Master Plan conflict. Respondents, People's Counsel for Baltimore County and the Greater Kingsville Community Association, argued that the Master Plan conflict provided a stand-alone basis for the County to reject the proposed amended development plan. The Court of Appeals agreed with Respondents and affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals.

This was an action for judicial review to determine whether the Maryland Board of Public Works committed legal error in denying, by a two-to-one vote, Respondent's application for a license to fill and dredge on certain State wetlands. The circuit court concluded that the Board did err, by basing its decision on considerations outside the lawful scope of its discretion, and reversed the Board's decision. The Court of Appeals vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded with instructions to vacate the Board's decision and remand the case to the Board, holding that the Board, through its majority vote, committed legal error by basing its decision on factors outside the scope of its authority and discretion.

After the IRS concluded its audit of the Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership's tax returns for years 1993-1999 and adjusted various partnership items, the personal income tax liability of Wanda King, one of the limited partners, was lessened and she became eligible for a state tax refund totaling $173,364. King filed a claim for refund, but the Comptroller of the Treasury denied it, stating that the refund claim was not timely filed because the IRS's final report regarding adjustments to King's personal tax liability had been issued more than a year before King filed her refund. On appeal, the Maryland tax court ruled in favor of the Comptroller. The circuit court reversed the tax court, and the court of special appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of special appeals, holding (1) the statute of limitations applicable to King's refund claim began to run when the IRS issued to her certain forms on January 3, 2006, and accordingly, King's refund claim had to have been filed within one year of that date; and (2) thus, King's submission on February 2, 2007 was untimely.

On two separate occasions, Respondent Edy Sanchez filed for benefits with the Workers' Compensation Commission while previous orders, in the same claim, were pending on appeal in the courts. The Commission decided that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Respondent's requests because of the pending appeals. The circuit court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not retain jurisdiction pending an appeal because the issues raised in the new filings did not fit within the jurisdictional provisions of Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-742. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the Commission had jurisdiction over Respondent's new issues under section 9-736(b). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under section 9-736(b), the Commission retains jurisdiction to hear new issues while other issues in the same claim are pending on appeal, so long as no evidence was taken or decision made on the new issues in the hearing from which the appeal was taken; and (2) section 9-742 was not intended to reduce the Commission's ongoing jurisdiction to grant relief, notwithstanding the appeal.

The Maryland Insurance Commissioner approved a filing by Allstate Insurance Company and Allstate Indemnity Company (collectively, Allstate) giving notice of its intent to cease writing new property insurance policies in certain geographic areas of the state. The Commissioner concluded that the filing was subject to administrative review under Md. Code Ann. 19-107(a) and Md. Code Ann. Ins. 27-501(a) and that it satisfied the pertinent criteria under both statutes. The circuit court affirmed both aspects of the Commissioner's ruling. The court of special appeals affirmed but on alternative grounds, holding that section 27-501(a) did not apply to the filing and that, even if it did, the statute was not violated. The Court of Appeals affirmed but, again, on different grounds, holding (1) the Commissioner did not err in finding that section 27-501 did apply to the Allstate filing, and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the Commissioner's decision.

Verizon Maryland, a telecommunications company, and the staff of the Public Service Commission (PSC) obtained PSC approval of a global settlement of six pending cases. Verizon employed an alternative form of regulation (AFOR) under Md. Code Ann. Pub. Util. Co. (PUC) 4-301 that included up to $6,000,000 in bill credits to customers with out-of-service complaints that were not resolved in compliance with specified standards. PSC approved the AFOR pursuant to PUC 4-301. A technicians union objected, contending that the service quality aspects of the AFOR did not ensure the quality, availability, and reliability of service required by PUC 4-301. The circuit court affirmed PSC's approval of the AFOR. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that PSC acted within its discretion in approving the AFOR, as PUC 4-301's use of the term "ensuring" did not require that PSC be completely certain that Verizon's incentive strategy would result in compliance with standards.

After Petitioners, Montgomery Preservation, Inc. and others, made proper formal requests, the Montgomery County Planning Board of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (MNCPPC) decided not to recommend a certain building for historic designation, and not to amend the county's master plan or historic preservation to include the building. The Planning Board forwarded this non-recommendation to the Montgomery County Council, which, sitting as an administrative agency, concluded it could take no action on the matter and therefore did nothing. Petitioners sought a writ of administrative mandamus, claiming that the Council's inaction rendered the Planning Board's previous recommendation final and appealable. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, holding that no judicial review of the Planning Board's recommendation could take place because the Council had indeed "acted" under the relevant statute. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Planning Board's recommendation was not a final appealable agency decision.

Woodmore Towne Centre applied for a non-tidal wetlands permit to construct a road extension and stream crossing in order to provide primary access into a development. After the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) approved the permit, Patuxent Riverkeeper, a nonprofit environmental group, initiated a judicial review action against MDE and Woodmore. The circuit court dismissed the action for lack of standing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Riverkeeper had standing under Md. Code Ann. Envir. 5-204(f) to initiate a judicial review action because one of its members had alleged sufficient harm to his aesthetic, recreational, and economic interests in connection with the issuance of the non-tidal wetlands permit at issue.