Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of a crime and sentenced to a period of imprisonment followed by community parole supervision for life (CPSL). While serving his CPSL sentence, Petitioner tested positive for opiates. During the CPSL revocation proceedings that followed, Petitioner was confined pursuant to parole board regulations pursuant to parole board regulations. While Petitioner was confined, the Commonwealth filed a petition in the superior court alleging that Petitioner was a sexually dangerous person (SDP). The parole board found a CPSL violation, and Petitioner’s confinement continued as a sanction for the CPSL violation. Petitioner was civilly committed pending the outcome of the SDP petition. While temporarily committed, Petitioner filed this complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking a declaration that his due process rights were violated in the CPSL revocation proceeding and that his CPSL sentence was unconstitutional under separation of powers principles. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that Petitioner’s CPSL sentence and his incarceration were unlawful, and therefore, Petitioner was not a “prisoner” for purposes of the SDP statute when the Commonwealth filed its SDP petition. View "Gangi v. Mass. Parole Bd." on Justia Law

Defendant was classified as a level two sex offender and was required to register as a sex offender. Defendant later pleaded guilty to failing to provide notice of a change of address. The district court sentenced him to six months of supervised probation and community parole supervision for life (CPSL). Defendant subsequently filed a motion to correct his sentence, claiming that the sentence was unconstitutional. Specifically, Defendant argued that CPSL violated the separation of powers doctrine by improperly delegating to the parole board the exercise of the judicial power to impose sentences. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Defendant and vacated his sentence, holding that CPSL violates article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights by granting to the parole board, an entity of the executive branch, a quintessential judicial power, the power to determine whether a defendant should be sentenced to additional terms of imprisonment. View "Commonwealth v. Cole" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were retired public employees who received a retirement allowances from the Massachusetts Teachers’ Retirement System (MTRS) and the Plymouth County Retirement System pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32. Plaintiffs filed an action against the Town of Middleborough, arguing that the board of selectmen did not have the authority to raise the health maintenance organization (HMO) premium contribution percentage for retired public employees from ten percent to twenty percent. The trial judge allowed Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32B, 16, the town’s board of selectmen has the authority to establish the percentage of the total monthly premium for HMO coverage that is to be paid by the town’s retired employees. View "Twomey v. Town of Middleborough" on Justia Law

New England Forestry Foundation, Inc. (NEFF) was a nonprofit corporation organized under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 180 and the record owner of a parcel of forest land in the town of Hawley. The Board of Assessors for Hawley denied NEFF’s application for a charitable tax exemption on the parcel. The Appellate Tax Board (Board) also denied the application on the grounds that NEFF did not show that it occupied the land for a charitable purpose within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 59, 5, Third (Clause Third). The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the Board’s opinion, holding that the Board erred in concluding that NEFF did not meet its burden to show that it occupied the property within the meaning of Clause Third. View "New England Forestry Found., Inc. v. Bd. of Assessors of Hawley" on Justia Law

The Department of Public Utilities imposed on Petitioners, electric companies, monetary assessments for the Storm Trust Fund (“assessment”) pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 25, 12P, 18, which specifically prohibited Petitioners from seeking recovery of the assessment in any rate proceeding. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the recovery prohibition, both as required by the statute and impose by the Department’s order, claiming it was an unconstitutional taking. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Department’s order, holding (1) the mere obligation to pay the assessment, regardless of whether recovery was permitted or precluded, did not rise to the level of a compensable per se taking; (2) Petitioner’s claim that the assessment constituted a taking by way of a confiscatory rate was inadequate on the facts as presented to the Court; and (3) the Department’s order imposing the assessment and articulating the recovery prohibition did not constitute a regulatory taking because the order simply required Petitioners to pay an assessment that served a legitimate public purpose and did not interfere with Petitioners’ overall property rights. View "Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils." on Justia Law

