Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a historic Black burial ground in Montgomery County, Maryland, known as Moses Cemetery. The land, which contains the remains of many individuals, including formerly enslaved persons, was sold and developed into an apartment complex and parking lot in the 1960s. The development process desecrated the burial ground, and it is likely that human remains are still interred there. The current owner of the property is the Housing Opportunities Commission of Montgomery County (HOC). The plaintiffs, including descendants of those buried in Moses Cemetery and a local church, sought to challenge HOC's plan to sell the land to a developer.The Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the sale and later issued a writ of mandamus compelling HOC to file an action under Maryland's Business Regulation Article § 5-505 before selling the property. The court found that there was overwhelming evidence of the burial ground's existence and that many bodies likely remain on the property.The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that § 5-505 is an optional procedure for selling burial grounds and does not impose a mandatory duty on HOC to file an action before selling the land. The Appellate Court reasoned that the statute is designed to allow certain burial grounds to be sold free from claims but does not require this procedure to be followed in all cases.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment in part and reversed it in part. The Court held that the common law of burial places in Maryland provides an appropriate framework for disputes regarding burial grounds and that extraordinary relief in the form of a writ of mandamus was not appropriate. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court, allowing the plaintiffs to seek leave to amend their complaint to state a claim for relief based on an alleged violation of specific rights protected under the common law of burial places. The Court also held that § 5-505 does not abrogate the common law of burial places and provides an optional procedure for selling burial grounds. View "BETHESDA AFRICAN CEMETERY COALITION, v. HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY" on Justia Law

In 1999, Mark McCloy was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) for tampering with a potential witness in an EEOC proceeding. In 2021, he applied to purchase a handgun in Maryland, stating he had no disqualifying convictions. The Maryland State Police (MSP) disapproved his application, determining his federal conviction was equivalent to a disqualifying Maryland crime under CR § 9-305.McCloy appealed the MSP's decision to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) was not equivalent to CR § 9-305 but sua sponte determined it was comparable to CR § 9-306, affirming the MSP's disapproval. McCloy sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County, which affirmed the ALJ’s decision but on the grounds that CR § 9-305 was the appropriate equivalent Maryland crime.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s decision, holding that the relevant Maryland law for determining equivalency is the law in effect at the time of the application, not the conviction. The court used a two-step approach to determine equivalency, comparing the elements of the statutes and considering whether a reasonable mind could conclude the statutes prohibit similar conduct.The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court’s decision. It held that the relevant Maryland law for determining whether an out-of-State crime is disqualifying is the law in effect when the application is submitted. The court adopted a modified categorical approach, comparing the elements of the out-of-State crime with the Maryland crime. If the elements are broader, the MSP must have conclusive evidence of the acts forming the basis of the conviction to determine if those acts would support a conviction under a disqualifying Maryland crime. The court concluded that McCloy’s federal conviction was not equivalent to a disqualifying Maryland crime and remanded the case with instructions to reverse the MSP’s disapproval of McCloy’s firearm application. View "In the Matter of McCloy" on Justia Law

A collection of Dutch and Luxembourgish energy companies invested in solar power projects in Spain, relying on promised economic subsidies. Following the 2008 financial crisis, Spain withdrew these subsidies, prompting the companies to challenge Spain's actions through arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). The companies prevailed in arbitration, securing multi-million-euro awards. However, the European Union (EU) argued that the ECT's arbitration provision does not apply to disputes between EU Member States, rendering the awards invalid under EU law.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the cases. In NextEra Energy Global Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain and 9REN Holding S.A.R.L. v. Kingdom of Spain, the court held it had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) arbitration exception and denied Spain's motion to dismiss. The court also granted anti-anti-suit injunctions to prevent Spain from seeking anti-suit relief in foreign courts. Conversely, in Blasket Renewable Investments LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, the district court deemed Spain immune under the FSIA and denied the companies' requested injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the cases. The court held that the district courts have jurisdiction under the FSIA’s arbitration exception to confirm the arbitration awards against Spain. However, it found that the district court in NextEra and 9REN abused its discretion by enjoining Spain from pursuing anti-suit relief in Dutch and Luxembourgish courts. The court emphasized that anti-suit injunctions against a foreign sovereign raise significant comity concerns and that the domestic interests identified were insufficient to justify such extraordinary relief. Consequently, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part in NextEra, reversed in 9REN and Blasket, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Turenne v. State" on Justia Law

Citizens of a town submitted a document they claimed was a petition for a referendum to reverse a zoning ordinance that reclassified certain properties. The document contained 1,051 signatures but did not mention the ordinance number or request a referendum. The town's Board of Commissioners reviewed the document and determined it did not meet the requirements of the town's charter for a valid petition for referendum. The citizens then refiled the document with a cover page referencing the ordinance and requesting a referendum, but the signature pages remained unchanged.The Circuit Court for Harford County ruled that the Commissioners' determination was invalid because they did not first verify the signatures and did not act by ordinance or resolution. The court ordered the town to verify the signatures and proceed with the referendum process if the signatures were valid.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the Commissioners correctly determined the document did not meet the charter's requirements. The court found that the charter did not require the Commissioners to verify signatures before determining the petition's validity. The court also held that the Commissioners were authorized to make their determination by a verbal motion, which was memorialized in the meeting minutes, and did not need to adopt an ordinance or resolution.The Supreme Court of Maryland vacated the Circuit Court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of a declaratory judgment consistent with its opinion, affirming that the citizens were not entitled to a writ of mandamus or permanent injunctive relief. View "Town of Bel Air v. Bodt" on Justia Law

This case involves a minor, Kodi Gaines, who was injured during a police standoff that resulted in the death of his mother, Korryn Gaines. The standoff occurred when Baltimore County police officers attempted to serve arrest warrants on Ms. Gaines and her boyfriend at her apartment. When officers entered the apartment, they found Ms. Gaines seated on the floor with a shotgun. A six-hour standoff ensued, during which Ms. Gaines acted erratically, sometimes negotiating with officers, at other times threatening them. Corporal Royce Ruby, a member of the SWAT team, fired a shot at Ms. Gaines when he observed her raise her shotgun into a firing position. The shot passed through Ms. Gaines, ricocheted off a refrigerator, and hit Kodi.The case was initially heard in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, which found in favor of the defendants, Baltimore County and Corporal Ruby. The court ruled that the evidence at trial could not sustain a verdict on Kodi’s claim of violation of his right to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Appellate Court affirmed the lower court's decision on two grounds: that Kodi had waived his claim by not pursuing it during the first round of appellate proceedings, and that qualified immunity barred Kodi’s claim.The case was then heard by the Supreme Court of Maryland. The court disagreed with the Appellate Court’s decision on waiver but agreed that under the standard established by the United States Supreme Court, qualified immunity precludes Kodi’s claim. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the Appellate Court. View "Cunningham v. Baltimore County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed a decision by the Maryland Public Service Commission ("Commission") that approved a rate increase for the Washington Gas and Light Company ("Washington Gas"). The rate increase came after the Commission approved the acquisition of Washington Gas by AltaGas Limited ("AltaGas"). The Commission had imposed conditions on the merger, including a condition that required Washington Gas customer rates to reflect "merger-related savings" of "not less than $800,000 per year over the five years" following the merger’s closing. The Office of People’s Counsel ("OPC") objected to the Commission's interpretation of this condition and the approved rate increase.The court held that the appropriate standard of review for the Commission’s interpretation of its own prior order is the arbitrary or capricious standard. Using this standard, the court found that the Commission’s interpretation of the merger-related savings condition was not arbitrary or capricious. The court determined that the Commission had reasonably explained the inclusion of the condition in the merger order and OPC had not shown that this explanation was arbitrary or capricious. Therefore, the court affirmed the Commission's decision to approve the rate increase for Washington Gas. View "Petition of the Off. Of People's Counsel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the State's duty to preserve scientific identification evidence, such as DNA, is limited to specific crimes specified in the Criminal Procedure Article ("CP") § 8-201(j)(1)(ii) and does not extend to all crimes for which a person may petition for DNA testing. The Court ruled that the preservation obligation does not apply to the inchoate (or incomplete) offenses of those crimes listed under the same section of the law. The Court also found that the State's duty to preserve evidence does not extend to attempted murder.The case involved Darrell Eugene Matthews who had been convicted of attempted murder and was seeking post-conviction DNA testing of a glove found at the crime scene. The glove had been destroyed according to the police department's evidence retention policy after Matthews's first petition for DNA testing. The Court held that the circuit court correctly denied Matthews's second petition for post-conviction DNA testing because the State was not required to preserve evidence related to Matthews's attempted murder conviction for the duration of his sentence. The Court also found that the evidence Matthews sought to test had been destroyed in line with the police department's evidence retention policy. View "Matthews v. State" on Justia Law

In a dispute regarding a Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC) decision to approve a rate increase for Washington Gas and Light Company (Washington Gas), the Supreme Court of Maryland held that a reviewing court must apply an arbitrary or capricious standard of review to the Commission’s interpretation of its own prior order. The issue arose from the interpretation of Condition 44, a provision in the merger order which mandated a certain level of savings for customers following the merger. The Public Service Commission interpreted this condition to mean that Washington Gas’s post-merger costs must be $800,000 per year less than they would have been without the merger. The Maryland Office of People’s Counsel (OPC) disagreed, arguing that the condition required Washington Gas’s post-merger costs to be $800,000 per year less than they were the year before the merger. The court found the Commission’s interpretation was not arbitrary or capricious, affirming the decisions of the lower courts. View "Petition of the Off. Of People's Counsel" on Justia Law

SmartEnergy Holdings, LLC, a retail electricity supplier, was found to have violated various provisions of Maryland law governing retail electricity suppliers, including engaging in deceptive, misleading, and unfair trade practices. The Supreme Court of Maryland upheld the decisions of lower courts and the Maryland Public Service Commission, affirming that the Commission has the authority to determine whether electricity suppliers under its jurisdiction have violated Maryland’s consumer protection laws, including the Maryland Telephone Solicitations Act (MTSA). The court also determined that the MTSA applies to SmartEnergy’s business practices, as it applies to sales made over the telephone where the consumer places the telephone call to the merchant in response to a merchant’s marketing materials. The court found substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission's factual findings and determined that the remedies imposed by the Commission were within its discretion and not arbitrary or capricious. View "In the Matter of SmartEnergy" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) did not err in concluding that law enforcement had reasonable grounds to believe that Rahq Deika Montana Usan was driving a vehicle while impaired by alcohol, drugs, or both. The ALJ found substantial evidence to support this belief, including Usan's erratic driving, red and glassy eyes, slow and sluggish movement, and failure to perform three Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs) successfully. The court also affirmed the ALJ's finding that law enforcement, having reasonable suspicion of a driver impaired by alcohol, drugs, or both, may request testing pursuant to the Maryland Transportation Article § 16-205.1. The court further held that Usan violated the statute by refusing to submit to the requested testing. As a result, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the decision of the Circuit Court for Charles County, which had overturned the ALJ's decision to suspend Usan's driver's license. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Usan" on Justia Law