In 2000, John Buonomo retired from his position as a Somerville alderman and began receiving pension benefits from the retirement board of Somerville (“Board”). Buonomo was subsequently elected register of probate of Middlesex County. In 2009, Buonomo was convicted of several offenses, including breaking into a depository and embezzlement by a public officer, which crimes were committed while Buonomo was register of probate. In light of Buonomo’s criminal convictions, the Board voted to forfeit Buonomo’s pension under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 15. The district court reversed the Board’s decision, determining that because the crimes for which Buonomo was convicted did not arise from his work as a Somerville alderman, for which he was receiving the retirement allowance, the Board lacked a basis for revoking Buonomo’s pension. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) there is no requirement in section 15 that the public office to which a board of alderman for the city of Somerville member’s criminal convictions relate be the same as the public office from which that member is receiving a retirement allowance; and (2) because Buonomo violated the laws applicable to a position of public trust, Buonomo forfeited his entitlement to a retirement allowance from the Board. View "Ret. Bd. of Somerville v. Buonomo " on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the town of Hanover, filed suit against Defendant, the New England Regional Council of Carpenters, alleging that Defendant engaged in abuse of process in prior legal proceedings by maintaining the litigation, providing legal counsel, and controlling the plaintiffs’ interests, despite not being named a plaintiff in the suit. Defendant filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to the “anti-SLAPP” statute, asserting that the town’s claims against it were solely based on Defendant’s constitutionally protected right to petition. The superior court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that Defendant did not have standing to bring its motion under the anti-SLAPP statute. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant showed that the suit against it was based on protected petitioning activity; (2) the town did not meet its burden of showing that Defendant’s exercise of its right to petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law; and (3) therefore, Defendant’s special motion to dismiss should be allowed. View "Town of Hanover v. New England Reg'l Council of Carpenters" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the owner of two adjacent unimproved lots in the town of Scituate. The lots were located in a flood plain and watershed protection district (FPWP district). Plaintiff applied for special permits from the Town’s planning board to construct residential dwellings on the lots. The Board denied the applications, concluding that Plaintiff had not demonstrated that her lots were not “subject to flooding” within the meaning of the applicable zoning bylaw. A land court judge affirmed the Board’s decision. The appeals court reversed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the appeals court adopted an incorrect definition of the phrase “subject to flooding,” and the land court judge adopted the correct meaning of the phrase. View "Doherty v. Planning Bd. of Scituate" on Justia Law

Petitioners owned thirty-six acres of land in Hampden. The Division of Fisheries and Wildlife (Division), a unit of the Department of Environmental Protection, restricted Petitioners’ ability to construct a home on their land by delineating the property as a “priority habitat” for the eastern box turtle, a “species of special concern” under 321 Mass. Code Regs. 10.90. Petitioners challenged the validity of the priority habitat regulations insofar as they allowed the Division to designate priority habitat without affording landowners the procedural protections due under the Massachusetts Endangered Species Act (MESA) to those owning property within significant habitats. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of the Division, concluding that the regulations did not exceed the scope of the Division’s authority as granted by MESA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the priority habitat regulations were a reasonable implementation of the enabling statute. View "Pepin v. Div. of Fisheries & Wildlife" on Justia Law

The Attorney General issued four citations to Plaintiffs for failing to pay the prevailing wage to certain employees. Plaintiffs appealed the citations to the Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA) under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 27C(b)(4). Kimberly Fletcher, a DALA administrative magistrate, heard Plaintiffs’ appeal but resigned before DALA issued a decision on the appeal. Shelly Taylor, the chief administrative magistrate of DALA, subsequently reviewed Fletcher’s proposed decision and took over responsibility for deciding the appeal. The DALA then issued a decision on Plaintiffs’ appeal, which affirmed the fourth citation and vacated the first three. Fletcher’s and Taylor’s rationales for vacation differed, however. The superior court affirmed the DALA decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court was correct in affirming the fourth citation; (2) the DALA chief administrative magistrate has the authority to review and approve a hearing officer’s decision in a section 27C(b)(4) appeal before a final opinion issues; and (3) under these circumstances, Taylor’s actions in completing the section 27C(b)(4) hearing and administrative decision process were appropriate. View "Lighthouse Masonry, Inc. v. Div. of Admin. Law Appeals" on Justia Law